There are growing cyber threats to the NATO’s satellites – Russia and China are rapidly advancing their cyber capabilities and have the potential to attack the NATO’s space based assets
Karl-Heinz Brunner 21, member NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Bundestag Defence Committee and Subcommittee on Disarmament, Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation, October 2021, “Space and Security – NATO’s Role,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Committee, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2021-04/025%20STC%2021%20E%20-%20SPACE%20AND%20SECURITY%20-%20BRUNNER_2.pdf
42. Space denial capabilities of NATO (near-)peer competitors have significantly increased in recent years, and so have the number of tests of such technologies. Several countries possess weapon systems that have the potential to harm space assets at any time. According to CSIS’s 2020-Space Threat Assessment there are four types of systems that can be used to damage or destroy space-based assets (Harrison, Johnson, Roberts, Way, & Young, 2020): (1) kinetic physical counterspace weapons, built to directly strike satellites or the ground stations operating them; (2) non-kinetic weapons, including lasers, high powered microwave (HPM) weapons, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, that can physically affect space assets without any direct contact; (3) electronic attacks targeting signal transmissions to and from satellites by interfering with radio-frequencies (RF) by creating noise in the same frequencies (jamming) or by falsifying a signal and tricking the receiver into it (spoofing), thus corrupting the data; (4) cyberattacks, that target data instead of transmission frequencies. 43. Kinetic physical counterspace weapons have attracted the most attention by far. Tests of direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons have increased as more countries develop capabilities in this domain (Harrison, Johnson, Roberts, Way, & Young, 2020). The most prominent of these tests has arguably been the destruction of a satellite by China in 2007 which increased space debris in LEO by roughly 10% and was followed by broad international condemnation (Ohlandt, McClintock, & Flanagan, 2021). A more recent ASAT test by China, conducted in 2018, was further evidence of Beijing’s growing prowess and ambition in space. Building on extensive experience from Soviet-era ASAT-programmes, Russia has also invested in numerous kinetic physical counterspace capabilities and allegedly has a range of ground-based and air-launched directascent ASAT missiles that could target satellites at its disposal (Harrison, Johnson, Roberts G., Way, & Young, 2020). 44. In addition to direct-ascent systems, co-orbital ASAT-weapons have also already been deployed in space. Their activity is more difficult to detect, however, as it is very similar to on-orbit maintenance or debris removal missions. As most space technologies, co-orbital weapons are a dual-use technology and can be used for both civilian and military purposes. Arguably, any asset in the orbits above earth can be qualified as a weapon just because of its high velocity. With speeds between 11,000 (GEO) and 28,000 (LEO) kilometres per hour, a satellite that changes orbit becomes a kinetic weapon by definition. 45. Some of the most advanced space denial assets have been developed and tested by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Pentagon’s annual China military power report notes that Beijing’s space capabilities include orbiting space robots (U.S. Department of Defense, 2020). Similarly, Russia has repeatedly launched inspection-satellites into LEO, which could potentially serve as co-orbital ASAT weapons. Although Moscow has not officially announced any plans to develop space based ASAT weapons, US Space Command accused the Kremlin of testing such weapons-systems under the guise of maintenance in 2020 (US Space Command, 2020). 46. Other than China and Russia, numerous other states are working on counter-space capabilities (Raju, 2020). The threat is also illustrated by the variety of modes of action against satellites: missiles, co-orbital, jamming, directed energy and cyber (Weeden & Samson, 2020). Research and development in these areas is significant, progress is rapid, and some capabilities such as jamming are already in use, in the Middle East (BBC, 2012) or to disrupt NATO exercises in the High North (Deutsche Welle, 2018). Even civilian systems, such as those intended for rendezvous and proximity operations to dock with a space station or perform maintenance, could be dual-use and pose a threat in the vicinity of military satellites or those providing services essential to our economies and lifestyles. 47. While receiving less public attention than their kinetic counterparts, non-kinetic weapon systems such as lasers and electronic technologies enabling jamming or spoofing have also been increasingly developed and tested. According to the Rand Corporation, China continues to develop space weapons and has developed jamming capabilities and tested them in exercises (Manson & Shepherd, 2020). 48. The development of China’s non-kinetic capabilities dates back to the purchase of Soviet-era equipment from Ukraine in the late 1990s (CSIS, 2018). Since then, Beijing’s indigenous space industry has made the ability to jam satellite communications one of its priorities (USCC, 2015) and has developed and tested several systems (DIA, 2019). China’s electronic warfare capacity includes an ionospheric radar located on the island of Hainan that is able to influence particles up to 2,000 kilometres. In 2020, officials announced an airborne laser which, although developed to target military aircraft or missiles, could potentially be used against satellites (Zhen, 2020). 49. Russia, too, has been consistently enhancing its space denial capabilities. The state armament programme for the period until 2027 lists the development of defensive space-based systems deployed to protect Russian satellites (Zak, 2018). Moreover, Russia is commonly believed to be testing electronic counterspace warfare, jamming and spoofing adversaries’ satellites in conflict zones as well as in nearby territories (Harrison, Johnson, Roberts, Way, & Young, 2020) and even on GPS-Satellites within its own state borders (BBC, 2018). 50. Finally, several actors in space have developed substantial knowledge in the cyber realm. As cyber-attacks are significantly cheaper and much harder to attribute than direct-ascent or co-orbital ASAT, they are a compelling alternative to these weapon systems. Russia has demonstrated its cyber capabilities as early as 1998, when it allegedly took control of a US-German satellite, pointed it at the Sun and thus destroyed its instruments (Tucker, 2019). The Chinese government appears to also have tested its cyber capabilities in several instances such as during the 2014 National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) hack (Al-Rodhan, 2020). The attack disrupted weather information and impacted end users around the globe (Al-Rodhan, 2020). More generally, research and development in space denial capabilities is significant, progress is rapid, and some capabilities, such as jamming, are already in use, for example in the Middle East (BBC, 2012) or to disrupt NATO exercises in the High North (Deutsche Welle, 2018).