Russia won’t risk a kinetic attack on NATO satellites – too worried about the response. Will only risk cyberattack.
Hitchens ’22 (Theresa Hitchens, Space and Air Force reporter at Breaking Defense, former Defense News editor, former senior research associate at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), former director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). “Russia could target American space firms to blind Ukraine” 02/15/22 https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/in-ukraine-conflict-russia-could-go-after-american-commercial-isr-providers/)
There is little question that Russia will jam and/or spoof GPS receivers should it decide to invade Ukraine, as going after GPS has become almost ubiquitous as a first military move since the conflict in Kosovo.
But US government officials, former officials and outside experts are divided on how worried the US government ought to be about attacks aside from GPS jamming. Specifically, there is concern that Russia could directly target US satellites, including birds.
A kinetic attack, such as the one in November, seems unlikely, as it would risk drawing the US into a conflict the President Joe Biden has said he has no plans to join. But Russia has a whole host of non-kinetic options for targeting satellite systems that could still be disruptive or destructive for American industry and its government customer, and which raise the question about where the line is between an act of aggression and an act of war.
Attacks on ISR sats: will they or won’t they?
The Russian military has routinely jammed GPS in Eastern Ukraine since the Crimean conflict in 2014, according to experts inside and outside the US government, and often spoofs GPS simply to disguise President Vladimir Putin’s movements around Moscow.
“We’ve seen lots of evidence of non-destructive counterspace capabilities being used by Russia in both Eastern Ukraine and Syria since 2014 and there’s a lot of evidence that these capabilities are fully integrated into their units at the doctrinal and operational level,” said Brian Weeden of Secure World Foundation (SWF). “So, I definitely expect ubiquitous use of jamming, spoofing, and cyber attacks against services like the civil GPS signals and satellite communications if Russia opens a new front in Ukraine.”
That evidence — as well as a wealth of information about Russia’s effort to develop destructive anti-satellite technology — is publicly documented in SWF’s 2021 annual report, as well as the sister report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) called .
Russia’s calculus on other types of satellites, however, is an open question. In particular, the fact that Ukraine is reliant on outside sources, including the US, for imagery about Russian troop movements raises the possibility that Russian military commanders might see those satellites as targets.
“Even though [America is] not directly involved in the conflict in other domains, we will be in space, because we’re likely going to be providing real time tactical intelligence from our space based assets to the Ukrainian forces. And that makes our space assets a target for the Russians,” CSIS’s Todd Harrison said.
Such attacks will be more likely if Russian forces find themselves in trouble in Ukraine, he said, “because Ukrainians are acting on really good intelligence about where the Russians are.” Thus, “Russia might try to cut that off” using “laser dazzling” to blind satellite cameras “or even maybe even a kinetic ASAT weapon.”
However, several other experts said the odds on Moscow directly targeting US government spy or missile warning satellites are low because Putin does not want the US or its allies to become involved in Ukraine. An attack on those ISR satellites, especially using a destructive ASAT such as the one , would almost certainly guarantee a US response.
“I doubt that the Russians would do anything in space. The US and their allies have made it clear they have no desire or intention to become embroiled in the actual conflict although they are certainly ready with sanctions and to respond if needed,” Doug Loverro, former head of Pentagon space policy, said in an email.
“It’s easier to stay out of conflict when you have no direct attack on US or NATO assets. And the Russians do not want the US involved, so they will likely avoid any direct physical attack on US assets.”
Weeden agreed, saying “It’s extremely unlikely that Russia would escalate that to destructive attacks against US or NATO satellites. We have never seen those kinds of counterspace attacks used in warfare to date and it would almost certainly draw the US and NATO into the conflict, something Russia desperately doesn’t want to happen.”
On the other hand, Loverro said that jamming and cyber attacks are not just possible but likely — noting that the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) clearly sets out that any satellites being used by Ukraine, no matter who owns those satellites, are fair game.
“The likelihood of jamming is quite high (as are cyber-attacks) because under anyone’s interpretation of the LOAC, any communication/information systems being used by the Ukrainians are legitimate targets, even if the other end belong to the US or NATO,” Loverro said.