This is exemplified by the security dilemma, which is born out of the inevitable uncertainty in all human relations
Booth and Wheeler 8 [Ken Booth FBA is a British international relations theorist, and the former E H Carr Professor of the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University. Nicholas J. Wheeler is professor of international politics at the University of Birmingham and co-editor of the Cambridge Studies in International Relations book series, published by Cambridge University Press and the British International Studies Association. Rethinking the Security Dilemma. 2008. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0505/37a6a9815cee8576c05fd83d13e77dcba32c.pdf]
The term ‘security dilemma’ describes a familiar predicament experienced by decision-makers in a world already overflowing with dilemmas. Despite its ubiquity, our claim is that the concept has been invariably misconceived by academic theorists, yet - properly understood - it should be regarded as the most fundamental concept of all in security studies, and as such should be at the centre of a reformed agenda of this field.1 The security dilemma is a foundational concept because, above all, it engages with the existential condition of uncertainty that characterizes all human relations, not least those interactions on the biggest and most violent stage of all - international politics. That its significance has not been properly recognized has been the result of orthodox thinking failing to give due credit to the work and insights of its major early theorists (John H. Herz and Herbert Butterfield, and later Robert Jervis) and at the same time missing the opportunity (as a result of paradigm blinkers) to appreciate the extent of the theoretical and practical horizons it opens up. Our claim is that an understanding of the dynamics and potentialities involved in thinking about the security dilemma gets to the heart of the central questions of security studies more profoundly than do even the traditional canon of concepts such as ‘war’, ‘strategy’, ‘conflict’ and the rest.
The house of uncertainty
By describing uncertainty as the ‘existential’ condition of human relations we mean that it is not an occasional and passing phenomenon, but rather an everyday part of the existence of individuals and groups. It is uneven in its significance and how it is felt, but it is ultimately inescapable. Insecurity, however, cannot be simply correlated with uncertainty, since uncertainty is a house in which there are many rooms, and in some life is much less insecure than in others. It is preferable to live with the uncertainties of what Kenneth Boulding (1979) called ‘stable peace’ than with the insecurities of Stanley Hoffmann’s (1965) condition of‘state of war’. When states practise cooperation, or societies even embed trust in security communities, significant degrees of security are attained, even within the house of uncertainty.
In the context of International Relations, the existential condition of uncertainty means that governments (their decision-makers, military planners, foreign policy analysts) can never be 100 per cent certain about the current and future motives and intentions of those able to harm them in a military sense. We call this situation one of unresolvable uncertainty, and see it as the core of the predicaments that make up the security dilemma.
The drivers of unresolvable uncertainty are multiple, but they can be reduced to the combination of material and psychological phenomena, and primarily the ambiguous symbolism of weapons and the psychological dynamic philosophers call the other minds problem. Together, these create the conditions for the concept first theorized by Herz (1951) and Butterfield (1951). Students of disarmament are familiar with the strategic meaning of the idea of the ambiguous symbolism of weapons, if not this actual label. The term refers to the difficulty (many would say the impossibility) of safely distinguishing between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ weapons. As the old adage has it, whether you regard a gun as defensive or offensive depends on whether or not you have your finger on the trigger. This subjective interpretation, in principle, is the same in international politics, though in practice it is more complex. If, for example, it is argued that it is possible to distinguish between what is clearly offensive (a sword) from what is clearly defensive (a shield) with respect to individual weapons, strategists are likely to reply, unanimously, that such distinctions are operationally meaningless when interpreted as a whole, because a shield can be a vital part of an offensive move when used in combination with a sword.
Such an understanding has informed Russian, Chinese and other strategic planners in their interpretation of various plans for US ballistic missile ‘shields’ over the years. In the early twenty-first century, the Administration of George W. Bush attempted to justify deploying missile defence systems with the argument that they would help protect the US homeland against limited missile attack from ‘rogue states’ in general, and crucially Iran and North Korea in particular. Washington’s critics (in potential target countries and elsewhere)claimed to the contrary that the shield of missile defence can potentially be used in combination with the sword of US offensive nuclear missiles in a disarming strike against their enemies at some point in the future. The domestic critics of such a deployment in the USA for this reason see the move as destabilizing. ‘What is not a weapon in the wrong hands?’ is the question delegates at the World Disarmament Conference asked themselves in the early 1930s.
The closely related second dimension of unresolvable uncertainty is the other minds problem. This refers to the inability of the decision-makers of one state ever to get fully into the minds of their counterparts in other states, and so fully understand their motives and intentions, hopes and fears, and emotions and feelings. Obviously, some degree of understanding, sympathy, and (even) empathy is usually possible, but when it comes to matters of national security, the degree of confidence required by national security planners has to be very high, since the cost of getting it wrong is never trivial. A serious misjudgement could result in a waste of money and loss of prestige through the pursuit of bad policies; ultimately, defeat in war and foreign occupation might be the outcome.