The AFF presents the paradox of liberal security---hybrid warfare is not an anomaly but rather the true nature of war, making the AFF a product of endless securitization and turning cooperation. The alternative is an interrogation of war, laying bare the indistinguishability of politics and warfare.
Maria Malksoo 18, Researcher at the International Centre for Defence Studies, Tallinn, Estonia and a Lecturer at the Institute of Government and Politics, University of Tartu, Estonia. Her main research interests include critical security studies, political anthropology and European memory politics. “Countering Hybrid Warfare as Ontological Security Management: The Emerging Practices of the EU and NATO” European Security 27(3), pp. 374-392 https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2018.1497984 //lenox
NATO “Hybrid warfare” has emerged as yet another “resilience test” (Stoltenberg 2015a) for the Alliance in its post-Cold War existential search for a new purpose and mission. Moreover, the hybrid insecurity predicament enables the allies to bring together the renewed focus on NATO’s traditional mission (i.e. endorsing collective defence in order to counter the main geopolitical contestant of the North Atlantic Alliance in Europe) and the Alliance’s post-Cold War out-of-area military expeditions. While “tak[ing] on two different forms of strategic challenges simultaneously” – that is, “the Russian hybrid warfare approach” and that of “other non-state actors like ISIS to the south” – remains NATO’s “greatest challenge”, the common idea behind these “hybrid strategies” endorses the relevance of “a comprehensive approach across the DIMEFIL spectrum” (i.e. diplomatic/political, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, legal) for NATO (Breedlove 2015, p. xxv; cf. Bell 2012, pp. 225-226). The “beauty of the hybrid warfare concept” is accordingly seen to lie in its ability to “provide[] tools for a comparative strategic perspective of NATO’s southern and eastern flanks, while allowing for a differentiated response” (Johnson 2015, p. 276). NATO’s motto in the face of these twofold challenges is called to be “adopt, adapt, adept”: the new strategies adopted to deal with the hybrid threats to NATO’s East and South need to be accompanied by NATO’s adaptation of “its structure and readiness to become adept at handling the new challenges it faces” (Calha 2015, p. 9). Countering hybrid threats posed by Russia and the Islamic radicals threatening the territories, populations, interests, and values of the Alliance thus enables NATO to endorse its continuing relevance by constructing a strong narrative and maintaining its OS as the core security guarantor for its members (cf. Flockhart 2012, pp. 78-79). The softer, partnership geared, or so-called “Jane” narrative of the early-post Cold War NATO is clearly giving way 23 to a more familiar, hard security-focused “Tarzan” self-vision and public representation (see further Flockhart 2011). Calling the kettle black is the least of NATO’s worries: Russia’s use of “proxy soldiers, unmarked Special Forces, intimidation and propaganda, all to lay a thick fog of confusion; to obscure its true purpose in Ukraine; and to attempt deniability” is explicitly dissected in outlining NATO’s emerging counter-strategy to hybrid engagements of the sort (Stoltenberg 2015a). Yet, just the traditional set of NATO’s capabilities is clearly deemed to be insufficient in the face of, inter alia, “sophisticated disinformation and radicalization campaigns” (Stoltenberg 2015b), this more forceful and traditional antagonist-driven agenda reflects NATO’s long-pursued comprehensive approach – that is, “a combination of military and non-military means to stabilize countries” (that others use to “destabilize”) (Stoltenberg 2015a). “Hybrid” is accordingly coined as “the dark reflection” of NATO’s comprehensive approach, and accordingly, early warning and situation awareness, good governance and the resilience of societies become equally essential parts of deterrence and defence against hybrid threats (Stoltenberg 2015a). This necessitates “renewed attention to strategic communications” and public outreach and education “to build up public awareness and resilience” and “strengthen the role of an informed civil society in every member state” (Calha 2015, p. 10).13 NATO declared its readiness to address the specific challenges posed by “hybrid warfare threats” in the Wales Summit Declaration of 5 September 2014 as a forceful response to the conflict in Ukraine. While NATO’s traditional toolbox of collective defence is hardly perfectly geared for “insidious and ambiguous threats” (Johnson 2015, p. 270; Calha 2015, p. 4), countering hybrid warfare emerges as a continuing relevance and resilience test for the Alliance. NATO’s institutional responses to “hybrid threats” have been further detailed in its Readiness Action Plan, a roadmap for building capability packages, a comprehensive concept for creating an enhanced NATO response force, in a classified strategy for hybrid warfare and a cyber security action plan. Altogether, the ambiguity and gradient nature of hybrid tactics directly challenge the ontological underpinnings of NATO’s core mission and strength as hybrid activities might “progress incrementally towards a threatening situation while remaining under NATO’s Article 5 threshold” (Calha 2015, p. 4). The detection and definition of a threat hence becomes significantly less straightforward, pointing at the need to renegotiate the scope and substance of NATO’s collective defence clause (i.e. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty) in light of the contemporary hybrid engagements. Conclusion This article has brought the notion of OS to bear on the thus far heavily policy-oriented hybrid warfare literature. As hybrid threats epitomize ontological insecurity, NATO and the EU’s synergistic discourse and emerging practice on countering the hybrid menace emerges as an attempt at the institutionalization of their organizational OS-seeking. Tackling the hybrid challenges of the day in apparent unison further provides NATO and the EU a silver lining of a tightened cooperation between the two organizations. Further research could map the complex interactions between the OS-seeking strategies of these distinct intergovernmental institutions and their member states/societies with regard to countering hybrid warfare. It would be interesting to investigate, for example, how the traditional lines of division within the European community along the more Russia-friendly and Russia-wary countries might tap into the institutional dynamics of hybrid threat management of the EU and NATO. Moreover, the newly established special sub-institutions to confront hybrid threats within the EU along with the organizationally unaffiliated Centre of Excellence could themselves develop their own 25 identities, OS drives and placating routines, potentially generating organizational fragmentation and inter-agency tensions instead of bolstering the OS of the Union as a whole (cf. Steele 2017). With regard to the ethical drawbacks of effective hybrid threat management, such endeavour points at the problematic prospect of compromising the already fuzzy distinction between politics and war – as according to the hybrid warfare paradigm, all politics becomes reduced to the potential build-up phase for a full-blown confrontation. In that sense, hybrid warfare is close to the criteria of “minimal wars, which consist in merely threatening the enemy with negotiations held in reserve” (Clausewitz 1976, 604, emphasis in the original). The alleged “minimality” of such a way of warfare nonetheless has considerable potential to induce broad and deep securitisation of various public policy processes in the Western societies and their supranational organizations in question. Hybrid warfare and the emerging institutionalization of its countering practices highlight the paradox of defending democratic security communities, as the efficacy of such defence might in fact be detrimental to some of the core organising principles of democracy. An alternative approach would be to argue that hybrid warfare, and the countering practices it is generating, have simply brought the nature of the modern power out into the open. As Foucault maintains in his Society Must Be Defended, liberal “civil peace” must be understood as a secret form of war, for “war is the principle and motor of the exercise of political power” in general (Foucault 2003, p. 18). Viewed from such a perspective, hybrid warfare and its emerging management practices by the EU and NATO enable us to see what politics is allegedly all about anyway – “the continuation of war by other means” (Foucault 2003, p. 15). For the EU and NATO, hybrid warfare embodies not just the unsettling of the politics/war distinction but raises the fundamental question about the practical distinguishability of their physical and ontological security in the first place.