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Specifically, cyber-attacks on space-based sensors cause total failure of missile defense systems

Beyza Unal 19, Ph.D., senior research fellow with the International Security Department at Chatham House, July 2019, “Cybersecurity of NATO’s Space-based Strategic Assets,” https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/cybersecurity-nato-s-space-based-strategic-assets/2019-06-27-Space-Cybersecurity-2.pdf

Missile defence relies heavily on early warning capabilities otherwise known as integrated threat warning and threat assessment (ITW/TA): US space-based infrared sensors detect the hot plumes of ballistic missile launches and communicate the information to the service component command.

Theatre missile defence, which includes the Patriot missile defence system – a long-range surface-to-air missile system used by the US and NATO allies – and standard missile defence systems, and which is part of the naval component of the integrated Aegis weapon system, also serves as part of overall missile defence capability.45 The Aegis combat system operates in the maritime domain, using radar to track and guide weapons to destroy targets; its elements – which include a space tracking and surveillance system, the AN/SPY-1A radar, a command and decision system and a display system – could all potentially be exposed to cyberattacks.

The US Department of Defense conducted an auditing exercise in 2018 for the internal controls of its ballistic missile defence systems (BMDS). The aim of the audit was to ensure that systems and programmes were functioning as intended. The findings indicated that there were ‘internal control weaknesses related to protecting networks and systems that process, store, and transmit BMDS technical information’.46 These weaknesses could be exploited through insider threat and/or cyber means.

Missile defence systems may fail, or they may be activated due to false information sent from communication systems (such as ground-based radars) to the command unit. The Israeli anti-missile defence system Iron Dome, for example, is claimed to have a 90 per cent accuracy rate when intercepting targets. Yet there have been cases where a faulty response within the system has activated the launch of interceptor missiles erroneously, such as occurred in Gaza in March 2018, when it was triggered by machine gun fire.47 Thus the battle management and weapons control system was proved at that time to be unable to make proper threat assessments. Similar outcomes could result if the threat assessment control system is interfered with via cyber means; the consequences could be much higher, including the loss of civilian life. In the Israeli case, it was reported that Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, a supplier of technology to the Iron Dome system, together with Israel Aerospace Industries and the Elisra Group, both of which were also involved in the project, faced persistent cyberattacks during the period of October 2011 to August 2012. This resulted in the loss of sensitive data that was believed to include the specifications of the Arrow 3 missile, developed jointly by the US and Israel.48 Vulnerability to cyberattacks within the supply chain is not unique to NATO, and NATO and its allies should address this type of risk. Supply chain integrity (in terms of both hardware and software) is imperative for reliable military systems.

One of the core elements of a missile defence system is that it relies on the reception of near real-time information by a command centre to be able to identify and project the trajectory of an incoming missile. Through automated response it calculates the speed, velocity and location of the target in order to be able to intercept the incoming missile in a short time frame. Any deliberate interference with the information, for instance from the radar, could mean that the defence missiles fail to intercept an incoming threat, or could lead to a faulty decision based on falsified or spoofed information. Thus, for example, a defence missile could fail to hit the correct target and strike well beyond the intended target zone. In order to detect deliberate interference or cyber intrusion, it is important to put preventive measures in place. One such measure could be to conduct organized, simulated cyberattacks on a system to assess its performance: this is known as penetration testing. In the future, detection of anomalies could be possible through ML and AI, especially in closed networks.49

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