Cyber-security research is based in sound research. Cold war threat inflation is a thing of the past.
Cavelty and Wegner 20 (Myriam Dunn and Andreas, PhDs from Zurich and lecturers, “Cyber security meets security politics: Complex technology, fragmented politics, and networked science”, 2019, Contemporary Security Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855)
Cluster 1: The reality of cyber conflict: Explaining state restraint and practices
In the beginning of this intellectual history, political aspects of cyber security were discussed almost exclusively in publications originating in U.S. think tanks and war colleges (for example: Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1992). This literature had little ambition to contribute to an academic debate. The two main questions it tackled were “who (or what) is the biggest danger for an increasingly networked nation/society/military/business environment” and “how to best counter the new and evolving threat.”
The first cluster is characterized by a reevaluation of the threat based on empirical evidence and a gradual application and adaption of “old” IR and strategic studies concepts to cyber security (Kello, 2013). Two cyber incidents–the discovery of Stuxnet in 2010 and later the Snowden disclosures in 2013–were instrumental in shifting the focus of both policymakers and researchers from the threat politics of “what if”-scenarios that had dominated the 1990s and early 2000s to the reality of the strategic use of cyberspace by state actors. In this new context, literature in IR and strategic studies could be used to examine how state actors use cyber instruments for their political or military advantage and analyze their impact on national and international security (Borghard & Lonergan, 2017; Kello, 2017; Maness & Valeriano, 2016). A strong disciplinary “pull” is visible in how early works zoomed in on an alleged offensive advantage in cyberspace due to the ubiquity of technical vulnerabilities (Peterson, 2013), grappled with the problem of escalation dynamics in cyberspace (Liff, 2012), and asked how deterrence might be adapted in order to uphold stability in cyberspace (Wilner, 2019).
As researchers began to build data sets of cyber operations (Kostyuk & Zhukov, 2019; Valeriano & Maness, 2014) to link cyber issues to the larger agenda of conflict studies, an empirical puzzle emerged that challenged many of the theoretical tenets and standards assumptions of the older literature. Most cyber operations did not seem escalatory, nor were they determined by power asymmetries or changed the existing strategic balance. Overall, states seemed to exercise a fair amount of restraint in cyberspace (Gartzke, 2013; Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). At the same time, however, a lot of cyber operations linked to state rivalries occurred, though as mere add-ons to existing conflict dynamics and not independent of a broad range of other foreign policy instruments (Betz & Stevens, 2011).
Reacting to this puzzle, the literature in this cluster has begun to move in two directions: First, and comparable to the evolution of the strategic studies literature during the nuclear age, some authors have started to integrate additional non-systemic explanatory factors into their analyses of cyber conflict. While some explore the role of beliefs and cognitive biases in cyber policy decision making (Gomez, 2019), others zoom in on the destabilizing role of bureaucratic politics and other deficiency of the policy process especially in crisis decision making. Second, and more consequentially, many authors acknowledge that the emerging empirical picture reflects the structural feature of cyberspace as an operating environment, which is marked by a high degree of technical interconnectedness and constant political contestation (Fischerkeller & Harknett, 2018; Smeets, 2018). Taking this into account, operating strategically in cyberspace seems to be more technically and organizationally demanding than the “cheap and easy”-metaphor suggests, while at the same time offering little enduring strategic gains in the sense of changing a rival’s political goals (Lewis, 2018; Slayton, 2017)