Attempts to manage technological problems are inevitable and good – they tend to a fragile working order WITHOUT falling into a strictly managerial approach. That uniquely lets us recognize complexity and accept insecurity
Nordmann, Professor of Philosophy and History of Science and Technoscience at Darmstadt Technical University, ‘18
(Alfred, “Four Horsemen and a Rotten Apple. On the Technological Rationality of Nuclear Security,” in Jahrbuch Technikphilosophie: Arbeit und Spiel, pg. 279 – 294)
The apple is rotting. During the times of the Cold War, the precarious equilibrium of strategic threats had its own working order. It could be trusted and, in fact, had to be trusted in many ways. The weapons were carefully monitored, subject to permanent surveillance from many points of view. They were closely watched through the eyes of one's own strategists, technicians and engineers, military personnel, local opposition forces, but also through the eyes of friends and foes, international agencies and monitoring groups. Everyone was attending to the weapons for different, perhaps conflicting reasons, and yet the many observations were maintained in a relation of mutual support. The weapons themselves became fixated and paralyzed at their center of attention.
When the so-called »four horsemen« (Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry, Sam Nunn) and political leaders like Barack Obama have called for a world without nuclear arms, it is because they are worried about the break-down of this working order.24 In their view, the current modes of monitoring, proliferation, negotiation, and sanctioning represent a deviation from the Cold War rationality of deterrence with its system of mutual checks and balances. Accordingly, they call for adequate ways of controlling material flows, of regulating access, of instituting transparency and accountability. Their question is a technical question: Given the half-life of plutonium and given the volatility of systems of government in many parts of the world, how does one institute a robust international system of arms-control? Thus, they worry only secondarily whether the weapons might get into the wrong hands, politically speaking and in the short term. They pose primarily a question from within a technologically advanced, economically and politically robust knowledge society — aside from the United States, who can be counted upon to reliably provide the necessary know-how in the long term? Who can take responsibility for the management of what was once and is no longer a denumerable, firmly circumscribed set of nuclear things?
This point can be further developed by briefly considering three other aspects of the current state of debate: First, as Christopher Daase has pointed out, the extension into the future of the nuclear privilege of weapon states in the NPT becomes questionable when this privilege no longer serves to maintain a taboo in times of strategic conflict but when it somewhat arrogantly declares whose hands are the good hands such that they can be entrusted to carry out a managerial process. Inclusion and exclusion can be justified more easily on the criterion of the possession of nuclear weapons, it becomes contestable if the criterion is the cultural competence of handling with due diligence and care a dangerous and globally endangering commodity.25 Second, this may prove to be the reason why some of the non-nuclear states like Norway, Austria, Mexico are seizing the moment to claim that, if anyone, they are best suited to frame the question or redefine the terms of the debate. They wish to bring the humanitarian consequences to the fore and thus the mishandling of the bomb, irrespective of a balance of power or terror.26 Finally, when the question is one of maintaining or recreating a safe working order for a dangerous technology and when the arms race is taking place between knowledge societies and their claims that the technology is with them in good hands, the general technical capabilities of these societies become increasingly important. The responsibility of diplomats and negotiators in the political and military sphere to create conditions for global security is shifting to the maintenance, broadly speaking, of a safety culture in civil society.
If this diagnosis is correct, the rules of the game have changed as has the rationale for inclusion and exclusion in the club of nuclear-weapon states, and the definition of the community of responsible actors. The global challenge is defined not as preserving peace or security in an age of ideological conflict and competing national interests. Instead, the challenge is one of tending to a working order of nuclear safety and safeguards. Issues of proliferation and disarmament, transparency and control now appear in the collective consciousness as analogous to the global threat of climate change. Both put national and stakeholder interests into a managerial mode. The Earth and the Bomb need to be handled with care — grounded in the perhaps illusory hope that in good hands, with a technical mindset, and attunement to the complexity of affairs, the challenge can be met and the danger contained.
Hazardous Waste
At this point it may appear as if I wanted to recommend or valorize an engineering approach that abstains from moral and political judgement but brings to the table the requisite understanding for maintaining, modulating, recreating a working order or technological system. This is not the case. I am arguing merely that one need to take seriously the different modes of conceiving the problems that are in need of solution — not only because the definition of a problem entails a conception of its solution and the reasoning processes adequate to it. If only for heuristic purposes we should attend to the implications of a shift from the logic of warfare and deterrence to a logic of attunement and trust — attunement to a working order and trust in the good hands of technical expertise. In conclusion, here are some of these implications, briefly stated.
First of all, the acquisition of working knowledge and the ability to maintain and modulate a working order does nothing to justify technocratic approaches or to en-throne the expertise of managers and engineers. As the case of the klu(d)ge served to remind us, deviations from strategic rationality coincide with deviations from top-down engineering or rational design. The situations in which working knowledge comes to the fore are highly ambivalent, whether it is the challenge of maintaining a rotten apple or of managing material flows in an ageing nuclear arsenal. In these situations, rational decision making is of the kind where a security update is scheduled to the operating system of a computer and users wonder a bit nervously whether it is really such a good idea to install the update. Not only the readers of Charles Per-row's Normal Accidents will wonder whether the security updates might increase the complexity, perhaps instability, perhaps insecurity of the operating system.27 And of course, with the end of the Cold War, the operating system of nuclear security has been changed, prompting us to ask anew what are the conditions for stability and security.