Lack of dialogue to clarify intentions in emerging conflict spheres like the outer space-cyberspace intersection escalates crises on earth by creating use-or-lose pressures for all space-enabled military assets
Laura Grego 20, senior scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 1/8/20, “The New U.S. Space Force Will Make Space More Dangerous, Not Less,” https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28452/why-the-trump-space-force-will-make-space-more-dangerous
But keeping space secure also requires reducing the threats to satellites. On this score, the Space Force is likely to make space a more contentious and dangerous environment, not less. It’s not just Trump’s rhetoric about dominance in space that is harmful; resources for the new military service will be provided to “deter aggression in, from, and to space.” This will create incentives within the national security bureaucracy to hype the threat of space weapons, and to then build new weapons to counter them.
In a speech last spring outlining his priorities for space, Gen. David L. Goldfein, the chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, stated that, “It’s not enough to step into the ring and just bob and weave… At some point, we’ve got to hit back.” What Goldfein failed to mention is that the U.S. already has more sophisticated anti-satellite technology than potential adversaries like Russia and China. In fact, having anti-satellite weapons actually does very little to keep one’s own satellites safe from attack. Yet military leaders appear to believe that reserving the option to deny the use of space to potential adversaries is more important than the benefits that come with a less weaponized space.
What’s more, unconstrained development of space weapons will make space more dangerous, costly and unpredictable to use. It will make conflict on Earth riskier, too. A space environment that is perceived as threatening may create an incentive to “use or lose” satellite-enabled military capabilities as a crisis approaches, potentially speeding up conflict. Goldfein underscored this point in remarks following a series of space conflict simulations conducted by the Air Force last month. “In every war game,” he said, “we determined that if you move first in space, you’re not guaranteed to win. But if you move second, you’re likely to lose.”
In the absence of robust international agreements to protect satellites and the outer space environment—the 1967 Outer Space Treaty does not specifically ban non-nuclear weapons from being tested in space or put into orbit—more countries are developing weapons that can destroy satellites in orbit, leaving fast-moving bits of debris that can stay in space for decades and later damage other satellites. When India obliterated its own satellite with an anti-satellite weapon last March, Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressed pride afterward that it had joined an “elite club of space powers.” Testing anti-satellite weapons, much less engaging in an actual conflict in space, can have profound and lasting effects on space. For example, the destruction of a single large satellite in low-Earth orbit would more than double the amount of dangerous debris in these important orbits.
Sensible constraints on this kind of behavior, and limits on dangerous space weapons technologies, would go a long way to augmenting stability, preserving the space environment and avoiding an arms race. But attempts to hammer out such constraints have seen little success. The United Nations Conference on Disarmament has been deadlocked for decades. Negotiations over the European Union’s proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities—which would require signatories to resolve not to damage or destroy any satellite except for reasons of safety, self-defense or to avoid debris production—foundered in 2015. Last year, a group of U.N.-convened governmental experts looking at space arms control concluded their deliberations without coming to consensus recommendations.
Still, the outlook is not all bleak. Even without binding legal instruments, no state has ever intentionally destroyed another’s satellite. And in 2018, 87 U.N. member states agreed to voluntary guidelines to protect the long-term sustainability of the space environment.
However, despite the United States having the most investment in space—nearly half of operational satellites are American—it has put very little effort into space-related diplomacy. While the Space Force is big news for the Pentagon, the State Department is nowhere to be seen. Russia and China have repeatedly submitted drafts of their preferred arms control arrangement to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament, most recently in 2014. Their proposed treaty would include binding prohibitions on placing weapons in space and using force or threatening the use of force against satellites. The United States repeatedly rejects these proposals as flawed but declines to provide its own alternative vision.
Despite, or perhaps because of, the deep ideological divides between the world’s great powers, it is critically important that they keep engaging with each other, if only to avoid miscalculation. Information about potential adversaries’ technical capabilities is plentiful, especially in a highly visible domain like space. But assessing their intentions is notoriously difficult. The U.S. and Russia have built some shared understandings over the course of decades of diplomatic engagement, but Washington has little such common ground with China. As a result, the world’s two largest economies risk misinterpreting each other in potentially very serious ways.
Understanding an adversary’s intentions brings more clarity to decision-making in a complex operating environment and may help manage or resolve a conflict more successfully. In 2010, Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr., a veteran U.S. national security official, warned that without a history of bilateral understandings or crisis management in conflicts involving emerging domains like outer space and cyberspace, there would be “no credible basis for anyone around the president to attribute restraint to the adversary, no track record from which to interpret the actions by the adversary.”
Those risks have not faded in the ensuing decade. If anything, they have multiplied. Doubling down on new space weapons and creating a dedicated Space Force while neglecting to vigorously pursue sensible negotiated constraints seems a sure path to a dangerous future, after having wasted billions of dollars.