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Assertions of realism and liberalism recreate the Aff’s conflict scenarios. Only the alternative provides a sufficient view to form policy solutions toward China.

Chengxin Pan 22, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, Australia, 2022, “Chapter 10: China’s Rise as Holographic Transition: A Relational Challenge to International Relations’ Newtonian Ontology,” China’s Rise and Rethinking International Relations Theory

A China that holographically emerges out of the contemporary globalized world cannot be adequately understood by theories that are still based on the Newtonian ontology, which treats states like China as ontologically separate and distinct. In opening up a new ontological perspective, this chapter now turns to a brief examination of why mainstream IR theories, particularly realism and liberalism, need to be rethought. First, realism, and power transition theory in particular (Tammen and Kugler, 2006; Lai, 2011), have almost completely overlooked China’s contemporary holographic transition. Analysts from those perspectives routinely see in China the rise of a Nazi Germany-like great power, but the world in which China has been rising has largely moved on from the one in which Nazi Germany emerged. The current international system is more ‘regime-intensive’ than the period during which Europe and the United States came into prominence (Lanteigne, 2005: 32). Western theorists may have good reason to draw upon past European and American experiences to fear the prospect of China adopting its own ‘Monroe Doctrine’ or falling into the ‘Thucydides Trap’ (Allison, 2017). What they fail to adequately appreciate is that the whole from which China has emerged has now become quite different (Wang, 2013). The holographic relational perspective does not necessarily mean that China’s rise or ‘Chinese’ relationality will be peaceful (Shih, 2016: 687). Hard power still matters in contemporary world politics, and realism remains part and parcel of China’s strategic thinking. Hence, despite the existence of a holographic world, if Chinese leaders behave as if they live in a Newtonian world of mechanistic relations, then the earlier-mentioned fears of China may be warranted. In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, rising antiglobalization sentiment and increasing global trade tensions, the shift to more emphasis on domestic circulation in China’s ‘dual circulation’ economic strategy seems to signal the winding back of its holographic engagement with the world. Nevertheless, a couple of points are worth noting here. One is that there is some Chinese recognition, at both scholarly and official levels, of the world as a cosmopolitan whole (for example in terms of ‘the community of common destiny’), and of the holographic entanglement that there is something of each in the other (ni zhong you wo, wo zhong you ni) (Xi, 2015). Whether Chinese foreign policy (for example the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)) will live up to such rhetoric remains to be seen, but at least such understanding could help underpin a consistent policy of opening up. Another point is that China’s holographic relational being/becoming is by definition relational and reciprocal. Given that how its significant ‘Others’ behave constitutes part of China’s holographic whole, the dominance of a zero-sum, non-holographic way of understanding and dealing with China from the ‘outside’ world is likely to produce a China that is similarly uncompromising and assertive. As China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi was quoted as saying during his discussion with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, ‘China will consider how to engage with the U.S. side based on the U.S. attitude towards China’ (Reuters, 2021). Second, while liberal scholars do pay close attention to China’s transformation and socialization (Economy and Oksenberg, 1999; Johnston, 2008), they also fail to recognize that its transformation/socialization is fundamentally holographic and multidirectional, rather than linear or unidirectional. Some liberal thinkers are right that it would be illogical and extremely difficult for today’s China to overturn the international capitalist order (Ikenberry, 2008); after all, China is already a holographic part of that order and so turning against that order would mean turning against itself. Still, many tend to misconstrue its holographic transition as reducible to Westernization or democratization in the Western image (Gilley, 2004; Hutton, 2006; Kristof, 2013), while forgetting that the sources of holographic influence on China are global, rather than merely ‘Western’. The global whole in which China exists and evolves includes also the ‘nonWestern’ world as well as ‘Chinese’ history and tradition (or what Wang Jisi calls ‘historical China’, see Chapter 6). To ignore those connections and their complex impact on China is to miss a significant aspect of China’s rise that does not fit well with the liberal narrative. Furthermore, even as China has absorbed many ‘Western’ influences (bearing in mind that there is nothing purely Western to begin with, as Hobson [2004] points out), such outside influences, once transmitted into China, may undergo further local holographic transition of their own by taking on some ‘Chinese’ characteristics (Pan, 2012: 116–17). Also, as China’s power grows and its relations further expand (such as through the BRI), it is certain to once again become a major source of holographic transition for other countries, just as it once was, particularly through its tributary system, in which the participation of the ‘barbarians’ was in part to ‘come and be transformed’ (lai-hua) (Fairbank, 1942: 132). Thus, China’s rise is both an object and an agent of holographic transition. To sum up, both the ‘identity’ of China and its implications for the world are inherently complex, dynamic and indeterminate. As a case of holographic transition, China’s rise defies the binary scenarios of either a hegemonic challenge to the Western-dominant order or a linear integration into it (see also Chapter 9). With China unable to meet the liberal expectation, there has now been growing disillusionment with, and renewed realist fear of, it in recent years (Pan, 2012: Chapter 7; Campbell and Ratner, 2018). China’s rise does pose many profound challenges, whether economically, politically, normatively or environmentally. But such challenges, despite their apparent ‘Chinese’ symptoms, often have their holographic origins in the world. Thus, without denying Chinese responsibility or agency, to effectively deal with those challenges requires us to see them also as global and holographic challenges that cannot be reduced to, let alone solved as, uniquely Chinese problems. Global problems demand global public policy and cooperative solutions. As such, the United States’ focus on ‘Chinese’ imports, for instance, as the cause of its job-loss problem misses the point. Similarly, attempts to contain China are unlikely to be effective given that China’s very being has been embodied and embedded in holographic relations with the global whole, with which we are all inextricably entangled and implicated.

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