“Debate-as-potlatch” is meaningless and devolves into a forensic reenactment of bygone revolutions that takes flaunting the rules as an endpoint and becomes complacent in the same sterilizing practices they criticize. Our framework doesn’t mold debaters in any particular way—it breeds the skills to make trained and tested actions through a ritualized policy debate-game that looks a lot like a potlatch!
Snider, 3—former director of debate at the University of Vermont (Alfred, “Paris Nocturne,” CAD 24 (2003): 16-101)
First, Schnurer offers what appears to me to be a major contradiction. He savages the game concept. He then introduces us to the game of “Potlatch,” and sings its praises as a way to tear down consumerist society and as a model for inspiring exchange of ideas. He finishes with an exhortation to “find games that fulfill our revolutionary potential, take whatever moments we can for ourselves to try and push for as much change as we possibly can.” How “Potlatch” avoids his earlier criticisms or how his search for “game to fulfill our revolutionary potential” can avoid them is not explained. He simply cannot have it both ways absent a substantial explanation of how this contradiction is bridged.
Second, I believe that Schnurer misunderstands the concept of “paradigm” as used in these discussions. He states that debate “paradigms are boundaries drawn to include and exclude certain types of behavior. At their most mundane, debate paradigms establish the ‘rules’ that encircle the activity of debating.” He offers no supporting documentation for this claim. Thomas Kuhn (1962, p. viii) has noted that paradigms set the stage for discussions, but are not controlling, in that they are “sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined practitioners to solve.” I have found the work of Masterman (1970, p. 68) to be very useful. She notes that there are three sorts of paradigms, being philosophical, sociological, and construct paradigms. A debate paradigm would seem to be a construct paradigm. The construct paradigm is an instrument or tool for learning. The focus is what a paradigm can do to guide our actions (p. 71). A construct paradigm is a “way of seeing” and helps guide us in how we understand a given situation or organize a set of data. She sees the Kuhnian construct paradigm as a starting point or “research vehicle” (p. 78). It is a beginning for theory, an analogy we can employ in understanding a process such as academic debate. It is not an iron set of rules, but a perspective. A paradigm is a beginning for theory, an analogy we can employ in understanding a process such as academic debate. These understandings are quite different from those of Schnurer.
Third, Schnurer seems to glorify the flaunting and breaking of rules. He wants to “agitate the gamers, and push them to look beyond the game and consider breaking even the most solid rules.” He longs for a world and a debate activity more like the revolution in Paris of May 1968 than a standard debate tournament. It is clear that in debate the “rules” (about which there can be no argument) are few, including the time limits, the wording of the topic, and the identity of the speakers. Which of these rules would he have us throw aside? All of the rest resides in the world of “procedures,” common practices that are still open for debate and disputation.
The “rules” of debate are not so constricting, and the relevance of procedures (common understandings that can be challenged at any time, such as the role of the topic in the debate) teaches students to question major guidelines, not to obey them [unquestioningly] blindly. I would defend a game with limited rules and debatable procedures, not an activity in which all rules should be boldly disregarded and violated. Just as Schnurer probably has limits to what is acceptable in his classroom, there should be some limits in a debate.
Fourth, Schnurer seems fascinated by the strategies and approaches of the Situationists embodied in the “revolution” that took place in Paris in May 1968. I find this to be an entertaining and romantic vision, but not necessarily a valid one. If Paris in May 1968 is his “paradigm” for revolutionary potential in debate, I am not a supporter.
This sort of revolution is neither “real” nor productive and is guilty of many of the same errors that Schnurer attaches to “debating” as opposed to “acting.” Dirk Jan van Baar (1998) wrote:
May, 1968 was not a “real” revolution. The students “played” revolution. It was the last attempt of Paris to justify itself as the ‘revolutionary centre’ of the world. But the French were lagging behind, the ‘counter-culture’ commercialized and globalized, and were not really interested in leftist ideology. Playing the revolution was fun, not serious stuff. The generation of 1968 contributed — contrary to its own aims — to the further Americanization of Europe (France). Today's revolutions that really matter — such as the imaginative revolutions in Information Technology — are more virtual, and can do without Paris.
It is not the “riots in Paris, with upended cars” that have the most real impact for change, but the “virtual” revolutions that take place inside the minds of individuals, something that happens regularly through debate participation.
Fifth, Schnurer ignores the realities that can emerge from what we do here on the “playing fields of earth.” It seems clear to me that real social change comes from skilled, thoughtful, and practiced human agents. Student debaters do not hover endlessly in the game of debate. They graduate and move on to lives and careers outside of the game. Yet, they take with them the skills they have learned. By demanding that the game of debate also become direct action, Schnurer denies them the training in a safe place that can facilitate later success.
Sixth, “Potlatch” may have more in common with the game of debate than Schnurer realizes. The game of debate is a process by which participants offer their lofty ideas, goals, and proposals for exchange and mutual analysis. Borrowing the rhetoric of Hussey used by Schnurer, academic debate is also a “living moment of poetry” that “breaks down and reverses conventional chronological patterns.” Academic debate offers arguments as “gifts,” often lofty and sometimes utopian. These gifts can easily be seen as a “catalyst of the future in the form of a crystallization of desire.” The rhetoric of Debord also makes this point, that the game “is able to distribute” our “novel desires and problems” and creates a process where “only the further elaboration of these by others can constitute the corresponding return gift.” Both Hussey and Debord are describing “Potlatch,” but it seems to me to be very much like the game of debate I have been describing for over twenty years.
Maxwell Schnurer is a gifted, insightful, and inspiring debate professional. His thesis, however, that gaming as a concept strips debating of its revolutionary potential, is incomplete. The game of debate is a training ground for future action for social change, first and foremost. His vision of a revolutionary debate where all rules are gleefully violated in a forensic reenactment of Paris in May, 1968 would damage the ultimate potential debate training has for real citizenship, social evolution and change. We need trained and tested actions and decisions, not spontaneous revolution.