Disinformation is a confirmation bias—research proves the amount of fake news is incredible tiny
Matthew Ingram 2019, He is CJR’s chief digital writer. Previously, he was a senior writer with Fortune magazine. He has written about the intersection between media and technology since the earliest days of the commercial internet. His writing has been published in the Washington Post and the Financial Times as well as by Reuters and Bloomberg., Febuary 2019, “Researchers say fears about ‘fake news’ are exaggerated”, https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/researchers-fake-news-exaggerated.php // SK
IT’S SO WIDELY ACCEPTED that it’s verging on conventional wisdom: misinformation, or “fake news,” spread primarily by Facebook to hundreds of millions of people (and created by Russian agents), helped distort the political landscape before and during the 2016 US presidential election, and this resulted in Donald Trump becoming president. But is it really that cut and dried? Not according to Brendan Nyhan, a political scientist and professor of public policy at the University of Michigan. He and several colleagues have been researching this question since the election, and have come to a very different conclusion. Fears about the spread and influence of fake news have been over-hyped, Nyhan says, and many of the initial conclusions about the scope of the problem and its effect on US politics were exaggerated or just plain wrong.
Nyhan says his data shows so-called “fake news” reached only a tiny proportion of the population before and during the 2016 election. In most cases, misinformation from a range of fake news sites made up just 2 percent or less of the average person’s online news consumption, and even among the group of older conservatives who were most likely to consume fake news, it only made up about 8 percent. Not only that, but the University of Michigan researcher says a new paper he and his colleagues recently published shows the reach of fake news actually fell significantly between the 2016 election and the midterm elections last year, which suggests Facebook has cracked down on the problem. Nyhan also says “no credible evidence exists that exposure to fake news changed the outcome of the 2016 election.”
This might come as a surprise to Kathleen Hall Jamieson. She’s a veteran public policy researcher who published a book last year entitled Cyberwar: How Russian Hackers and Trolls Helped Elect a President. Jamieson, whose colleagues call her “the Drill Sergeant” for her no-nonsense attitude, has more 40 years of studying human behavior under her belt. In the book, she says the evidence suggests misinformation propagated by Russian trolls likely influenced the outcome of the election, in part because of the number of “swing” or undecided voters who were susceptible to those kinds of tactics. Jamieson also notes that the traditional news media played a key role in spreading this fake news and propaganda, by writing innumerable articles about Hillary Clinton’s emails. And she argues fake news wouldn’t have had to make much of an impact to influence the election, since a fairly small number of votes gave Trump the electoral college wins he needed.
Nyhan and his fellow researchers, however, including Princeton political scientist Andrew Guess, say their study looked at the actual behavior of a large sample of users who consented to have their online activity tracked and recorded in real time, and then followed up with interviews about their perceptions of the content. Not only was the amount of actual fake news they encountered incredibly tiny, Guess told CJR this past fall, but the idea that this would influence their behavior is also a bit of a stretch (something Nyhan wrote about for The New York Times last year). “It’s predominantly people who are inclined to believe the conclusions that are being made in this content, not so much swaying them to believe something,” Guess said. “In other words, it’s more or less just confirmation bias.”
So why has this myth of fake news swinging the election persisted despite a lack of evidence to support it? Nyhan’s theory is that it’s a little like the myth that Orson Welles’s radio play “War of the Worlds” caused widespread panic among the US population when it was aired in 1938. The play was likely only heard by a tiny number of people, and there’s no actual evidence that it caused any kind of panic, and yet the myth persists—in part because newspapers at the time played up the idea, as a way of discrediting radio (a relatively new competitor) as a source of news. In the same way, Nyhan argues, concerns about fake news being spread by Russian agents on Facebook are fueled by broader concerns about the influence of social networks on society.