Debating about Russia as an actor creates more critical thinking and solves interpersonal violence
Earle 86 [Professor of Psychology, The Ohio State University. International Relations and the Psychology of Control: Alternative Control Strategies and Their Consequences. Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Jun.,1986), pp. 369-375. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3791131.pdf]
Research into the psychology of control has revealed that control needs are key elements of individual psychological functioning. This paper argues that a “need for control’’ framework is also useful for understanding actions and ideologies at the national and international levels. It critically analyzes prevalent strategies for exerting control in this domain and proposes alternative strategies which permit greater fulfillment of control needs. These alternatives emerge from an examination of potential similarities between satisfaction of control needs within the separate but parallel domains of international relations and interpersonal relations.
Political psychology has the potential to translate issues of international relations into the terms of human interpersonal encounter. In my view, such a translation enhances our ability to think creatively about the current world situation.
The students in my freshman psychology course recently surprised me by adopting this approach for an in-class assignment. I had asked them to role-play a negotiating session between the United States and the Soviet Union on the issue of arms control. My assumption had been that they would act out the roles of political leaders on both sides, and would proceed by exchanging official positions on arms control issues. Instead, they took the viewpoint of ordinary Ameri-can and Soviet citizens and exchanged candid remarks concerning their feelings about the nuclear danger.
Their tone of earnest sincerity was in stark contrast to the kind of elaborate posturing, deceitfulness, and strategic “positioning” that usually characterizes this kind of endeavor at the diplomatic level. Having translated the arms race into its smallest constituent parts—the feelings of individual Soviet and American citizens—they had stripped away the layers of pretense and revealed the rigidly arbitrary nature of their country’s “party line.” After the role-play had ended, the students pressed me to admit that, if the political and military leaders on both sides were removed from the picture, much of the current conflict between the two countries could be settled by a consensus of common citizens from both sides.
It only occurred to me later that, regardless of the practicality of their solution, my class had arrived at it by a highly unusual means: They had asserted that the problems were amenable to human control by acknowledging their own individual human reactions to the dangers of continued international confrontation. I choose to focus here not on the solution my students proposed but on the impulse behind their proposal. The need expressed by these students to render these issues “controllable” in some fashion is a basic one. Perhaps an examination of this need, and the more vs. less healthy ways it can be satisfied, holds the key to a novel approach to international relations.
The concept of a “need for control” has recently received much attention within the field of psychology. The belief that one can exercise control over one’s outcomes is said to be critical to psychological well-being (Glass and Singer, 1972; Langer, 1983; Seligman, 1975; Wortman and Brehm, 1975). Research has shown that the negative consequences of a stressful event on physical and mental health can be overcome by a sense of control—i.e., a belief in one’s ability to cope with (respond effectively to) the event (Anderson, 1982; Langer and Rodin, 1976; Perlmuter and Monty, 1979; Weiss, 1972). The accumulating body of research in this area has promising applications for the restoration and maintenance of psychological health in a wide range of human environmental settings.
To date, feelings of control have been studied as an attribute of individual psychological functioning. However, the recent work of Fred Rothbaum and John Weisz and their colleagues (Rothbaum et al., 1982; Weisz et al., 1984) suggests that a “need for control” analysis may also be useful for understanding the functioning of individual nations within the international arena. Rothbaum et al. distinguish between primary and secondary forms of control. Primary control is the ability to enhance one’s rewards by doing something to influence existing realities (e.g., other people, circumstances). In secondary control, rewards are obtained by accommodating to existing realities and maximizing satisfaction with things as they are.
In other words, people attempt to gain control not only by bringing the environment into line with their wishes (primary control) but also by bringing themselves into line with environmental forces (secondary control). Weisz et al. argue that cultures differ in the extent to which they emphasize primary vs. secondary forms of control. They conclude that the proper relation between the two forms of control involves a dynamic interplay between them, and warn that too heavy an emphasis on either primary or secondary control may be maladaptive for cultures as well as individuals.
Extending the logic of Weisz et al. to the realm of international relations, it can be assumed that citizens and policymakers alike define the requirements of national self-interest in somewhat the same terms they use to evaluate their own individual sense of well-being. For example, there is widespread agreement that a key element of a “healthy” American psyche is a sense of national potency (“primary control,” in our terms) in the international arena. Ronald Reagan’s Presidency has been lauded by both supporters and detractors for its “restoration” of this sense of control after the “humiliating” decade of the 1970s—a legacy of Vietnam, the oil embargo, and the Iranian hostage crisis (cf. Yankelovich, 1982). Whether or not such a felt sense of control (or lack of same) would be sustained by an objective appraisal, it is nonetheless real if it has real consequences for domestic political priorities and foreign policy actions.
Given the present context of international relations, is an enhanced sense of control by one nation purchased at the expense of diminished control by other nations? [The Weisz et al. analysis does not attempt to address this key issue.] Under what conditions can this zero-sum notion of control be overcome? If the attainment of a sense of control is indeed an important objective within the world community, then these questions are critical.
The answer may lie in exploring alternative strategies for attaining primary control. For example, the prevailing strategy requires nations to maximize their power vis a vis potential adversaries. Yet the sense of control thus attained is always tenuous, because (a) the technological basis for maintaining such relative power may be eclipsed by breakthroughs on the other side, (b) such technology is subject to dissemination to third parties, thus diluting the power of its former owners, and (c) power that involves the domination of one nation by another (either directly or through surrogates) is bound to be resisted by those subject peoples whose own needs for control have been thwarted. Numerous examples attest to the existence of these needs (under the guise of “nationalism” and “self-determination” or “revolution” and “rebellion”—depending on the orientation of the describer) as a continued source of frustration for the great powers in their attempts to maintain the stability of client states.
Faced with these difficulties of asserting primary control, both the United States and the Soviet Union have come to rely heavily on a form of secondary control that Weisz et al. refer to as interpretive control. This is the attempt to interpret events so as to derive a sense of meaning and purpose from them. In the current great power struggle, this assumes the form of rigidly ideological beliefs about the nature of the “other side’’ and the necessity of continued struggle. It allows individual persons and actions to be subsumed under a “grand scheme” of impersonal global forces (e.g., “good” vs. “evil”). The interpretive route to control works to the extent that it provides a reassuring sense of order and predictability. However, this unifying vision is purchased at the expense of an empirically based analysis of what the rest of the world is doing and why. Reality is distorted to fit the dichotomy of rightness (on one’s own behalf) vs. transgression.
The selective “management” of information about foreign policy successes vs. failures is essential to this enterprise [the U.S. invasion of Grenada provides a recent example; see e.g., Middleton (1984) and Nelson (1983)]. Unfortunately, such selective information-gathering seriously impairs foreign policy. Numerous authors have described occasions on which great powers have become the captives of their own over-simplified world views (e.g., Didion, 1983; Tuchman, 1984; Sick, 1985).
Extended use of this secondary control strategy requires a blurring of the distinction between international politics and fiction. The Soviet Union does not enjoy a monopoly in this regard. Within the last year, the Vietnam War veteran has been resurrected as an American hero, and American audiences have eagerly imbibed his cinematic revenge against the North Vietnamese in “Rambo,” “Missing in Action,” and their television counterparts.
A related phenomenon is the president’s identification with the on-screen personas of fellow actors Clint Eastwood and Sylvester Stallone, whose adherence to simplified credos belie the gnawing complexities of value choices in the real world. Such reactions are likely not unique to Americans or to their current president. Instead, they are symptomatic of the frustrations incurred by nations who have failed in their attempts to exert active control over world events.
The control needs themselves are legitimate; the strategies that are currently employed for satisfying those needs are not. Use of such measures guarantees that the cycle will repeat itself—i.e., that unrealistic thinking and erroneous judgment will serve as the basis for future foreign policy actions.
The question remains: If the nations of the world cannot afford continued reliance on such an ineffective (and unbalanced) “mix” of control strategies, what are the alternatives? As suggested above, the answer lies in exploring alternative conceptions of “control.” Rather than conceiving of control as a subject-object relationship, in which the “object” is a fixed quantity (of land, resources, subject populations) to be apportioned among contending powers, one could instead consider it in the context of a subject-subject relationship, a dy-namic system in which control needs are realized by the exercise of mutual influence.
An analogy between the realms of international relations and interpersonal relations may serve to illustrate this distinction. In a personal relationship that is subject-object-based, each party has a mutually exclusive sphere of self-interest (“turf”) to be protected; the relationship must be negotiated on the basis of how much turf each party will cede to the other in exchange for similar consideration. A failure of negotiation may lead to unilateral attempts by either/both parties to grab some of the other’s turf. “Compromise” and “confrontation” thus define the parameters of this type of relationship.
Alternatively, a personal relationship may be subject-subject-based, to the extent that the relationship is not primarily directed toward the issue of sharing vs. hoarding (of a separate domain of self-interest) but rather toward a redefinition of self and self-interest in terms of the relationship. Satisfaction in such a relationship is not derived from the amount of turf seized from, or conceded by, the other party. Instead it obtains from the opportunity to exert positive influence over the other’s outcomes, and in turn to be the beneficiary of the other’s positive consideration and favorable regard (cf. Kelley, 1979; Kelley and Thi-baut, 1978).