2ac at: nukespeak
Only effective discursive stewardship and technological power prevents the rogue usage of nuclear weapons – this turns and outweighs the K and proves the permutation is possible and desirable.
Futterman 94. J.A.H. Futterman, Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin and Physicist at the University of California’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Obscenity and Peace: Meditations on the Bomb,” http://web.archive.org/web/20060106211941/http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html
Now this contrasts with the argument of those who would "reinvent government" by putting up bureaucratic roadblocks to maintaining the reliability of the US nuclear arsenal through research and testing. They reason that if the reliability of everyone's nuclear arsenals declines, everyone will be less likely to try using them. The problem is that some "adventurer-conqueror" may arise and use everyone's doubt about their arsenals to risk massive conventional war instead. An expansionist dictatorship might even risk nuclear war with weapons that are simpler, cruder, less powerful, much riskier (in terms of the possibility of accidental detonation) but much more reliable than our own may eventually become without adequate "stockpile stewardship."[14] But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [15] "History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm. It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only catastrophe, it seems, forces people to take the wider view. Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war? Certainly, the moment we become blasé about the possibility of holocaust we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war." Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technologies, unless genuine peace precludes it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons — a fact we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death — thus, the fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs.[16]
Their criticism of nukespeak fails – its nostalgia for a utopian world beyond language with authentic relationships to nuclear weapons merely feeds the fantasy of nuclear control they claim to resolve. Instead, a subtle struggle over the power of the meaning of nuclear weapons through our Foucaultien approach solves better.
Chaloupka 92. William Chaloupka, professor of political science at Colorado State University, Knowing Nukes: The Politics and Culture of the Atom, University of Minnesota Press, 1992, 20-23
From the nuclear critic's perspective, nuclear opponents unnecessarily constrain themselves when they adopt a first political assumption that is misleading and has not been subjected to the same reflection reserved for the other terms of the debate. The claim that nukes are "unspeakable" appears as an intolerable oppression, a paternalistic admonition to "be quiet" that outdistances (and silences) all such preceding calls. In carry- ing as well the injunction that we not speak about that which can only be spoken, this presumption deepens the paradoxes of nukes. There must be a reason we "cannot speak," and there is. To speak is to reveal a paradox nuclear politics must repress. We can begin to see the awkward, reversed influence of this repression when we consider the one activity by which nuclear opponents have been attentive to language—their focus on interpretations of "nukespeak."53 Nukespeak actually stands for a simple critique of euphemism; the problem is that this simplicity leads away from the rest of the critique offered by opponents —it is inverted. The nukespeak argument imagines a world, just before this one, which had no technocratic euphemisms and no evasive verbs and nouns. Somehow, this was a world without language games, without genres of political speech, where words "meant" some- thing explicit. That world —presumably the one that Einstein argued the nuke inalterably changed —sits invitingly just outside our grasp, recover- able if only we would resolutely call things by their real names. The nukespeak argument conforms to Baudrillard's "nostalgia for the real." There can be no reconstructive politics based on eradicating euphemism. The artifacts and practices of nuclearism have no honest, real meanings. There is no straightforward name for a protective reaction strike. To call it a bombing run trivializes it. To call it genocide (or eco- cide) conflates it with phenomena —such as the Holocaust —that we would rather keep separate, for good reasons. And so on. The activities of nuclearism are encased in a context so thoroughly bound to its discourse —technologized, simulated, and then turned into spectacle — that any attempt to speak simple truth could only be another part of the simulation. This is where nuclear criticism draws the line between itself and the liberal critics of modern society, from Orwell on to the present. Either Einstein was right and the world was irretrievably changed, or he was wrong and it can be returned to a prior condition of innocence, where things had "real" names. While the nukespeak argument suggests that these things are nameable, the nuclear critic responds that the nuke has already been actively reshaping situations. Indeed, that insight on the activism of nukespeak has been available for some time now. It was Marcuse who showed how contemporary nuclear discourse is not simple misleading, but is a manip- ulation that has its own syntax and grammar. Nuclear criticism might disagree with Marcuse's (and, later and more explicitly, Habermas's) pre- sumption that a clearer language game would be closer to truth. Still, we can note that Marcuse identified the discursive component of nuclear- ism's authority. The forms Marcuse finds all share a pattern, constructing an inverted universe in which absurdity and danger serve security and trust. In one important example, Marcuse deconstructs Edward Teller's oft- repeated, unofficial title, "the father of the H-Bomb," showing how this highly improbable combination is powerfully useful for discipline: Terms designating quite different spheres or qualities are forced together into a solid, overpowering whole. The effect is ... a magical and hypnotic one —the projection of images which convey irresistible unity, harmony of contradictions. Thus the loved and feared Father, the spender of life, generates the H-bomb for the annihilation of life.54 The cleverness (or, for Marcuse, the cunning) of such formulations belies the hope that clarity could solve matters. The simplest nukespeak commentaries ask the wrong question when they argue that matters would be more obvious if terminology were less euphemistic. At a certain point—in Utopian remove from the realm of knowledge and power —that would be the case. But the better question is slightly different. We could ask, What sort of an authoritative logic would behave this way? Founding strength on deterrence, then announcing the unspeakability of its topic, then pro- ducing a discourse that flaunts contradiction and turns it into unity and safety, nukespeak is more than euphemism. It turns ecstatic. An oppositional politics, fully capable of problematizing this (hyper-) exuberant nuclearism, is possible on bases other than such suspect cate- gories as euphemism, survival, unspeakability, and numbing. Through- out this book, I am trying to reposition antinuclearism within such a defensible political practice. At the very least, this implies an intellectual project; to paraphrase Foucault, there is a struggle over issues of knowledge, set off by nuclear criticism. The political mood of the language-and-politics position is well framed by nuclear criticism. More precisely, a political mood could yet form, one that would contrast sharply with an existing nuclear opposition that, in the United States, has adopted a paradoxical structure, as if driven to mirror the paradoxes of nukes themselves. Antinuke talk has been ponderous —so responsible and serious that it just obviously defeats itself, and must invent the defense that "people really don't like to talk about nuclear war very much." Paradoxically, opponents then test that humorlessness by asking citizens to become independent entrepreneurs of risk, weighing the likelihood and amplitude of possible disasters. It should not be surprising that such a politics works only intermittently, if at all.