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France nuclear deterrent solves—Macron announced intention to create a European based nuclear deterrent

Benjamin Hautecouverture 2020, He is a Senior research fellow for arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament issues at the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique. He is the Technical Director of the EU Partner to Partner programme of the European Union for the implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), at Expertise France. He is also a founding member as well as a manager of the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium since 2010., September 2020, “President Macron on French Nuclear Deterrence”, https://www.cgai.ca/president_macron_on_french_nuclear_deterrence //skwon

Deterrence with a European Dimension, Arms Control and Disarmament

A much-anticipated part of last February’s speech was the role of French deterrence in the European context. Macron followed on his predecessors by taking a further step in opening up to European partners. Thus, “France lives in a web of interests that extends beyond its borders. It is not isolated. Western Europe as a whole cannot therefore fail to benefit indirectly from French strategy, which is a stable and determining factor in European security.” This broader interpretation of France’s vital interests is therefore reaffirmed, Macron stating that “our nuclear forces ... strengthen European security by their very existence and in this respect have a genuinely European dimension.”

Next, Macron proposed to pursue a “strategic dialogue” on the role of nuclear deterrence with those European countries that wish to do so. France’s ambition is to shape a “shared European strategic culture”. Macron suggested that European countries wishing to participate should join “exercises with French deterrent forces”. It should be noted, however, that this option does not mean setting up an integrated structure like the one that exists in NATO.

Finally, the president placed great emphasis on the importance of a common strategic culture in Europe in order to evolve in the field of arms control and disarmament.

Macron recalled the foundations of France’s disarmament policy, French achievements and French priorities in this area: compliance with the NPT, negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons (“cut-off treaty”) and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), continuing work on verification and the launch of work on reducing strategic risks. Macron defended France’s logic, according to which disarmament is not an end in itself, but rather makes it possible to increase everyone’s security. His speech therefore seeks to rebuild a European disarmament policy on security considerations and not on ideological or strictly humanitarian considerations.

On the subject of arms control, Macron called on his European partners to wake up to “once again understand the dynamics of escalation and seek to prevent or avert them by means of clear, verifiable standards”. In particular, he said that any new agreement on nuclear forces in Europe should include Europeans, and that discussions in this area “must not go over our heads”. In general, the president argued that Europe needs to develop “a very clear position” that “takes into account ... the evolution of contemporary armaments” and allows it to defend its interests and what it considers favourable to the preservation of strategic stability on the continent.

It will now be a question of monitoring French initiatives. Naturally, the methods to be used by French diplomacy will be decisive in winning the support of France’s partners.

French nuclear umbrella deters aggressors from targeting EU member countries—similar interests

Tom Sauer 2019, Tom Sauer is a post-doctoral research fellow of the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research and a lecturer at the Department of Politics at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium, December 2019, “Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of the European Union”, //skwon

Status-quo

After Brexit there will only be one EU member state (France) that possesses nuclear weapons, while the EU institutions themselves – because of internal divisions amongst the member states – keep silent on nuclear deterrence. Interestingly, neither the Ban Treaty nor the Eurobomb is much discussed at the yearly gatherings of the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, a consortium of think-tanks in the EU.

France and the UK have negotiated bilateral agreements in 1992 and 2010 with respect to their nuclear arsenals, including a mutual defense clause. Both states “do not see situations arising in which the vital interests of either Party could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened” (Perot 2019, 2). Whether those arguments will stay alive after the Brexit remains to be seen.

As a result of the mutual defense clause of the Lisbon Treaty, the French nuclear weapons are also used to deter attacks against other EU member states, though implicitly. Already a long time ago, France made clear that the security interests of the other EU member states are regarded as similar to the security interests of France. For instance, French Defense Minister Chevènement stated in October 1989: “It is not necessary for the radius of action of France’s deterrence to be declaratively extended to the territory of the FRG to apply there de facto, according to the concept of ‘vital interests’” (quoted by Palmer 1991, 54). President Sarkozy extended that notion to the EU in 2008: “As for Europe, it is a fact: by their very existence, French nuclear forces are a key element in Europe’s security. Any aggressor who might consider challenging it must be mindful of this” (quoted in Jasper & Portela, 161). That idea was repeated in the more recent Franco-German Cooperation and Integration Treaty, signed in Aachen on 22 January 2019. That Treaty does not refer to NATO being central for collective defense, in contrast to the Lisbon Treaty, and contains a mutual defense clause with respect to Germany. But it uses the words “security interests” instead of “vital interests”, which, according to Perot (2019) who is affiliated with the Brussels based Egmont Institute, “could be interpreted as a persisting timidity when it comes to explicit references to nuclear deterrence within the Franco-German relationship”.

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