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China non-kinetic satellite attacks escalate quickly – the US is more vulnerable than adversaries

Nicholas Wright et al 18, Georgetown University, Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Col Peter Garretson (USAF), Namrata Goswami (Independent Analyst), James Lewis (Center for Strategic and International Studies), Bruce W. MacDonald (Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies), Kazuto Suzuki (Hokkaido University, Japan), Brian C. Weeden (Secure World Foundation) and Nicholas Wright (Georgetown University) 7-2018, “Outer Space; Earthly Escalation? Chinese Perspectives on Space Operations and Escalation”, (SMA) Periodic Publication /billy

Information is the lifeblood of US military strength, making the space assets that create and/or transmit this information to distant forces extraordinarily appealing targets. The US economy increasingly depends on space-enabled information services (SEIS) as well. China is also becoming more space dependent, but most scenarios for possible military space operations would occur much closer to China (e.g., Taiwan, East/South China Sea) than to the US mainland, allowing China to be less space-asset dependent than the US. The space and cyber domains are closely intertwined, and in their essence deal with information and share a number of similarities. The importance of both the space and cyber domains to strategic planning and crisis management is matched by the lack of much real-world crisis management experience in these domains. These incentives exist for Russia as well. In a crisis, both China and the US would likely face an unstable, high-stakes environment that is neither familiar nor well understood. In this environment, China in particular would likely be tempted to escalate quickly in both space and cyber domains to disrupt US military forces and operations if it could, ideally before they could even arrive (Miller & Fontaine, 2017). Being somewhat less space dependent, China would be less vulnerable to US space offense and might be more emboldened to escalate in space than the US. Both countries seem likely to conduct offensive operations in cyberspace during the early stages of a crisis, though they would want to exercise some caution in the extensiveness of their operations because of escalatory risks. Understanding space escalation dynamics in the context of crisis stability requires grasping its strategic landscape, including how deterrence functions or fails in a crisis and what factors strengthen or weaken that deterrence. Interdependencies between and among space and other domains are enormously complicated, and their exploration is essential to understanding twentyfirst century strategic crisis dynamics. In the late stages of a crisis that threatens to transition into conflict, adversaries would be likely to engage in limited space and cyber actions designed both to send a signal of intention to escalate if conditions are not met (could be either a real threat or a bluff) and to put themselves in a more advantageous position should major conflict break out. Space asset vulnerabilities provide an adversary with dangerously attractive incentives to escalate and preemptively attack in a crisis (MacDonald, Blair, Cheng, Mueller, & Samson, 2016). In such a scenario, each side would confront the choice of striking first with all its assets in place, knowing that a conflict is beginning; or ceding the initiative, absorbing a first strike, and making a ragged retaliation against an opponent fully expecting such a response. As a crisis progresses and becomes more intense, each side must wrestle with the prospect that the chances for full-scale conflict are increasing. While neither side may wish for a full-scale war, neither side wishes to receive a major first strike. instability, where pre-emption pays far greater benefits than retaliation (Colby & Gerson, 2013). The weaker or more disadvantaged country in a crisis may find this line of thinking irresistible, or at least preferable to the alternatives. Countries sometimes go to war not because they want to, but because doing so appears less risky than not doing so. Any space power would want to avoid being in an unstable use-or-lose situation. In addition, a major feature of the space and particularly cyber domains is that major attacks can be initiated with little advance warning—and in the case of cyber— with almost no warning. In the space and cyber domains, there is nothing comparable to the stabilizing threat of an assured second-strike capability like that represented in the nuclear domain by sea-based ballistic missiles. For the United States, there are greater risks if conflict escalates into space. Given our greater dependence on space both militarily and economically, the US will want to emphasize deterrence of conflict in space. This can be achieved not just by having space offense, though this would be a necessary component, but also through cross-domain pre-eminence. Conflict is unlikely to be confined to space; cyber and conventional domains will also be involved. Even if the US prevailed in a space-only conflict, the victory would likely be Pyrrhic unless it was overwhelming—China and Russia are unlikely to engage their forces far away from their shores, unlike the US. Thus losing our space capabilities would be more damaging to us than it would be to Russia or China (Morgan, 2010). Until we have a much more survivable and resilient space architecture, we should not want to put our space assets at risk unless absolutely necessary. This 'vulnerability/dependence gap' can be addressed through cross-domain advantages that the US has, particularly in the cyber domain

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