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Ukraine completely shifted NATO priorities towards Russia---failure to readdress Chinese advancements opens the door for Chinese adventurism AND security threats.

Liselotte Odgaard 22, professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, 2/24/2022, "NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space," Washington Quarterly, 45(1), pp 175-180, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059145, sg

NATO’s vague recognition in 2021 that China constitutes a challenge to the transatlantic alliance reflects an institution that has failed to take on the security threats emanating from Beijing. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 highlights the reasons why this omission is problematic. The war in Ukraine has reignited transatlantic unity of purpose in addressing threats from Moscow toward European security. The existential shock that Europe is facing now that a Russian regime has shown itself willing to go to war against European countries carries with it the risk that China will be forgotten when NATO discusses its future priorities. During the war, China is walking a tightrope between maintaining its commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity and keeping up cooperation with Russia. The future strength of the Chinese-Russian partnership is likely to be determined by the continued usefulness of Moscow in China’s efforts to carve out more space for a Sinocentric international order based on authoritarian regimes. Meanwhile, China will continue to engender threats to the US and Europe in all domains and across geographical regions.

With the summit statement of the North Atlantic Council released June 14, 2021, NATO extended a commitment to “engage China with a view to defending the security interests of the Alliance,” since “China’s stated ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security.”1 China’s coercive policies, nuclear arsenal, military modernization, military cooperation with Russia, lack of transparency, and use of disinformation are listed as main areas of concern for the alliance. NATO takes the China challenge seriously but has yet to devise a strategy to address it.

Compared to the United States, Europe took a long time to acknowledge its stake in managing security challenges from China. As Beijing pushed beyond its traditional zones of interest in East and Southeast Asia toward the Indian Ocean in the 2000s, US security policies began to focus more on China as Washington sought a new geopolitical equilibrium in Asia.2 Since 2014, France and the UK have spearheaded Europe’s naval diplomacy to counter the displays of force and increasing tensions in maritime Asia to which China contributes. This engagement has focused on regular exercises with the US and its Asian allies, operations in support of freedom of navigation, and base-sharing agreements.3 In 2021, the EU recognized that these geopolitical dynamics directly impact its security and announced the establishment of supportive mechanisms in its Indo-Pacific strategy.4 However, NATO has been conspicuously absent in these transatlantic endeavors designed to counter challenges to US and European security. Reflecting NATO’s absence from the main arena of US-China strategic competition, the alliance is hardly ever mentioned in off-the-record conversations on Indo-Pacific security between diplomats and think tank personnel.

NATO’s reluctance to take on the China challenge is perhaps not surprising, given its inherent assumption that the European continent is the jewel in the crown of the US alliance system, which is thought to guarantee US assistance in the event of a military threat against Europe. This assumption was challenged during the Trump administration, which openly questioned the US commitment to Article Five’s collective defense obligation. The invasion of Ukraine has given NATO a new lease on life and put it at the frontlines of transatlantic cooperation on deterring Russia from further military action in future. However, NATO’s focus on its eastern frontline carries the risk that the alliance turns into a Russia-focused European institution and ignores that China is a global great power competitor which also constitutes a major challenge to the security of all NATO member states.

Washington increasingly looks to the EU rather than NATO for guidance on Europe’s future security policy. One reason is that NATO’s toolbox is lagging in domains such as cyber and outer space, although cyber and outer space operations are key enablers of actions in all domains including air, sea, and land. One indication of this is the US-EU negotiations surrounding a common response to cyber threats which took place during the first US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) meeting in Pittsburgh in September 2021. In addition, during Trump’s presidency, longstanding US dissatisfaction with Europe’s modest defense spending threatened to put NATO on the backburner in transatlantic security debates.5 Since then, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has elicited a sea change in German defense policy with the announcement in February 2022 that defense spending will increase to more than 2 percent of its gross domestic output annually.6 While this may be a convincing signal that Europe will finally devote the resources required for its own defense and revive NATO’s central role in transatlantic security, there is also a risk that China will be moved to the periphery of the alliance’s agenda.

On February 11, 2022, during the runup to the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Biden administration published its Indo-Pacific strategy as US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken was in the midst of a Pacific trip to Australia, Fiji, and Hawaii.7 This US prioritization signaled that despite Moscow’s war in Europe, Washington remains committed to strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific and competing with China. If the US drops the ball on the Indo-Pacific, Washington is concerned that China might use force against Taiwan.8 Consequently, the key question for the US is how many resources can be tied up in Europe without losing sight of the long-term goal: deterrence of China. As US strategic competition with China increases while NATO is sitting on the fence, failure to develop a transatlantic defense policy that addresses China will leave Europe vulnerable to China’s ability to exploit the weak links in European defense arrangements, which are newly fragmented by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.9

EU efforts to build an independent regional defense profile and nurture cooperation between Europe’s defense industry and national defense communities reflect a growing recognition that the region needs to become a self-reliant defense actor. However, Europe still needs to demonstrate that self-reliance does not imply merely focusing on Europe’s periphery. Otherwise, the industrial challenges from China may outcompete Europe’s defense industry. Shipbuilding is a case in point. By 2021, China built 50 percent of all existing ships in the world. Through design collaboration agreements, cyber espionage, and acquisitions, China has copied advanced innovative ship designs. Enormous financial resources from the state allow Chinese companies to enjoy economies of scale by building dual-use factories which not only outcompete Western companies in the commercial shipbuilding industry, but also threaten the production of navy vessels. If not taken seriously, Europe and the US may soon have no choice but to buy frigates from China.10 This example demonstrates the centrality of China for global economic and security developments and should encourage Europe to manifest a position of unified strength in defending NATO member states against Chinese security challenges. This realization will help convince the US and its adversaries that Europe continues to be a credible partner in countering common threats against transatlantic security, whether they appear in or beyond the European region.

China’s challenges to US and European security constitute such common threats across a broad range of sectors. These include gradual reinterpretations of principles of international law, the subversion of universal liberal market economic practices, and cyber insurgencies targeting a wide range of civilian and military entities. These Chinese policies all have major military implications because they are related to developments in the operating principles, capabilities, and priorities of China’s armed forces. Only NATO can offer an integrated transatlantic response to the military aspects of Chinese policies that threaten those sectors across the globe, including European actors. NATO’s involvement is essential if the credibility of the alliance’s security guarantees is to be preserved and an effective response to China’s encroachments on a liberal rules-based order is to be established.

NATO’s involvement is essential to establish an effective response to China

The omnipresent character of the China threat demonstrates that it is long overdue for NATO to position itself as a significant player in addressing Beijing’s challenges to transatlantic security. NATO is key to keeping US and European security policies coordinated when applying mechanisms of deterrence and defense against Chinese challenges. If transatlantic unity of purpose is lost, both the US and Europe are far less likely to succeed in addressing China sufficiently.

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