Predictable limits are critical to issue specialization---opening discussion to every important issue simultaneously causes cognitive overstretch and undermines the educational potential of debate to loosen elites monopoly on expertise
Kevin J. Elliott 19, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Murray State University, 11/14/19, “Democracy's Pin Factory: Issue Specialization, the Division of Cognitive Labor, and Epistemic Performance,” American Journal of Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12486
In this article, I present an underappreciated mechanism of collective wisdom—by which cognitively average individuals can, taken as a group, make better decisions than even the smartest and most informed citizens, individually or in small groups1—based on issue specialization through deliberative enclaves called “issue publics.” Though this epistemic mechanism does not entirely answer the epistemic challenge, it responds to it in the same instrumental terms in which it is put and avoids appeals to democracy's intrinsic worth, which critics might view as evading the question. I hope that issue specialization enters the debate over the wisdom of democracy alongside promising epistemic mechanisms like diversity. I also aim to show that issue specialization is a promising subject for renewed empirical investigation since topics discussed here, such as the specialization of citizens’ political knowledge, need more study.2
It must be emphasized, however, that this mechanism is broadly Hayekian in its operation, rather than Condorcetian; it does not promise right answers but rather helps inform decisions by gathering information widely dispersed in society. My modest claim is therefore that issue specialization makes democratic choices more informed, not that it makes democracy “truth tracking” or leads to optimal decisions. At best, it may eliminate some of the worst options by defining a broad top set among which informed citizens disagree. Like diversity, issue specialization does not render bad policy impossible but merely less likely.
Because this article engages deeply with empirical evidence, I must clarify the status of the claims I make. One might wonder, for instance, whether I use the evidence to contend that issue specialization through issue publics is something that currently happens in democracies or whether it is an aspiration that could improve democratic performance after reform. My response is both. It is generally agreed that issue publics (which instantiate issue specialization) exist at least to some degree, but not necessarily to the extent required to generate the epistemic performance I suggest. This makes issue specialization both something that can potentially explain the excellent performance of many democracies today, as well as a realistic ideal toward which we might aspire. I therefore highlight how existing evidence is consistent with or positively supports issue publics, with the main purpose of illustrating the conditional claim that if we made issue specialization more central to our expectations of citizenship and democracy, the potential exists for it to do good epistemic work.
The Cognitive Division of Labor in Democracy
In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith claims that the specialization of tasks in an economic division of labor allows for great advances in productivity and the alleviation of scarcity (Smith 2008). In this section, I analogize Smith's claims to issue specialization in a division of the cognitive labor involved in making democratic decisions and argue that issue specialization generates an epistemic advantage for large groups over smaller ones, even if the latter are made up of the smartest or most competent individuals.
Consider the task facing citizens trying to make democratic decisions—that is, decisions about what policies to enact or who should have political power. This is conventionally understood to require citizens to consider and learn about every possible issue, figure out what the best policy is regarding each issue, and then trade off those policies against each other to construct an optimal political program (Beerbohm 2012). Then, in representative democracies, citizens must further consider which party or candidate most closely matches that program, bearing in mind that further trade‐offs are often necessary since none are likely to be a perfect match.
This presents citizens with an immensely complex task, akin to an individual manufacturing, say, a modern car. But, like making a car, the difficulty of the task can be alleviated by breaking it up into smaller pieces, just as in Smith's pin factory. Democracy's pin factory, I argue, is found in breaking up and specializing the task of democratic choice through issue specialization and, to a lesser extent, by functional differentiation.
Issue specialization is the first and most powerful element of this division of labor (Beerbohm 2012, 180–81; Elkins 1993).3 If we use a spatial metaphor and think of all the potential issues on the political agenda as occupying space on a landscape, then issue specialization operates by dividing that space into limited parcels corresponding to specific issues and having particular groups attend to each area. This vastly simplifies the task of coming to informed decisions (Lupia 2006, 227). Instead of becoming informed about every possible issue and trading off between them, members of each specialized group need only become informed about a single area and make their decisions on the merits of that issue.
This specialization also allows members of these groups to develop a kind of issue expertise through surveillance of news and familiarity with the facts, organizations, and coalitions surrounding it.4 This is analogous to the dexterity Smith argues workers develop through the economic division of labor. In particular, specialized citizens are likely to have identified trustworthy groups or individuals from whom to take informational cues, reducing the costs of staying informed (Lupia 1994). This expertise enables them to do a better job than others at judging the performance or promises of candidates on that issue.
Likewise, by concentrating on limited issue areas, citizens gain issue focus, which eliminates the costs of following every twist and turn of political events and learning about entirely new issues every few weeks. This is analogous to the elimination of changeover costs from one task to another highlighted by Smith. Issue focus also alleviates worries of activist fatigue arising from being pulled in several directions at once by a fragmented political agenda. Finally, by specializing and focusing, citizens are able to make maximally efficient use of the limited time, attention, and resources they can devote to politics, improving the “productivity” of their “citizenship time.”
The complexity of the task is further simplified by another division of cognitive labor: functional differentiation. This is familiar in democratic theory and consists in dividing labor between individuals with different but complementary roles in a democratic system, in the way that the functions of representatives, activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens mutually complement each other (Christiano 2015; Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012). In this way, the task facing ordinary citizens is made even more tractable. Not only do they focus their attention on a limited share of the overall issue space, but they also share the burdens of surveilling and making decisions about that space with others fulfilling different roles.
The two dimensions of divided labor work together, yet issue specialization is primary. We can see this by imagining the functional division of labor replicating itself within each of the specialized issue areas, as activists, journalists, and citizens specialize by issue, along with civil society. It may seem that functional differentiation is doing the work, but it must be remembered that it only comes into play on a field that has already been differentiated by issue. Issue specialization easily falls out of notice because it defines the ground over which first‐order political contestation occurs. It tends to disappear into the background because we take it for granted in any particular political debate. Though both kinds of division of labor are at work, the main source of epistemic merit is the topical division of labor that divides the decision task into limited parcels of issues.
One question arising from the analogy between the economic and democratic division of labor is this: What mechanism aggregates the specialized work of these groups? In factories, aggregation happens spontaneously because the output of each specialized worker serves as input for the next step in production. But there is no obvious analogue among groups attending to different issues. In this account, the main agents of aggregation are representatives and political parties. As discussed below, in seeking election and building coalitions, these actors look to issue‐specialized groups for electoral support and for information about the sorts of policies they should advocate. Thus, aggregation mainly occurs through governing and competing to do so (e.g., constructing electoral platforms).
If this account is correct, it creates a scalable advantage for mass publics over individuals and small groups because they cannot specialize in an analogous way. Individuals must decide using only the scarce attention and limited ability they individually possess. Small groups can, of course, specialize—there are, after all, Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, Education, and so on—but this specialization is severely limited by numbers and the broad diversity of issues. No matter how informed or sophisticated an individual or small group is, they will be importantly blinkered by their inherent cognitive limits. They can only admit a finite number of issues as important enough to command their direct attention. As a result, they will neglect many other important issues. A democratic public specialized by issue faces no such limits. Mass publics can be endlessly subdivided such that every issue has its specialists. Within this group of relative specialists, moreover, there is a further division of labor along the axis of functional complementarity, between ordinary citizens, activists, experts, and so forth. Democracy thereby reaps epistemic gains from specialization at a scale no individual or small group can match.
One might ask what is specifically democratic about this mechanism since it might seem to be primarily about expertise and interest groups. The answer is that ordinary citizens—not just elites—are cultivating issue expertise and that it is the openness of democratic processes of aggregation and deliberation that mobilizes this distributed expertise, whereas nondemocratic or epistocratic institutions more closed to popular input cannot.