Baudrillard’s logic is faulty, it doesn’t take into account the thing to be simulated is equally affected by the real. War games and planning aren’t simulations, they’re the same as war, no meaning is lost.
Von Hilgers 12 (Phillip, Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of the History of Science at Harvard University, Managing Director at Meetrics, “War Games: A History of War on Paper,” Chapter 4: Historiography in Real Time (2012), translated by Ross Benjamin, 6/23/22 - FI)
The Real of Simulations For a long time, media theories have burgeoned regarding how media seem to capture the world in simulations. The fact that media themselves are not based on virtualities but on realities — which even former radio officers occasionally find hard to master — is often overlooked. Thus sociologist Jean Baudrillard has elevated the simulacrum to the central concept for the description of the state of the Western world — without, however, asking about the historical development of the simulation. For Baudrillard, simulacra have, in an escalating fashion, first taken up the play with the real, then taken the place of its appearances, and finally themselves created a basis that is no longer dependent on the real. 32 In particular, the referential system of the image has thereby undergone a transformation that leads from reflection to self-referentiality. 33 The logic of this interpretation, however, implies that the real is excluded from the simulation media and their history is effaced. But it is precisely the development of war games that shows how much the real intrudes into the simulation media, which is the case whenever the simulation reaches its limit and suffers disturbances. The thing to be simulated is equally affected by the intrusion of the real, even if it sometimes takes on the technical forms of the simulation. In particular, effects of the real emerge at the communicative and mediatic level. In the military political war game, a Prussian legation councilor ’ s ability to empathize might underlie the position of the Polish foreign minister. However, the communication practices that are thereby tested could not be more real. It is in the war game that the difference between simulation and communication comes most clearly to light. Though infantry units in the war game that do not shoot with live ammunition — or if they do, then only at targets — and tank battalions that operate, in the absence of available tanks, with mockups or entirely on paper exclude a world of real pitfalls from the outset, their signal battalions do not proceed any differently in the war game than in war: “ The headquarters or the command post is set up in houses, in the open, in vehicles or tents. The signals personnel set up the required wire and radio connections so that during the exercise the entire communications operation including the messengers proceeds as in a war. ” 34 To make the situation appear to the remaining battalions “ as in a war, ” recourse could be had to an old alliance between the film industry and the military. It should be recalled that the chief of the supreme army command, Erich Ludendorff, had already founded Universal-Film AG (UFA) in 1917 for propaganda and psychological warfare. The war game, however, made use not of film ’ s contents but of its production methods — indeed, so much so that the general of the signal corps, Praun, would use the word “ film ” as a synonym for “ war game ” : “ Mostly the director [of the war game] will have assembled his ‘ insertions ’in a sort of ‘ screenplay, ’according to which the film then proceeds. ” 35 “ Insertions ”are measures undertaken by the war game director during meticulous plans in the run-up to the game or at the same point through the deployment of intercept companies so as to confront the war game participants with exceptional situations on the one hand and optimize one ’ s own signals intelligence on the other hand. 36 The borrowings from film thereby serve a form of psychological warfare that is not directed against opponents but subjects one ’ s own battalions to stress tests: The staff must be occupied constantly in a warlike form, thus to some extent put under pressure. It is therefore the main art of the director to generate realistically the numerous “ frictions ”that occur continuously in war. The director must have prepared these well in the form of “ insertions. ”Among these are the abundance of reports that amass, especially during critical situations, false reports, “ rumors, ”outof-date orders and reports, deceptive communications, wishes of the neighbors, inquiries of higher-ranking command posts — these should rain down on the staff and force the participants day and night to make swift evaluations and discern the essential. Among the countless individual events of war are wire faults, unintelligible telegraphs and radio reports, decoding missions, prisoner interrogations, evaluation of aerial images, assessments of the enemy demanded by superior posts, supplying missions. A captured enemy map with writing in a foreign language can also perplex the responsible specialists. Such specialists, or individual commanders or a whole section of the staff can be completely or temporarily lost in the decisive moment, while the staff operation must continue as in a case of emergency ( Ernstfall). Such losses, caused by direct hits, paratroopers or partisans, then force the remaining staff to instructive assistance. 37