China is increasing their technological advancements in space – an attack on NATO’s system would rapidly degrade alliance military capabilities and lead to miscalculation
Madeline Moon 20, a member of the UK Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Vice-Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation from 2012 to 2015, rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities “THE SPACE DOMAIN AND ALLIED DEFENCE,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2017-space-domain-and-allied-defence-moon-report-162-dscfc-17-e-rev1-fin, p. 1-10 /BL
2. NATO forces depend greatly on the use of space-based systems for essential communications, navigation, tracking, and targeting capabilities, as well as weather forecasting. Space-based system coordination plays a vital role in all current NATO key pillars of defence; allowing for the effective management of conventional forces at home and abroad, nuclear deterrent systems, and the evolving ballistic missile defence system. Rapid development, use, and dependency on space, however, imply growing risks.
3. Renewed attention to kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities as well as other forms of non-kinetic space denial capabilities such as jammers and lasers is increasingly bringing space to the forefront of security policy planning and debate. As great power strategic competition rises again in Europe and Asia-Pacific, the ability to deter and defend space assets is more important than ever due to the rising costs associated with a space denial campaign.
4. While the costs of disruption to space-based architecture are high, the arena inherently lends itself to collaboration rather than confrontation, largely due to the difficulty of verification mechanisms for space-related activities. As a result, many governments continue to push for a space code of conduct to enhance the prospects for peaceful space cooperation by reducing the opportunities for miscommunication, misperception, and misuse of the domain. To date, the Alliance has no official space policy, though it does have the recently published Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations. Given its critical dependence on space, NATO Allies must look for a way to consolidate their approach to and understanding of defence and deterrence in space.
5. This report will examine the rapid evolution and increasing necessity of space-based systems security. It will seek to demonstrate the role space-based systems play at all levels in Alliance security. It will then highlight steps parliamentarians can take to push for an effective NATO space policy.
II. WHY A DEFENCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON SPACE?
6. The 21st century will prove to be the race for space. Space-based systems are the key enablers of national and international infrastructures of today and tomorrow. The current speed of technological developments indicates the pace of diffusion of technology with some form of dependence on space-related hardware will only accelerate. Accordingly, outer space is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.
7. The benefits to investing in space-based assets are clear: Space-based infrastructure provides data for global positioning, navigation and timing; enables communication systems via large-scale data relay; guarantees the accuracy and efficacy of global financial transactions and trade; supports a wide range of private and public scientific research; as well as oversees environmental monitoring and forecasting. As such, satellite constellations are vital for the efficient functioning of modern aviation, maritime navigation, and ground transportation (both civil and military).
8. As dependence on space-based infrastructures grows, the costs associated with the disruption, denial, or even destruction of such assets will have increasingly distributed and devastating effects. In military operational terms, space-based assets allow for critical manoeuvre of forces, strategic and situational awareness, and precision-strike capabilities. The loss of space assets would significantly hamper any modern military’s ability to respond to not only defend vital assets and populations, but also to respond quickly and efficiently in a crisis.
9. As a result, understanding the evolution of the space security environment is critical for the NATO PA Defence and Security Committee (DSC). As the scale of impact of space denial scenarios grows, it is clear the disruption, denial, or destruction of any Ally’s space assets will have an Alliance-wide resonant effect. Just as NATO forces require freedom of action in the land, air, and sea of their territories, so do they require the freedom from interference with their space-based assets.
A. MILITARY USES OF SPACE
10. Throughout the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union utilised a range of satellites in conjunction with their strategic nuclear forces: to both link together their respective command and control systems and to monitor and track the other side’s movements. The first Gulf War in 1991 put the benefits of space-enabled systems on dramatic display; even television audiences could witness the tracking and elimination of Iraqi military assets by US precision-guided weaponry. In the ensuing quarter of a century, the centrality of space-based assets to modern militaries is undeniable.
11. Today, space-based assets are essential strategic enablers of modern forces. Since the advent of net-centric warfare during the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, NATO military forces depend on satellite services to link and integrate information into land, air, and sea platforms. Effective and real-time inter-services integration enhances decision-making and facilitates navigation. As a result, space-based assets are serious force multipliers for today’s militaries.
B. SPACE PROLIFERATION: MANY NEW ACTORS
12. Technological advances over the last two decades have greatly expanded the breadth and depth of possibilities for space access. As a result, a proliferation of actors hoping to have a stake in space is changing the nature of the three principal geocentric orbits. The flood of new actors is making these orbits increasingly congested and dirty.
13. Currently almost every country either owns a satellite or has a stake in space. There are approximately 1,100 operational satellites in orbit around the Earth, causing some orbital planes to be severely overcrowded. The recent advent of new, dynamic commercial actors has renewed public interest and ignited a second space race (UK Parliament Briefings). Companies such as SpaceX and Virgin Galactic are providing competition between service providers to build, launch, and operate new space systems: the outcome being a steady decline in the cost barrier to space entry and the proliferation of new systems operators (Insinna, 2016).
14. As entry costs continue to fall, the space domain is becoming more easily and more widely accessible, not only to the military and the commercial sector, but also to ordinary citizens due to the development of a range of new, increasingly smaller satellites from mini to micro, and even nano, pico, and femto-satellites – which range from over 500kg to less than 100g. While providing many of the capabilities of current satellites, they will be cheaper to produce and easier to launch, but harder to track and regulate (Lewis and Livingstone, 2016).
15. The scope of the challenge of the growth of satellites in space will only continue to grow because of this relative democratisation of space entry and use. In 2016, the Federal Communications Commission of the United States alone, for example, had received over 8,700 filings for launches of Non-Geosynchronous Orbit (NGSO) communications satellites (Messier, 2016). If these projects are completed, along with the thousands of other projects planned by nations around the globe, Low Earth Orbit congestion will pose a significant regulation challenge.
III. GREAT AND RISING POWERS IN SPACE
16. New actors are changing the geostrategic space environment and will shape space policies in the 21st century. The United States and Russia are still the world’s leading space powers; other countries, however, are steadily advancing their space capabilities, particularly China, which has developed successful launch capabilities and a multifaceted space programme over the last decade (Robinson and Romancov, 2014).
17. The United States is still widely considered the world leader in space. It has the largest space budget, a vast network of military and commercial satellites, and a burgeoning commercial space sector. The rise of the commercial sector’s involvement in space has spurred on a second space race, with companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin racing to see who can get to Mars first (Briefings UK Parliament). European space and defence sector giant Airbus Defence and Space is working on the ExoMars rover to explore the surface of that planet (Briefings Airbus Defence and Space).
18. As noted above, the rapid pace of commercial development of space launch, control, and satellite assets is changing the nature of space access and exploration. A clear benefit to the United States’s growing commercial space sector is the competition’s cost reduction effect and the added resiliency to the US military’s vital assets in space. The US military has used Boeing-Lockheed Martin’s United Launch Alliance to launch its payloads, but the recent certification of SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket to launch US national security payloads is adding price-lowering competition to the market. In addition, Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic are competing to supply the US Space Agency with a reusable spaceplane for its Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) (Insinna, 2016). The continued growth of US involvement in space at both the governmental and private sector levels has allowed it to remain the clear leader in space.
19. Second to the US presence in space is Russia. Moscow owns a massive constellation of military satellites. Most provide the Russian military with globe-spanning communications capabilities (Luzin, 2016). In 2014, the Russian government announced it would increase funding for the Russian Federal Space Agency to modernise and expand infrastructure and capabilities by 2020 (World Economic Forum, 2016). However, international sanctions following Russia’s annexation of Crimea have crippled the Russian space industry by depriving it of the advanced components needed to build many new communications and navigation satellites (Luzin, 2016).
20. Despite recent tensions and growing strategic competition in Europe and the Middle East, Russia and the United States maintain relatively strong levels of space cooperation. The long tradition of US-Russia space cooperation, dating back to the earliest era in space exploration in the 1950s and 60s, continues today with the countries’ use of the International Space Station (ISS). The ISS is the cooperative project supported by the United States, Canada, Europe, and Russia; the ebb and flows of the US Space Agency has made the US dependent at times on Russia’s shuttle capacity, and the United States currently depends on the Russian-made RD-180 engines for its Atlas rockets, which launch US payloads into space.
21. After years of investment and strategy, China is on its way to becoming a space superpower. While China’s estimated space budget is still dwarfed by the US, in 2016 it had 19 successful space launches — the second-highest number for the year behind Russia’s 26, and ahead of America’s 18. China has put up sophisticated communications and intelligence satellites, offered cheap launch services to other nations, and launched manned mission initiatives. In addition, China developed a “quantum satellite” designed to transmit quantum-encrypted information from space, which is theoretically hack-proof and ensures any attempt to intercept or tamper with the transmission would alert both sender and receiver (Dillow et al., 2016).