NATO’s ambiguous threshold for what constitutes “armed attack” sufficient to activate Article 5 ensures Russian gray zone probing against allied space assets, risking cascading escalation
Tomas Jermalavičius and Alejandro Leal 20, Head of Studies and Research Fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security; research assistant at ICDS, post-graduate degree candidate in technology governance and digital transformation at Tallinn University of Technology; Securing Democracy, December 2020, "Gravity of ‘Star NATO’: Can the Alliance Pull the Baltics Into Military Space Affairs?" https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/towards-nato2030-the-regional-perspective-of-the-baltic-states-and-poland-read-in-english.pdf
The geopolitical context, technological trends and new concepts of warfare raise the unpalatable prospect of the militarisation of space. The Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit that – it only bans the deployment of nuclear weapons in it.12 But while an attack against terrestrial objects on the Alliance’s territory from future space-based weapons would constitute a clear act of armed aggression, it remains to be seen if an attack on, for instance, satellites owned by an Allied government could eventually trigger requests to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Even if the current answer is “no” or “it depends,” it will be hard to avoid further discussions given the growing importance of the space domain.13 After all, the Alliance has already agreed that devastating cyberattacks could prompt an invocation of the collective defence clause, and some nations are very clear about their national responses to acts of aggression in outer space. For instance, the French Space Defence Strategy of 2019 explicitly states that “in the event of armed aggression in space, France may avail itself of its right of self defence.”14 It is hard to imagine its Allies, such as the Baltic States, standing aside should Paris decide to request the activation of Article 5 in response to an escalating conflict in outer space.
Aggression in outer space or from the surface of the Earth against space-based assets is not in the realm of technological fiction. Various countries are developing and deploying counter-space capabilities that are able to destroy, degrade, deny or compromise space-based assets. These include kinetic means, such as anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles, as well as non-kinetic capabilities. Countries ranging from China and India to Russia and the US have tested and demonstrated their ability to destroy satellites with missiles.15 Russia is also developing a new system that is able to deploy into outer space swarms of small “killer satellites” loaded with explosives that would be carried into orbit by missiles launched from a MiG-31BM fighter aircraft.16 This is a concept that will enable counter-space operations that are cheaper, faster, larger in scale and less demanding (e.g. in targeting accuracy) than employing ground-launched ASAT missiles.
The destruction of a satellite, however, inevitably produces thousands of pieces of debris that scatter across Earth’s orbit, potentially provoking a chain reaction. Such an event – known as Kessler syndrome – could severely threaten space activities and prevent the use of satellites in specific orbital ranges for decades if not longer. Given that Russia itself (and China, for that matter) is becoming increasingly dependent on space infrastructure as a result of its military modernisation, some analysis suggests that Moscow is interested in developing a diverse set of kinetic counter-space capabilities primarily as a deterrent for such space-dependent powers as the US, as well as being an escalation control instrument that expands the range of options available to decision-makers.17 In the event of a regional military crisis in the Baltic area, this would echo the logic of nuclear signalling in order to deter the US and other Allies from reinforcing the Baltic States.
At the same time, the application of more affordable and easily available electronic and cyber-warfare methods could be just as disruptive. Satellites are vulnerable to cyber and electronic attacks, which can have reversable or irreversible effects. This includes the use of radio-frequency energy to interfere with or jam the communications of a satellite, the use of directed energy weapons to dazzle their sensors, and the use of software and network techniques to influence or compromise computer systems linked to satellite operations or even to hijack the satellites themselves.18 Such non-kinetic counterspace capabilities, as well as some means of kinetic attack (e.g. using hijacked satellites to damage or destroy other satellites, or conducting Rendezvous Proximity Operations to approach and damage an opponent’s satellites), will become part of the repertoire in the so called “grey zone” conflicts that Russia and China excel at and so far tend prefer to direct military confrontation. For the decision-makers in the Baltic States, this raises the spectre of space services (such as imagery, communications, or global positioning and navigation) provided by Allies or commercial partners becoming restricted or unavailable at some critical points during a security crisis manufactured by Russia.
If a mechanical failure – due to a natural incident or hostile action – leading to a denial of service or complete loss of space assets occurs during a period of heightened geopolitical tensions, the possibility of escalation and broader conflict could arise. At this point, in the words of Joan Johnson-Freese, “the chances of maintaining a space war at a limited level appear similar to those of fighting a limited nuclear war: not good.”19 Scenarios like this may require that NATO not only coordinate the development of new capabilities and enhance its space threat awareness, but also incorporate diplomacy into the implementation of its space policy in order to advance international norms of responsible behaviour with regard to space-based systems and assets, build transparency and trust, and preserve the overall strategic stability, which could be threatened by escalating conflict in outer space.20 For the Baltic States – which have become sceptical towards arms control, CSBM and other frameworks and initiatives involving Russia – this might become a difficult proposition, prompting them to define some clear “red lines”, the crossing of which might weaken the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture. However, doing so would entail understanding strategic issues related to outer space and defining their own perspective.
The Baltic perspective and challenges
The recognition of outer space as an operational domain has various implications for the Alliance and its individual members, even if NATO’s ambition is not (yet) to become an actor in it. As Kęstutis Paulauskas points out, the “implementation of space as an operational domain will allow NATO’s military commanders to properly and fully take into account space requirements in training and exercises as well as defence and operational planning.”21 The Alliance will now be busy defining and refining its requirements for space capabilities and then, through the defence planning process, will seek to ensure that the capabilities of all NATO nations are catalogued and coordinated, as well as that national plans take into account NATO’s needs and do not leave any significant gaps when put together. The Alliance’s planning of multidomain operations (MDOs), joint doctrine development, standardisation processes, and training and exercises will include space considerations as a composite part.22 By establishing a Space Centre, the Alliance has already started to make some visible structural adjustments, allowing it develop space domain awareness, share data, and coordinate activities within NATO’s overall command structure – and there is much more less-visible but equally important work being done across the Alliance in order to implement its overarching space policy.23
Where does this put the Baltic States? The space domain has always been a blind spot in the defence planning and capability development processes in the three capitals. Just a few years back, mentioning the need to consider the implications of developments in outer space drew blank faces at best and outright ridicule at worst. Interest in support from space-based assets was confined to small, specialised military communities of practice such as ISR, communications, naval and special forces, or air surveillance. It seldom, if at all, entered the considerations of the high command or defence planners, as the Baltic States retained their steady focus on developing land forces as their top priority – even though land operations rely, to a considerable extent, on the availability of various space-based services. Space ignorance also stands in stark contrast to all the attention paid to the cyber domain, which was declared a new operational domain by NATO in 2016, leading to such steps as the establishment of a dedicated Cyber Command in the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF).24
NATO’s London decision is now tentatively putting space on the mental map of the defence leadership in the Baltic States. In a recent media interview, for instance, the Commander of the EDF Major General Martin Herem said that this was potentially a new area for trilateral Baltic military cooperation, and he even suggested that the Baltic States draw upon the civilian sector’s work in order to develop their own space-based capability (in the form of nanosatellites).25 Although this may sound like a somewhat poorly thought-through idea – not least because trilateral Baltic military cooperation has been underperforming in many other areas that are less challenging or complex than venturing into outer space – it still marks a welcome turn of sentiment regarding opportunities related to space as an operational domain.26 At the same time, it is necessary to understand that any national or regional ambition that is linked to a broader NATO framework would take a long time to acquire shape, to develop all the ingredients necessary for its success, and then to reach maturity as an integral part of national defence.
In this process, however, there are some issues and aspects that could already be addressed by Baltic defence policymakers and military planners in the short- and medium-term:
At the policy level, there is a need for national and regional (e.g. within the format of the Baltic Ministerial Committee) discussions on what would constitute acts of aggression in outer space that would warrant the invocation of Article 5 and where the “grey zones” of conflict lie with regard to adversarial kinetic and nonkinetic action against the space assets and infrastructure of the Allies. This is a necessary mental exercise that would help the Baltics appreciate how various scenarios may unfold and when a collective diplomatic and military action might be called upon (or when scenarios would just warrant security consultations under Article 4).