Even if the center’s inexpensive, enforcement isn’t.
DHS 21, Department of homeland security, “Combatting Targeted Disinformation Campaigns,” https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/phase_ii_-_combatting_targeted_disinformation.pdf, cy
An alternative to naming specific domestic threat actors is to alert information consumers to those threat actors who assume fake persona or claim to have credentials which they do not have. The status of the threat actor plays an important role in influencing the perceived trustworthiness of that threat actor.20 Someone who claims to be an epidemiologist will likely be viewed as more reliable on the topic of coronaviruses than a person who claims to be a bus driver.
Information consumers who assume fake personas or claim fake credentials to deceive others for illegitimate purposes have no moral or legal standing for protection for their fraud, which is a form of disinformation. Revealing that credentials are fake can be accomplished without identifying the threat actor by name or by other information which can be tied to a specific person.
Threat actors who spread disinformation often seem to act with impunity, facing few negative consequences for the harm that they cause. In some circles, their disinformation may enhance their status and generate lucrative opportunities for them due to the attention that they draw. Legal actions against threat actors are available, but limited in number, and invariably costly and time-consuming. In a deeply divided society, shunning and ostracism no longer have the practical import they may have had in earlier generations. The lack of perceived consequences encourages threat actors to continue their activities. We acknowledge the challenges in today’s environment and believe that punitive measures are less effective than measures which provide information about the threat actors upon which information consumers can make better informed decisions.