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EU is increasing its military defense—US decline means that Europe must step up to protect itself

Tom Sauer 2019, Tom Sauer is a post-doctoral research fellow of the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research and a lecturer at the Department of Politics at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium, December 2019, “Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of the European Union”, https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2020.1764260 //skwon

The EU is generally regarded as a soft or “normative” power (Manners 2002). While the original goal of the European project in the 1950 s was maintaining peace, its main instrument was economic cooperation. That said, already in 1952 the European Defense Community was set up, only to be vetoed by the French Assembly two years later. It is probably no coincidence that in the same period French Prime Minister Mendès-France started up a secret nuclear weapons program. Jean Monnet – one of the founding fathers of the European Community – was against the force de frappe because in his view it was incompatible with the fact that Germany was constitutionally not allowed to possess nuclear weapons.

Since then, European integration made progress on a step-by-step basis, including the establishment of the European Economic Community and Euratom in 1957, the latter aiming to create a European free zone for nuclear fuel, i.e. uranium4. Unsurprisingly, Europe was called “a civilian power”. Duchène (1972), then director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), predicted in the beginning of the 1970 s: “Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth-century citizen’s notion of civilized politics. In such a context, Western Europe could in a sense be the first of the world’s civilian centres of power” … ’Europe will be a giant middle power’. Similar ideas were still heard in the 1990 s, despite the announcement of a Common Foreign and Security Policy by the Treaty of Maastricht (1991). Christopher Hill (1996, my emphasis), for instance, stated: “Where [European Political Cooperation] is weak in leverage, it is strong on values … and European diplomacy has steadily become associated in the public mind with a distinct set of principles”. Earlier on, Hill (1990) had characterized the EU “a civilian power”. Later on, Manners (2002, 241, my emphasis) triggered a lively academic debate describing the EU as “a normative power”. He argued: “This combination of historical context, hybrid polity and legal constitution has, in the post-cold war period, accelerated a commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with its member states and the world”. Also Sjursen (2003, 38) claimed that “the EU has considerable impact on the international system”, in a liberalist sense.

That said, since the end of the Cold War, steps have been taken to give body to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including in the field of defense. For instance, respectively Javier Solana, Catherine Ashton, Federica Mogherini and Joseph Borell have taken up the position of High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, leading the European External Action Service. An EU Military Committee aided by a EU Military Staff – be it small-scale (in comparison with NATO) – has been set up in Brussels. The EU initiated both civilian and military interventions, be it low-risk, around the world. A European Defense Agency (EDA) and a European Defense Fund (EDF) have been created. It was also the E(U)-3 that negotiated a deal with Iran in 2003 and that was successful in coordinating the multilateral talks that led to the Joint Common Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 (Sauer 2007, Sauer 2019a). The Lisbon Treaty (2009) included the notion of an integrated security policy and foresees the possibility of creating a common defense. The Treaty also included a mutual defense clause in the sense that if one member state is attacked, the other member states have the “obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power”(art.42.7). It also contains the possibility to integrate further with a limited group of member states in the framework of PESCO. The EU Global Strategy (2016) introduced the concept of “strategic autonomy”. But – as sceptics do not hesitate to repeat all the time – progress with respect to European defense integration is slow, especially in comparison with NATO. Even the Lisbon Treaty continues to regard NATO as the main security organization responsible for collective defense. In short, European defense today can be described as a glass half full or a glass half empty. Experts are divided between Atlanticists and Europeanists.

The assumption in this article is that despite the financial crisis in 2008–2009, the Brexit, and the Corona-crisis, the European integration will continue, including in the military sphere. The European Monetary Union (EMU) requires better political oversight, and phenomena like migration, global warming and pandemics can better be managed on a European scale than on a national scale. The trend towards more political integration (including foreign, security and defense policy) in all likelihood will continue, be it maybe at a slower rate than in the past. One of the side-effects of Brexit is progress made in the field of defense integration, as the UK was always skeptical.

In addition, there is an important factor that may further stimulate European defense integration: the shifting balance of power in the world with China on the rise and the US on the (relative) decline. As a result, there are more and more voices in the US that argue for isolationism or restraint, or at least offshore balancing (Posen 2014; Walt 2018). President Trump does not stand alone in his request to spend less money on US alliances, especially NATO. Many Americans believe that Europe should take up its responsibility to protect itself. Trump has stated on different occasions – both before and after his election – that NATO is obsolete (although – paradoxically – he has sent more US troops to Europe). While NATO is still regarded as the main security framework in Europe, there are more and more cracks in the wand (Sauer 2019b). In January 2019, there were even rumors that the US would leave NATO (Barnes & Cooper 2019). From a European point of view, the most logical alternative for the Atlantic Alliance is EU defense integration. If NATO stops to exist, which admittedly is still unlikely in the foreseeable future, the EU (or a core group within the EU) in all likelihood will take over.

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