Cybersecurity in space is the largest threat to NC3 integrity --- US collaboration with NATO allies to develop new measures now is key.
Dr. Jared Dunnmon 17, postdoctoral fellow in the Computer Science Department at Stanford, 2017, “Nuclear Command and Control in the Twenty-First Century: Maintaining Surety in Outer Space and Cyberspace”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep23162.5.pdf \\SYang
While rapid advances in information technology, communications, and computation have yielded many improvements to NC3 systems, these improvements have come at the cost of NC3 surety and security. The two domains in which these costs are most apparent are the two newest arenas of conflict: outer space and cyberspace. In the words of Admiral Haney, “the space domain, along with cyberspace, is simultaneously more critical to all U.S. operations yet more vulnerable than ever to hostile actions.”14 The worrisome combination of international norms that have been far outpaced by the speed of technological advancement and democratization of key space and cyber technologies has led the United States to a point where it is difficult to be confident that the current NC3 structure is resilient in a cyber-physical sense. Outer Space The major threat to NC3 posed by vulnerabilities in space-based assets results from potential disruptions to both early warning and communications functions. As noted by Frank Rose, former deputy assistant secretary of state for defense policy and verification operations, The United States in particular is deeply reliant upon space. While such reliance enables the United States and our allies and partners to undertake a range of operations in support of peace and security, this reliance has increasingly been viewed by potential adversaries as a vulnerability to be exploited through the development of counterspace capabilities. This reality is particularly emergent in the context of NC3. At present, it is known that Russia and China are actively pursuing or already maintain such capabilities as laser weapons for satellite denial, electromagnetic (EM) jamming for communications degradation, and physical antisatellite (ASAT) systems. Given heavy reliance on satellites such as Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM) in the NC3 system, ensuring both reliability and resiliency to these types of threats will be critical to creating a flexible and efficient NC3 system. Cyberspace In the cyber domain, potential vulnerabilities exist in all three parts of the command, control, and communications triad. Specifically, due to cyberspace’s relatively low cost of entry, cyber threats range from state-sponsored offensive military operations and espionage activities, to [violent extremist organizations] intent on disrupting our way of life, to cyber criminals and recreational hackers seeking financial gain and notoriety. Additionally, the U.S. supply chain and critical infrastructure remains vulnerable to cyber attack, and even as we detect and defeat attacks, attribution remains a significant challenge. At present, assumptions are that NC3 is secured via a combination of air gaps, technological superiority in outer space and cyberspace, and human intervention in the control loop. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. In the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program, for instance, documented vulnerabilities include potential entry into the firewalled NC3 system, phony orders being conveyed via a backup antenna, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on the nuclear infrastructure, and even a direct attack on thousands of feet of cable of the Hardened Intersite Cable System. For the strategic ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) component, it has been widely publicized that the United States has chosen to use Linux-based operating systems in its SSBNs, as opposed to Windows XP-based architectures currently used by the British Trident program. While neither of these operating systems is inherently problematic, the fact that their use in specific functional domains has been published so widely will enable hackers to focus on the correct class of exploits to use against these systems. This observation, furthermore, hints at a distressing reality: with the emergence of ubiquitous cyber threats, the U.S. acquisition process has already begun moving toward increased levels of security and classification across the Department of Defense (DoD) enterprise, which hinders efficiency at all levels of the acquisition process. Without firing a shot, the opponent may well have caused substantial cost to the United States already due to the inefficiency resultant from broadly increased data security and classification procedures. With the bomber airborne component of the command, control, and communications triad, the Air Force has experienced several NC3 breakdowns in the past several decades, the most recent of which involved the inadvertent placement of several nuclear warheads in a strategic bomber that flew over the United States. While this latter situation was not necessarily a cyber failure of commission, it is certainly one of omission in the sense that appropriate command and control safeguards were not in place to prevent such a mistake from occurring. Critical infrastructure that either directly or indirectly supports the nuclear enterprise, such as the domestic power grid is also vulnerable to cyber attack. Janet Napolitano, former secretary of homeland security, recently estimated that an adversary could disable one of the major U.S. power grids with 80 to 90 percent probability of success. The frequency of such cyber vulnerabilities generally correlates with the size of the codebase—one can usually assume one error per thousand lines of code. For perspective, a generic Linux operating system had 15 million lines of code as of 2011. Thus, while the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) currently deploys a wide variety of cyber-defense techniques in defense of nuclear assets, including vulnerability scanning, firewalls, commercial antivirus systems, encryption, data loss prevention, data at rest security, network monitoring, enterprise forensics, and automated security control assessment, it is impractical to find every possible vulnerability in a large codebase and thus impossible to guarantee absolute security from zero-day exploits.2Further, post-detection attribution remains a challenge that usually takes weeks to sort out, meaning that attribution may be unachievable on timescales characteristic of a crisis. Many of the most daunting challenges for NC3 resilience lie at the intersection of cyberspace and outer space domains, where cyber attacks are directed at space-based NC3 assets. A recent study revealed substantial numbers of exploitable flaws in many widely used commercial satellite architectures, including the Iridium constellation, International Maritime Satellites (INMARSAT), and other satellites commonly used by both North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and critical infrastructure systems. Key vulnerability categories included hard-coded credentials (undocumented credentials that can authenticate in documented interfaces), undocumented protocols (protocols not intended for end users), insecure protocols (end-user protocols that pose a security risk), and backdoors (mechanisms used to access features not intended for end users). Outcomes from reported exploits included control over systems as varied as land-based communication and aircraft navigation, either of which could have a debilitating effect on MEECN integrity and ultimate NC3 efficacy. Understanding and mitigating the potential effects of these cyber threats to space-based assets will be imperative in ensuring the continued effectiveness of NC3.