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Hermeneutical production of knowledge and the forecasting of technical futures is not a neutral project – it resymbolizes and overcodes thought itself towards a cybernetic metaphysics

Hui 19 (Yuk Hui PhD - juror of the Berggruen Prize for Philosophy and Culture since 2020, and initiator of the Research Network for Philosophy and Technology since 2014, teaching in various institutes including Goldsmiths College, Leuphana University, Bauhaus University, Strelka Institute Moscow, Chinese Academy of Art, and City University of Hong Kong, “Recursivity and Contingency”, Rowman and Littlefield International, Pages 231-237, January 2019, MG)

The rejection of the notion of knowledge as reducible to science and calculation is an attempt to show that there is knowledge such as savoir faire, savoir vivre, and savoir-écouter that are beyond the realm of scientific knowledge. Stiegler seems to have gone a step further in this respect by showing that savoir faire is necessary for savoir vivre, and that therefore the deprivation of savoir faire is a form of proletarianization, which problematizes existence by undermining the means of subsistence. The shift in the sense of knowledge in the era of digital automation underlines a delegation of knowledge production and decision making to machines. Lyotard says that “the question of knowledge is now more than ever a question of government.” 26 The organic totality of the system that is based on recursivity is realized through different technological schemes (such as the smart city, the internet of things, etc.), which characterize a planetary computation. In chapter 4 we named the new faculty of the machine to anticipate tertiary protention. The preemption of the tertiary protention is possible only because of the computational hermeneutics, which is essentially recursive: It constantly evaluates the past in order to anticipate the future, which in turn determines the present. Human beings are reintegrated into the temporality of machines, not only as individuals but also as collectives and communities. This is precisely what is called algorithmic governmentality. 27 It seems to me that in order to intervene into this new temporal structure today, it is necessary (while we have to do it elsewhere) to redefine savoir faire—or, more precisely, savoir technique—in today’s system of knowledge production.

Besides theoretical discourse on the question of recursivity and social systems in the work of Niklas Luhmann and Heinz von Foerster, who also gives another name to recursion—“non-trivial machines” (ironically, Lyotard also calls cybernetic information theory trivial) 28—we have attempted to show that such discourses are gradually materialized through the implementation and distribution of smart objects, neuro-networks in urbanism, and the use of smart devices in order to access infrastructures. In this process of the totalization of the technological system, the immediate effect is the process of desymbolization through the establishment of inter-objective relations and resymbolization within the technical system, as Jacques Ellul pointed out in his Le système technicien. 29 When Ellul says that “on the one hand, man’s inherent power of symbolizing is excluded; on the other hand, all consumption is symbolic,” 30 he means that symbols that connect humans to nature and allow them to master nature in a nonviolent way slowly give way to technology, and finally lead to a resymbolization of the technical system in which symbols are no longer linked to nature but to commodities.

The social system is not separable from the technical system. Indeed the technical system is the support of the social system, not only in terms of communication but also in terms of organization. The social system is not reducible to the technical system, though this reduction is taking place rapidly at the moment. Written two years after Ellul’s Technological System, Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition also hints at the realization of totalized technical systems when he says that “the growth of power, and its self-legitimation, are now taking the route of data storage and accessibility, and the operativity of information.” 31 The realization of this system is for Lyotard the continuation of the concept of development, which is a metaphysics without finality: “[W]e are in an Umwelt that is the realization of metaphysics as a general physics under the name of cybernetics.” 32 Lyotard here takes up both Heidegger’s verdict on the status of cybernetics and Luhmann’s systems theory, which is the avatar of a “general physics.” 33 Cybernetics realizes metaphysics, makes metaphysics reality, and establishes its right over thinking. 34 What is left for metaphysics is to incorporate the outside as its inside, to exclude itself as the dominant thinking. For systems theorists the task is not to get out of the system but rather how to optimize the system by modulating its performativity and increasing its capacity for resilience based on feedback. 35 Therefore, when modern leftists lament that there is no longer any outside, they become the true metaphysicians. The opposition between engineering and the humanities can be caricatured as an opposition between positivism and hermeneutics, or between efficiency and reflexivity, but such a distinction, as Lyotard already noted while commenting on the Frankfurt School, is not acceptable, 36 for the solution proposed by the latter “is no longer relevant” in postmodern societies, since this opposition ceases to function as a critical apparatus. 37

§40. TECHNOSPHERE OR CHRISTOGENESIS

Instead of seeing cybernetics as a nonphilosophical system, in this work I have been attempting to show that cybernetics is fundamentally a metaphysical project. The passage from nature to logic, from the organized inorganic to the organizing inorganic, is staged as a conceptual conflict between form and matter. However, this has not been presented as the triumph of one over the other, since they are not separable. It is only in our archaic epistemology that form and matter are separated, and this conflict is interpreted as a philosophical melodrama. With the organizing inorganic, where are the humans heading with their technologies? For decades we have been talking about an intelligence explosion, superintelligence, the technological singularity, a foreseeable technological utopia in which genetic engineering, human enhancement, and immortality are promised. Speculation concerning what comes after the human has been widely discussed. The emergence of x-humanisms, whether this x be post- or trans-, attempts to point to a definite future in which humans can be either saved by a posthuman ethics or by advanced technologies. On the one hand, the posthuman gives us an impression of liberation, of freeing ourselves from the older category of the human. On the other hand, this “being liberated” is nothing other than the fact that humans have become obsolete in relation to their own products, as Günther Anders has described in his The Obsolescence of Man. 38 I am very sympathetic with posthuman discourse and with the idea that the humanities must fight against any anthropocentrism for what the Italian theorist Rosi Braidotti calls posthumanities. 39 However, certain forms of posthuman discourse also betray a naive attitude toward technology, seeing it simply as secondary to a “true” and “good” posthuman ontology, as if all oppositions can be neatly resolved by a theoretical canon, whether this be a process philosophy or a relational ontology, while completely ignoring the transformation of machine-organism relations that we have endeavored to illuminate.

Transhumanists, on the other hand, take an opposite position and exploit technology to an extreme. They embrace functionalism (seeing the human as composed of functions that can be improved individually) and an interdisciplinary program for human enhancement, including information technology, computer science, cognitive science and neuroscience, neuralcomputer interface research, materials science, artificial intelligence, regenerative medicine and life extension, genetic engineering, and nanotechnology. 40 They emphasize the importance of technology as a means to extropia (as opposed to the “static utopia”), an open-ended perfection of the human species. 41 There is an ambiguity between the terms transhuman and posthuman. For example, transhumanists like Nick Bostrom see the transhuman as a form of the posthuman, which possesses some posthuman capacities transcending the limits of the human (for example, life span, cognition, and emotion). 42 We may recognize that the transhuman sounds like a typical “scientific humanism,” 43 and indeed it is a humanism under the guise of a posthumanism. We want to point out that the posthuman cannot be defined according to a simple divide between a clean posthumanities and an outdated humanism, 44 so the transhuman cannot be seen as an enthusiastic open transhumanism opposing a closed dualist humanism.

However, here we would like to question the notion of humanity before we justify distancing ourselves from it. Carl Schmitt, in his The Concept of the Political, claims that “the concept of humanity is an especially useful ideological instrument of imperialist expansion, and in its ethical-humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism. Here one is reminded of a somewhat modified expression of Proudhon’s: whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat.” 45 What Schmidt is saying here deserves our attention, since the term humanity itself is problematic and any attempt to define a new future for humanity seems to be a form of cheating. Schiller was able to talk about the realization of humanity since Enlightenment humanism was necessary for his epoch, while after more than two hundred years we will have to face a new politics announced as the end of the Enlightenment. 46 This politics concerns not so much human nature as inhumanity. Humanist discourse continues, and it is indicated by a political theology that entails a rather simplistic conception of world history, which we can analyze as a linear progress from premodern → modern → postmodern → apocalypse. This Judeo-Christian eschatology seems to be a dominating discourse in which science and technology will bring forward a system that is more and more favorable for human existence while it will finally confront self-destruction, and what remains is the salvation or the completion of world history as theodicy. It is not without surprise to see that this end of history resonates with the concept of the Homo deus, since by then theodicy will be indicated by transformation of humanity into a kingdom of gods. The author of Homo Deus introduces dataism, a human-algorithm reduction; in the name of “life science,” dataism claims that:

1. Organisms are algorithms, and humans are not individuals—they are “dividuals”; that is, humans are an assemblage of many different algorithms lacking a single inner voice or a single self.

2. The algorithms constituting a human are not free. They are shaped by genes and environmental pressures, and take decisions either deterministically or randomly—but not freely.

3. It follows that an external algorithm could theoretically know me much better than I can ever know myself. . . . Once developed, such an algorithm could replace the voter, the customer, and the beholder. Then the algorithm will know best, the algorithm will always be right, and beauty will be in the calculations of the algorithm. 47

The transhumanist tone, claiming insight from “life science,” has already pointed to the future of humanity, which can be reduced to artificial intelligences governed by a superintelligence that knows anything and everything. We can find a similar argument in Teilhard’s concept of the noosphere. The noosphere will finally lead to the realization of a superorganism: the Brain of all brains. Through the systematization and planetarization of tools—especially automation —it will finally lead to the complete liberation of human beings from production —or, in economic terms, mass unemployment. Teilhard doesn’t see this mass unemployment as a danger but rather as the possibility of the realization of humanity. Like Schiller, who was concerned by the determination and domination of reason, Teilhard was also obliged to address the question of freedom. He distinguishes two types of freedom: individual freedom and collective freedom. The realization of the technical system as a superorganism may undermine individual freedom, but it also realizes collective freedom: “One might put it that determinism appears at either end of the process of cosmic evolution, but in antithetically opposed forms: at the lower end it is forced along the line of the most probable for lack of freedom; at the upper end it is an ascent into the improbable through the triumph of freedom.” 48

Teilhard avoids a crucial problem here: What really is “collective freedom,” and how can it justify the sacrifice of individual freedom? Is it not similar to the argument of “collectivism” that we have seen in former communist regimes? And further, what precisely is meant by “convergence”? We have seen in chapter 4 what Simondon calls convergence, which is not the convergence facilitated by transport and communications network, but rather to reattach the figure to the ground. But maybe at the end, for Teilhard, the question of the future of humankind is fundamentally a theological one, as he indicated in a note in the text we cited above titled “The Formation of the Noosphere,” published in Revue des Questions Scientifiques: “The description of the Noosphere and its attendant biology, as here propounded, is no more opposed to the Divine Transcendence, to Grace, to the Incarnation or to the ultimate Parousia, than is the science of paleontology to the Creation, or of embryology to the First Cause. The reverse is true.” 49

What Teilhard said concerning the process of evolution and the realization of the superorganism is now much easier to imagine than when he wrote it in the first half of the twentieth century. Today this image is reinforced by the fantasy of the technological singularity, in which the speed of technological development will be indicated by a vertical acceleration. We may say then say that this is a true completion of humanity, since there will no longer be a sharp distinction between the finite and the infinite. In a review of The Phenomenon of Man titled “Cosmologist of the future,” Joseph Needham called Teilhard “the greatest prophet of this age.” 50 He admired Teilhard’s work and regarded the “convergent integration” (a term that was employed by Julian Huxley in his preface to The Phenomenon of Man) of the superorganism or superbrain as the most original point of the book, which could be seen as a “Christogenesis”:

[T]ime is also of the essence; there was a time when there were atoms but no molecules, later on there were nucleoprotein molecules but no living cells, later fishes but no mammals, later man but no cooperative commonwealth. What are these propositions? Simply, the view of the universe held by the overwhelming majority of working scientists in our age. Implicit in it is the conviction that social evolution is continuous with biological evolution, and therefore that what materialist theologians have called the kingdom of God on Earth is not a desperate hope but a sure development with all the authority of evolution behind it. 51

However, in the spirit of eschatology one may ask: Is this completion of humanity a revelation or a catastrophic becoming? We are asking this question, as most of the sci-fi movies do, since we are living in an epoch of technological uncertainty and instability. Cybernetics, the accomplishment of metaphysics, is the force unifying “humanity” through globalization and neocolonization. In other words, we can use the vocabulary of Gestalt psychology in claiming that technology becomes the ground instead of the figure. The noosphere becomes the most dominating sphere on earth, overriding the biosphere. The system is an indication (or the Absolute in the Hegelian sense) of the evolution of science and humanity, 52 but it doesn’t necessarily take the form that Schiller envisaged in terms of artistic creation. Any future philosophy that ignores the question of system is fundamentally deficient.

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