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Attacks on space assets and orbital weapons trigger rapid escalation to great power nuclear war

Michael P. Gleason 20, national security senior project engineer at The Aerospace Corporation’s Center for Space Policy and Strategy, previously senior strategic space analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense Office of Net Assessment; and Peter L. Hays, retired Air Force Lt Col who works as a defense contractor in the Pentagon supporting the assistant secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, October 2020, “A ROADMAP FOR ASSESSING SPACE WEAPONS,” https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/Gleason-Hays_SpaceWeapons_20201005_1.pdf

In addition, some argue that space weapons present broader geopolitical risks due to their potential effects on deterrence and strategic stability. Space capabilities have a close relationship to nuclear stability and the potential for escalation between great powers. Space weapons could therefore alter how decisionmakers calculate nuclear deterrence. Many of the visions of space-to-Earth weapons imagine them having incredible speed and accuracy tied to the ability to target any point on Earth with minimal or even no warning. At enough scale and with sufficient destructive effects, such attributes would threaten a first-strike capability; i.e., the ability to wipe out a target country’s nuclear deterrent before it has a chance to launch a retaliatory strike. If so, nuclear deterrence may fail, a consideration that may outweigh all others. Similarly, some have comparable concerns about space-based ballistic missile defenses nullifying a country’s nuclear deterrent and providing a nuclear first-strike incentive for the country that possesses such capability.

Earth-to-space weapons create concerns because targeting early warning satellites, strategic surveillance satellites, and nuclear command and control communication satellites could also be perceived as the immediate prelude to a nuclear first strike by an adversary, triggering a response on the nuclear escalation ladder. Even if space weapons do not fatally undermine nuclear deterrence, they still offer another path to rapid nuclear escalation.

Space weapons might upset strategic stability in other ways as well. Space is considered an offensive dominant arena, meaning it is materially easier and less costly to attack a satellite—including space-based weapons—than to defend a satellite. Earth-to-space and space-to-space weapons provide an offensive capability for attacking targets in space. Political scientists contend that war is more likely when the offensive is dominant—especially if it is difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons—and argue that there are strong incentives for striking first should a conflict appear inevitable.13 Surprise attack is perceived as leading to large rewards. Space weapons provide a first-mover advantage for striking in space, but their speed could create crisis instability since decisionmakers—on all sides—will have very little time (perhaps only a handful of minutes) to decide what to do in the face of a sudden attack in space, creating a high risk of rapid escalation due to misunderstanding, miscommunication, and miscalculation.

Finally, the use of destructive, non-reversible kinetic Earth-to-space or space-to-space weapons would likely leave a persistent cloud of debris and pose a long-term (potentially decades or much longer) hazard to all satellites, including commercial and scientific satellites as well as satellites from non-adversary nations. Using weapons with non-kinetic, non-permanent affects would mitigate this risk.

The Previous Debate: Changes in Context, Assumptions, and Alternatives

A vigorous public discussion covering many of the factors discussed above flared during the last period in which the U.S. seriously considered the merits of space-based weapons, peaking around 2002 and waning a few years later.14 But a lot has changed since then.

The earlier debate centered around two key alternatives: the first was whether the United States should deploy space-based weapons first—well before China or Russia would be capable of doing so effectively—in order to take a significant strategic leap ahead or, second, whether the United States should practice restraint in order to preserve strategic stability and not provoke China or Russia to react in kind. Those core alternatives are no longer operative. Since that era, China has deployed operational ground-based, direct-ascent, kinetic-kill ASATs and demonstrated co-orbital ASAT capabilities.15 Russia has also tested ground-based, direct-ascent kinetic ASATs and appears to have tested in-orbit anti-satellite weaponry as well. The United States no longer gets to choose whether to leap ahead or to seek to inspire restraint among U.S. competitors. Indeed, today both China and Russia have the capability to station weapons in space and the June 2020 Defense Space Strategy states bluntly that China and Russia have already weaponized space.16 While a future administration could revise U.S. strategy in space or attempt to secure new international agreements restricting space weapons, the U.S. has rung a bell that cannot be unrung by declaring space as a warfighting domain and by revealing some of what is known about potential adversaries’ activities there. There will be implications on behavior by allies, adversaries, and third parties, as well as within the U.S. government.

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