Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

The AFF fails and cohesion is impossible---NATO is uncoordinated and says no, the research center empirically isn’t enough, and any military strategies are pipe dreams.

Rod Thornton 15, Senior Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department of King's College London. He previously taught at the University of Kurdistan Hewler in Erbil, Iraq and in the University of Nottingham's department of Politics and International Relations. “The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare”, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047 //lenox

Russia has shown it can occupy whole slices of another state’s territory using no more than information warfare, deniability and a few highly disciplined special forces. The Russian military, supported by a substantial information warfare infrastructure, has employed the tenets of hybrid warfare remarkably skillfully. Such activities have, of course, to be countered by NATO and the EU to ensure Moscow cannot use these tactics so easily in future. As NATO STRATCOM COE puts it, ‘analysis of the Ukraine conflict suggests that NATO and the EU must adapt to the new reality where information superiority, as opposed to military power, is becoming increasingly important’. 70 If today ‘the main battlespace is in the mind’, it must be considered how Western powers and institutions engage in this arena. The first option, censorship of the Russian media message, is widely dismissed across the EU and in the US. As John Whittingdale, the UK’s current secretary of state for culture, media and sport, stressed in 2014: ‘There is nothing Russia would like more than to be able to say the West is censoring [it]’. 71 The second alternative would be for Western powers, through NATO, to employ their own counter-information warfare campaigns to match those of Russia. However, this would be futile, not least because NATO’s members are, for the most part, liberal democracies whose governments are expected to remain wedded to the truth in the information they provide to both domestic and international audiences. Moreover, they have a free media acting as the fourth estate to ensure that the truth is told. When it comes to conducting information-warfare campaigns, this predilection for the truth can be something of a handicap, allowing for the projection of only one narrative amid the welter of counter-narratives produced by Russian outlets. Furthermore, Western efforts to promote this singular message have been underwhelming. As the UK parliamentary Defence Committee was recently told, ‘although the BBC Russian Service was available, it was only online and was in no way a counterweight to the propaganda channelled through Russian Television’. 72 One outlet tucked away on a website is no answer to a Russian information-warfare ‘blitzkrieg’. There is similar reluctance, for instance, in Washington, to use the Voice of America radio station in an ‘overtly propagandistic role’. Meanwhile, in the Baltic States the attempts to counter Moscow’s ‘information war’ are seen as ‘uncoordinated and weak’. 73 The basic problem across the board is that liberal democracies have an inherent distaste for producing anything at the strategic level that resembles propaganda or could be classed as psychological warfare.74 In fact, one of the reasons that the Russians concentrate so much on their information-warfare output is that they know it cannot be countered effectively; indeed, they have shown a ‘readiness to stoop to methods the West cannot emulate without sullying itself’.75 As Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss point out, the Russians are thinking asymmetrically: ‘Feeling itself relatively weak, the Kremlin has systematically learnt to use the principles of liberal democracies against them’.76 This asymmetry in willingness and abilities does not, however, mean that no action has been taken by Western powers. In January 2014, NATO set up a Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga as a direct consequence of the Russian information-warfare campaign in an attempt to counter Russia’s significant advantage in this realm. Yet even this body recognises that it is difficult for the West with its free media ‘to compete with the forceful, synchronised messaging of the Russian government’. 77 For its part, the EU is discussing sponsoring its own Russian-language channel as ‘The truth is the best weapon the EU has’. 78 However, doubts remain as to how much impact a single channel can have; indeed, this channel ‘needs to find a way to counter Moscow’s grip on the Russian-language airwaves or its target audience will never hear [the truth]’. 79 Furthermore, it will always be difficult for any collective of states – whether NATO or the EU – to agree on the nature and content of information campaigns, not least due to disagreement over what exactly the ‘truth’ is and how best to present it. As one Estonian military officer concerned with NATO’s information operations put it, ‘if we want to counter Russian propaganda…we have to unite our lines and speak with the same voice’.80 However, there is no such unity in these international organisations and thus the idea of NATO producing its own ‘synchronised messaging’ remains a pipe-dream. Therefore what collectives such as NATO will always lack is what makes Moscow’s information assault so effective: a truly integrated approach. The major threat to Western interests anywhere in the world is not terrorism, it is the threat posed by information warfare such as that recently conducted by Russia. It has achieved clear results and this success can be repeated. As NATO finds it almost impossible to react effectively in a symmetrical fashion to this threat, it has felt the need to resort to more traditional means. Yet the responses seen so far are redolent of ‘Maginot Line thinking’–in other words, these are responses that are better suited to the ‘last war’. Unlike the Russian military, NATO is still putting the use of military force ahead of information warfare because – as an institution–it knows no other way of reacting. The US and the UK have, for instance, decided to send a small number of (non-combat) troops to Ukraine.81 This, though, is a naive move that does no more than play into the Kremlin’s hands. The message that Moscow can now send out to those who would support its actions is that while Russia is not sending any of its own troops over the border into Ukraine (officially, at least), the US and UK are doing so – and from thousands of miles away. Under such circumstances, it raises questions as to who the aggressor really is. It is an easy sell for the information-warfare-savvy Russians. There is talk, too, of NATO responding both by beefing up the rapid reaction forces currently on standby to be sent to the Baltic States and by holding more exercises there.82 This, though, raisesthe question of to what exactly they are supposed to ‘react’. Russian troops, while they might one day mass near the Baltics to apply psychological pressure, are unlikely to cross any borders, at least not overtly. Indeed, Russia’s ‘new generation of warfare’ is specifically designed to achieve results without the need for any such crass action that might, in turn, provide an excuse for NATO (or others) to interfere–thereby paralysing both the target country and those that might come to its defence. Moreover, one aim of the Russian information warfare campaign has always been to ‘sow discord’ within NATO. 83 ‘Russia’, as the former head of Polish special forces, Roman Polko, says, ‘is mercilessly using NATO’s weaknesses in order to play its own game’. 84 Of prime importance to Russia is to prevent the invocation of Article V by avoiding the trigger for ‘an armed attack’ on any one NATO state.85 This weakness of Article V has been recognised – with the UK parliamentary Defence Committee one voice among many calling for the word ‘armed’ to be removed:86 NATO must resolve the contradiction between the specification in Article 5 that a response should be to an ‘armed attack’ and the likelihood on the other hand of an ‘unarmed attack’ (such as a cyber attack or another form of ambiguous warfare). NATO must consider whether the adjective ‘armed’ should be removed from the definition of an Article 5 attack. Most NATO states are, however, unlikely to agree to this – again showing the weakness of a multinational body. They will not want to engage militarily with Russia just because one of their number might be subject to a (plausibly deniable) ‘form of ambiguous warfare’, however disruptive. Thus, such debate over rapid reaction forces and Article V merely facilitates Moscow’s information-warfare campaign. It should be remembered that NATO’s offer of military assistance to the Baltic States is also an offer to fight a war–a very destructive one – on their territory. Such an offer may well have the effect of stoking fear among both Balts and compatriot Russians, once again providing potential grist to Moscow’s information-warfare mill.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.