The DoS solves---old agencies for countering disinformation were reorganized and placed in the jurisdiction of the DoS and multiple empirics prove.
USACPD 20, United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, tasked by Congress with "appraising U.S. Government activities intended to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics and to increase the understanding of, and support for, these same activities.” “PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE NEW “OLD” WAR: COUNTERING STATE-SPONSORED DISINFORMATION” https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Public-Diplomacy-and-the-New-Old-War-Countering-State-Sponsored-Disinformation.pdf //lenox
As we gathered background information for this report, we noticed a pattern: experts and practitioners alike became quick to turn to the past for cues on how to proceed in the future. In fact, the discussion of the historical framework of disinformation as a threat area revealed a common understanding that the challenge of disinformation is “not new.” Several of our interlocutors spoke reverently of the tools of the Cold War and cited the merits of the United States Information Agency (USIA), Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and, most notably, the Active Measures Working Group (AMWG) as successful instruments of PD in countering disinformation.2 However, these experts agreed that they might be over-emphasizing the similarities between the disinformation threat then and now, while perhaps unintentionally underestimating the differences. Much of the apparatus that supported Cold War-era counter disinformation efforts still exists today, albeit in a somewhat disaggregated form. In 1999, USIA closed down as an independent foreign affairs agency. Its information, cultural, and exchange components were integrated into the Department of State as, respectively, the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA). Meanwhile, oversight of USIA's regional programs was turned over to the State Department’s geographic bureaus. USIA’s broadcasting components became part of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG–now the U.S. Agency for Global Media, or USAGM). The AMWG was formally disbanded in 1992 with no heir apparent; and at the BBG, the establishment of an independent board of directors removed direct USG editorial oversight and created a firewall between Congress and the independent journalism operations within the VOA and RFE/RL. In addition to the structural changes that have occurred since the integration of USIA functions into the Department of State, the rapid convergence of connection technologies -- the internet, mobile and social networks -- have fundamentally altered the domain in which information competition occurs. About half of the world’s population has access to one another via the combination of internet and social media access and mobile phones, which allow for disintermediated peer-to-peer communication at scale. The global information space is marked by a constant fight for attention, and viewership is determined by complex interactions among algorithms, professional media outlets, corporate brands, and user generated content via apps on mobile devices. As a consequence, modern public diplomacy practitioners find themselves in an environment that offers an overabundance of information—what Joseph Nye presciently described as a “paradox of plenty” that leads to a “scarcity of attention.”3 This shift has irrevocably changed the information environment in which PD officers operate, and it gives an asymmetric advantage to those who would attempt to alter, obscure, or destroy the very concept of objective truth. Initial efforts to meet the most recent iteration of these challenges began in the 2010s, during a period of what some have described as U.S. government “overexuberance” about the ability of emerging social media technologies to advance democratic values. By the time the Arab Spring began to unfold in 2011, new policies were established that encouraged State Department officials to establish online profiles and pages with the intent to amplify public affairs messaging through these increasingly influential mediums. However, constrained by bureaucratic inertia and, perhaps, overconfident that “traditional” public diplomacy measures transposed to the online space (i.e., press releases, photos from speaking events and conferences, etc.) would have the intended effect, innovation on USG social media platforms largely stopped there. While these official Department social media accounts now number in the hundreds, most PD officials agree that for a number of reasons, including but not limited to the risk aversion that arises from engaging in an often-frenetic online environment, the overall impact remained relatively muted. With the intensification of Russian disinformation efforts following Ukraine’s “revolution of dignity” and the subsequent annexation of Crimea in 2014, it became increasingly clear that the social media space had become, in effect, the front line in a new global competition for influence. Shortly thereafter, the threat of disinformation expanded far beyond the borders of Eastern Europe to become the subject of intense focus from Washington, D.C. to the Silicon Valley. The 2017 National Security Strategy included a section on Information Statecraft warning about the exploitation of “marketing techniques.”4 Meanwhile, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg described efforts to combat disinformation on his platform as an “arms race,”5 and Apple CEO Tim Cook warned that personal data was being “weaponized against us with military efficiency.”6 To paraphrase Peter W. Singer, whose 2019 book LikeWar7 explored this phenomenon in depth, tech executives were starting to sound more like national security experts, and national security experts were starting to sound more like tech executives. Recognizing a Resurgent State-Sponsored Disinformation Threat: 2016-2017 In the early stages of Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s integrity in the global information space, the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR) developed a nascent set of counter-disinformation tactics. But formal and far reaching alterations to PD CSD infrastructure originated with the passage of the May 2016 Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act, which became a part of the 2017 NDAA. The first legislation tasking an official lead in government-wide counter disinformation efforts since the Cold War, the NDAA signaled that the USG once again recognized disinformation as a high-priority threat that warranted immediate action. The State Department’s GEC, established by Executive Order in March 2016, became the prime vehicle for CSD. It was originally envisioned as a mechanism to counter violent extremist (CVE) messaging and “foreign propaganda and disinformation” operations.