In Baudrillard’s work we can trace we can trace a neo-primitivism logic – as a projection of the western fantasy.
Li 06 (Victor, an award-winning multimedia journalist based in Chicago, “The Neo-primitivist Turn: Critical Reflections on Alterity, Culture, and Modernity,” Primitivism without Primitives, or Towards Alterity, Culture, and Modernity, (2006), 6/27/22 - FI)
Neo-primitivism as a primitivism without primitives will logically seek to dismiss or drop the term ‘primitivism’ altogether. It is, after all, a problematic term that some anthropologists as early as the 1940s sought to eliminate altogether from their vocabulary. 121 But though the term may be dropped, a primitivist deep structure that privileges the Other of modernity – an Other that critically interrogates the modern – is retained. The disappearance of the term ‘primitivism,’ like the vanished or vanishing primitive, is thus not so much a complete effacement as a displacement and transposition onto other terms or concepts that now occupy the oppositional role to modernity that primitivism once did. I will examine in the chapters that follow how primitivism has been displaced into three new terms: alterity, culture, and, paradoxically, modernity. That alterity should be a form of neo-primitivism is perhaps not so surprising. A postmodern ethics of alterity has sensitized us to the dangers of ethnocentric claims to universal sameness. Particular, local forms of otherness have been mobilized in the struggle against the universalizing metanarratives of a Eurocentric modernity. These local others, often non-Western or seen as marginal to modernity, are not directly referenced as primitives or represented as such in order to avoid the evolutionary, hierarchical implications of the term. Nevertheless their alterity, symmetrically opposed to Western modernity, continues to exhibit characteristics present in earlier descriptions of primitive cultures and societies. The concept of alterity thus follows the fetishisitic logic of neo-primitivism in disavowing the primitive only to reinscribe its difference once again. 122 As we will see, in the next chapter on alterity, Jean Baudrillard not only opposes the Eurocentric representation or incorporation of the primitive, he argues that there are no longer any primitives. He remarks that the death or disappearance of primitive others like the South American Indians is not only a sign of their uncompromised alterity but also of their return as ‘viral spectral presence[s] ... [infecting] the synapses of our [Western] brains.’ 123 According to Baudrillard, then, there are no longer any primitives and precisely for that reason they continue to haunt us powerfully. Another philosopher of alterity, Jean-François Lyotard, drawing loosely on the ethnographic work of André-Marcel d’Ans, mobilizes the cultural difference of the Cashinahua, a small South American Indian tribe, to interrogate Western universal or cosmopolitical thought. But, ever alert to the dangers of ethnocentric projection, he also admits that his description of Cashinahua difference may be ‘simplistic’ and part of a tradition of Western exoticism. This autocritique of his own primitivism does not, however, prevent him from regarding the Cashinahua example as being ‘essential’ to any theoretical investigation into processes of mythic or narrative legitimation that occur in modern forms of totalitarianism. 124 Again we see a disavowal of the primitive instance followed by its reinscription as an example of alterity essential to exposing the totalitarian terror present in the metanarratives of legitimation that constitute the modern West. Thus, in Baudrillard’s and Lyotard’s work we can trace a neo-primitivist logic in which the primitive disappears as a presence to serve as an irreducible idea. Alterity is also the name that Marianna Torgovnick uses to question Western primitivism’s ethnocentric projection of its fears and desires onto primitive others. To Torgovnick, primitivism reveals more about the West than about the primitive whose alterity continues to elude and challenge Western views of the self and the world. The primitive of Western primitivism therefore does not exist or, rather, exists only as the projection of Western fantasy. But if the fantasized, projected primitive does not exist, the argument for an authentic primitive alternative to modern Western thought is promoted in Torgovnick’s work. She argues, for example, that in the oceanic experience, which Freud considered to be regressive and ‘pre-Oedipal,’ we have a primitive alternative to the modern Western separation of the self from the world. Our fascination with primitive life is thus an expression of the desire to undergo this oceanic experience in which the autonomous self is voided and merged with the entire sentient universe. 125 But, Torgovnick adds, this desire is to be found not only in primitive societies. It is a desire also present in certain religious forms and practices of the West. But this desire is more often repressed, ‘hounded out of institutionalized religions,’ and ‘projected abroad in a complicated process by which an aspect of the self was displaced onto the Other.’ 126 Even as Torgovnick incisively critiques Western primitivism’s ethnocentric construction of an exotic Other, she also asserts that ‘what has been sought elsewhere may yet be found in the folds and creases of the West’s own neglected traditions.’ 127 In short, the West’s primitive Other disappears to become the Other within the Western self. Primitive alterity is to be sought not outside but inside the West itself. In Torgovnick’s version of a primitivism without primitives, primitive others – geographically, temporally, or culturally separated from us are no longer needed because the so-called primitive quest for oceanic ecstasy is to be found as much in the West as elsewhere. We no longer need to go in search of primitives because they have been generalized or universalized to the point where we can now say, ‘primitives are us.’