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Mounting Russian ASAT capabilities necessitate a clarification of non-kinetic response thresholds

Marcin Piotrowski ’19, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Warsaw, Analyst with the International Security Program at the Polish Institute of International Affairs; Polish Institute of International Affairs, November 14, "Russia’s Approach to Anti-satellite Weapons and Systems," https://pism.pl/file/8abbf9bc-8742-4f18-a2e9-c09c73ac69d0

Implications for the U.S. and NATO. Russia is concerned about the United States’ growing technological advantage and military domination in space and is proposing international laws aimed at limiting ASAT. At the same time, the Russian authorities are developing kinetic ASAT weapons, which are presented as a response to similar projects carried out by China, the U.S. and India. Russia is currently able to add ASAT functions to missile defence systems such as A-235 and S-400, which can intercept exo-atmospheric warheads. In the next few years, it will also be able to use kinetic ASAT weapons (Rudolf and S-500) against civilian and military satellites in low-earth orbit and to deploy robotic satellites capable of disrupting military and civilian satellites in higher orbits. Russia’s ASAT weapons are an element of its “asymmetric response” to the development of the United States’ missile defence, new ground-launched missiles and hypersonic weapons. The U.S. is also paying close attention to Russia’s visible and advanced non-kinetic ASAT capabilities in terms of electronic and cyber-attacks. These threats from Russia were among the factors justifying the recent creation of a new space force branch of the military in the United States.

The broadening spectrum of Russia’s ASAT capabilities also requires a response from NATO and EU states. The Alliance approved a space policy in June, and the next stage might take place at the December meeting of NATO heads of state and government in London, where space will be recognised as a fifth domain of military operations and the Allies will work on a specific space strategy. NATO’s doctrines current see air and space as one, so need to be updated to take account of new threats. Within NATO there is a need to address the implications of ASAT weapons on Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. It may be that non-kinetic disruption of a satellite belonging to any NATO member will be the subject of consultations under Article 4, and the Alliance could decide that the physical destruction of a member’s satellite may be deemed an act of aggression that would call for Article 5 to be invoked. Allied exercises should incorporate ASAT-attack and GPS-jamming scenarios in future, particularly when planning large-scale exercises such as the upcoming Defender 20. Poland’s armed forces technical modernisation programme for the period to 2035 assumes the acquisition of reconnaissance satellites, so additional protection from non-kinetic attacks might be necessary. The EU institutions and countries should use information campaigns to increase awareness among civilians who rely on satellites vulnerable to non-kinetic ASAT attacks during peacetime or in hybrid warfare.

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