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The way we play the game of debate matters – the choice of arguments, the languages we use, and the connections we make inside the space all implicates debaters as subjects

August 21 (Vincent August PhD - postdoctoral researcher in political and social theory at the Department of Social Sciences. He has been a visiting researcher at UC Berkeley, “Network concepts in social theory: Foucault and cybernetics”, European Journal of Social Theory, 17 February 2021, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1368431021991046, MG)

Cyberneticians believed that this ‘old’ world view increasingly fails to grasp the growing complexity of the world. Therefore, they called for a new way of thinking, a ‘new world view’ (e.g. Ackoff, 1979, p. 96). The polemic call for a new mind-set that follows from the narrative of rising complexity survives in Foucault’s writings (e.g. Foucault, 1994, IV, p. 108) and in nowadays rhetoric of network theory and network governance (e.g. Eggers, 2008, p. 28; Raworth, 2017). To overcome the ‘old’, ‘insufficient’ models, early cybernetician W. Ross Ashby (1956, p. 1) already proclaimed a revolutionary shift towards an operational epistemology that disposes of the ontology inherent in humanism and mechanics by switching the attention from what to how and from essence to doing: ‘Cybernetics [ ... ] does not ask “what is this thing?” but “what does it do?”’ (original emphasis).

For developing this operational approach, cyberneticians invented a range of concepts that are abstract enough to deal with any assembly of elements and to model how these elements may connect to do something (Beer, 1959, 1967, pp. 9–10). Presenting ‘connectivity’ as the core idea of cybernetics, Stafford Beer once advanced five models of connectivity in a single paragraph – machines, systems, networks, diagram and electric circuits:

A machine is a system, a set of points joined together by certain specified relationships. Therefore we may set up as its model a simple network. [ ...] The lines by which these dots are connected reveal the possible modes in which the system can operate. [ ...] A schematic diagram [ ...] can obviously be drawn [ ...]. This diagram will bear a marked resemblance to any representation of an electric circuit. (Beer, 1967, p. 95, original emphasis)

Beer’s explanation illustrates that cybernetics defined a set of models to conceptualize connectivity, in which one model is used to explain another model, creating a paradigm to describe reality: an assembly of elements is like a system, is like a network, is like a diagram and so on. In that manner, the apparatus of cybernetics encompasses graphical models (flow charts, diagrams, esp. circuit diagrams), material models (machines and computers), conceptual models (network, system) and mathematical models (matrices).1 Finally, and despite their critique of rational choice theory, cyberneticians adopted the model of games, strategy and tactics, because it enabled them to describe connectivity and complexity from the perspective of actors without conceptualizing them in humanistic terms (Dupuy, 2000, pp. 61–62).

As the adoption of game-theoretical metaphors illustrates, the different models have their own strengths and weaknesses. While the concept of a system is very abstract, allowing for an application to any arbitrary assembly of elements, networks and diagrams are much more intelligible in describing the idea of connectivity. Because of that, they also help to understand two general epistemological premises of cybernetic modelling. First, there is a multiplicity of interdependent relationships that condition each other. The opportunities of an element a to connect with another element b are influenced by the connections among the elements c, d and e, as well as the chosen ‘strategy’ of element a will influence the opportunities of the elements c, d and e. Secondly, the complexity is even higher as there is also a relationship between actualized and potential connections. The diagram, for instance, demonstrates that some connecting lines between the elements are active in each moment, whereas others are inactive but could have been chosen or might be chosen at a different point in time. What we can observe, therefore, is neither the essence of a thing nor the identity of a person, but only one possibility actualized at given moment.

Here lies a radical consequence of shifting the attention from essence to doing, which was finally explicated by second-order cybernetics: Systems or networks only exist in doing, in processing, in reproducing their elements and their relations in real-time (e.g. Maturana & Varela, 1980). Exploring these processes of ordering, cybernetics adopted the concepts of emergence and evolution. ‘Emergence’ means that some pattern appears as the elements in a network relate to each other. This emergent order and its possibilities are not intended; they are simply an effect of simultaneous coordination in the network. Yet, as the relations reproduce themselves in response to changes in the network and in its environment, the pattern of the network transforms – which is called ‘evolution’. In contrast to stable identities that develop coherently over time, emergence and evolution are erratic, unintentional and irreducible to former formations. Second-order cybernetics thus undermined modern theories of identity and linear history alike.

A new concept of ‘governance’: Circularity, self-regulation, diversity

In line with their categorical rejection of Newtonian mechanics and ontological philosophy, cybernetics also came to refuse linear-causal and mechanistic concepts of steering, in particular hierarchical forms of organization, command-and-control approaches and central planning. Cybernetics thought of those models of regulation as ‘primitive’ and ‘naı¨ve’ (Beer, 1967, p. 21), because they are based on a reductionist idea of causality and imply that systems can be steered intentionally and hierarchically. While this critique targeted the models of modern science (not political decision-making), some cyberneticians argued that the ‘old’ rationality also yields insufficient concepts of government and power. According to Beer (1967, p. 21), for instance, those concepts still dominate post-war societies and simply identify control with coercion. In either case, cyberneticians believed that in refusing such simplistic models cybernetics would offer a new, more accurate understanding of control.

The cybernetic concept of control (or regulation) entertains two fundamental shifts. On the one hand, it maintains that regulation is a universal and ubiquitous phenomenon. While there are no systems (and no societies) without regulation, regulation rarely takes the form of coercion or linear causality. This is because complex systems are ‘highly differentiated’, which prevents them from being easily steered from a control centre. Rather, the interdependent elements in a network regulate themselves via mutual influence. Each element in a system is shaped by connecting processes and, at the same time, it shapes those processes by redirecting the flow of communication. In other words, cybernetics argued that regulation is but the name for the circular processes of communication and coordination (Beer, 1959).

To model circularity, early cyberneticians introduced the term ‘feedback’ (Rosenblueth et al., 1943). It described that a system uses its output as its input. Early cybernetics started from observing systems that minimize the difference of its actual output to a specified goal (negative feedback). This focus on quasi-teleological or purposive mechanisms of goal-attainment, however, soon was criticized. First, Ashby argued that complex ‘homeostatic’ systems would randomly seek their own viable patterns, rather than to orient towards a given goal (Kline, 2015, pp. 52–53). Then, second-order cybernetics developed this thought even further by arguing that input and output are not even objective terms. Instead, what counts as input is determined by the processes inside the system: ‘an organism does not receive “information” as something transmitted to it, rather, as a circularly organised system it interprets perturbations as being informative’ (Scott, 2004, p. 1369).

This conceptual clarification radicalized cybernetics’ idea of control as self-organization. First-order approaches already argued that the elements of the networks regulate themselves by their own ‘language’ (Beer, 1959, p. 5) or ‘codes’ (Ashby, 1956, p. 140). To generate resonance inside a system, you must connect to those codes rather than to exercise command. But second-order cybernetics was even more rigid. According to them, the environment of a system is only ‘noise’ until the systems selects on which turbulences in the stream of noise it is going to act (Clarke, 2009; von Foerster, 1984). Because there are so many connections and co-dependencies in a network (and in a network of networks), systems are completely self-organized. Complexity and selforganization go hand in hand.

It is obvious by now that these ‘governance’ concepts are descriptive and normative. The descriptive aspect is that (according to cybernetics) complex systems have internal processes that are highly differentiated and flexible, which allows them to deal with massive amounts of complexity and contingency in their environment. This observation is famously stated by Ashby’s ‘law of requisite variety’ (1956, pp. 202–213). It is, however, easily turned into a normative statement: If you do not want to undermine highly complex systems, command-and-control approaches are the wrong way to go. Complex systems depend on diversity, flexibility and self-regulation, because they allow them to innovate, experiment and ‘design’ new answers in response to a highly volatile environment. Here, cybernetics has an inherent link to aesthetics and style (Ackoff, 1979, p. 101), as those answers are not ‘the one best way’ (as searched for by rational choice approaches) but only one ‘viable’ way found through the creativity that is unlocked by diversity and self-regulation. Cybernetics, thus, offered a theory of difference that undermined concepts of ontological identity, economic rationality and political integration.

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