Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Cooperating over space-based cybersecurity including at least clarifying Article 5 solves.

Rose Gottemoeller 6-26; Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy; Defence Studies, June 26, 2022; “Engaging with emerged and emerging domains: cyber, space, and technology in the 2022 NATO strategic concept,” https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2082955

NATO’s ability to achieve its core tasks of Collective Defense, Crisis Management, and Cooperative Security requires strength and resilience of each member state. It is critical to build a common strategic culture among Allies that embraces the technological complexity of these new domains and seeks to address the challenges of the strategic environment. While member states will continue to have differential capabilities within each domain, the culture among Allies must reflect a desire to maintain a competitive edge by growing human capital and technological development. Political elites of member states must also understand how this technological complexity may shape their decision making and their understanding of escalatory pathways (Kubiak and Mishra 2022). NATO must foster a culture of adaptability and flexibility to handle the everchanging nature of cyber, space, and EDT. Consensus, communication, and cooperation, described below, serve as the foundational pillars upon which a resilient and adaptable Alliance grows.

Consensus

Consensus is at the heart of the Alliance. To properly integrate cyber and space domains into the Strategic Concept, Allies should seek internal consensus on three topics: 1) the threshold of cyberattack or space action upon which Allies can invoke Article 5 2) actions short-of-war that must addressed by steady-state defense operations or that require a collective Allied response 3) actions that NATO will proactively take in these domains to ensure adequate defense in cyberspace.

First, although the Comprehensive Cyber Defense Policy acknowledges that Allies may invoke Article 5 after experiencing a cyberattack, it is not clear what threshold of cyberattack constitutes a violation of Article 5. This must be explored further by the Allies to reduce delay in consensus in the event of a cyberattack. Second, Allies must also seek to understand what cyber operations place NATO’s core tasks of Collective Defense, Crisis Management, and Cooperative Security at risk. Cyber operations, such as espionage and cyber-enabled information operations, are often used to subvert and erode state power outside periods of conventional conflict. The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept narrowly scopes defense and deterrence to cyber attacks; however, it is precisely cyber operations short-of-force that require thoughtful consideration to integrate within the forthcoming NATO Strategic Concept. Cyber operations create and amplify crises, eroding the “territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members” (NATO 2010, 9). This is best illustrated with numerous attempts to sow division through election interference (Sarts 2017). Cyber operations undermine the collective nature of defense by exploiting democratic society and wedge driving among NATO states. The democratic nature and open information environment of most Allies makes the Alliance particularly vulnerable to cyber operations short-of-force. Member states must reach consensus that cyber operations below the threshold of war are still critical threats to the effectiveness of the Alliance. This also extends to actions in space that threaten the essential tasks of the Alliance but fall short of physical destruction (Smith 2022).

While consensus is required among members to identify these thresholds, the Allies must also reach consensus on whether to reveal or conceal these thresholds beyond the Alliance. NATO must ask if a clearly declared threshold in cyber and space domains bolsters deterrence or whether deterrence in these domains operates differently than conventional armed conflict. One consideration that may inform this discussion: Will adversaries test the limits to find a covert threshold or does the strategic ambiguity provide a greater deterrent? If Allies believe that a declared Article 5 threshold will be tested by adversaries to challenge the credibility of the threshold, it may be worth concealing. If Allies believe that concealing an Article 5 threshold would increase probing attacks that test the limit of the Alliance, it may be worth revealing. Regardless, an openly declared threshold upon which member states can invoke Article 5 must also overcome the limitations of the cyber domain that make deterrence difficult. Moreso than armed attack, cyber operations continue to generate significant uncertainty about intentions, and can be concealed from the public due to their often-clandestine nature (Lonergan and Lonergan 2022). Also, the timing associated with attribution could reduce the salience of a response (Baliga et al 2020). These features of the cyber domain may make deterrence by punishment less credible and may make Article 5 invocation slow to realize. Therefore, if NATO would like to publicly declare a threshold to invoke Article 5 in cyber and space, NATO must acknowledge these challenges to preserve the credibility of the threshold. NATO must also over-communicate that, across all domains, Article 5 must be invoked by an Ally and is not an automatic escalation pathway.

Finally, Allies must seek consensus on how NATO uses cyber operations short-offorce within the context of cyber defense. As offense-defense distinguishability is muddled in cyberspace, Allies must decide whether Defense and Deterrence is best advanced by in-network activity or whether NATO will operate outside their network as a form of defensive practice (Slayton 2017). There has been a large academic debate on the efficacy of deterrence by punishment in cyberspace (Gartzke and Lindsay 2019; Nye 2017; Brantly 2018). Recently, scholars have coalesced around deterrence by denial as the most effective deterrent in cyberspace. However, deterrence by denial is most successful when states are willing to conduct counter-cyber operations. Yet, these operations can be controversial for their offensive nature; for example, the United States cyber doctrine of “Persistent Engagement” and “Hunt Forward” utilize offensive means for defensive ends (Borghard and Lonergan 2021). The Allies should seek consensus as to what operational actions within the cyber domain best uphold Collective Defense.

Communication

Communication is central to properly integrating cyber and space into the NATO Strategic Concept and contributes to the resilience of and within the Alliance. Communication about cyber, space, and EDT should purposefully occur with two audiences in mind: intra-Alliance communication among member states and extraAlliance communication intended for NATO’s adversaries and partners.

Intra-Alliance communication must focus on three primary objectives: 1) reducing technical barriers for political decision makers to facilitate their response to rapidly evolving space and cyber development; 2) creating common understanding among member states at varying degrees of capabilities; 3) eliminating stove-piping of complex technologies. The technical nature of these domains can intimidate or create high barriers to entry for political decision makers. Decision makers must be able to understand crises to manage them. NATO must seek to integrate experts who can serve as the translators between decision makers and technicians in the field to facilitate consensus and development within cyber and space domains. Intra-alliance communication and knowledge sharing can also help overcome disparities among member states who have differential capabilities. Additionally, intra-Alliance communication between conventional domains and the cyber, space and EDT operational and policy cells will further integrate these new domains into the fabric of the Alliance.

Extra-Alliance communication must: 1) enhance credibility of deterrence through clear, credible guarantees of punishment and communication of NATO’s capabilities (Lonergan and Montgomery 2022) and 2) collectively attribute perpetrators and disclose discovered vulnerabilities to improve the resilience of these domains. Deterrence relies on a clear understanding of cost–benefit analysis (Lindsay and Gartzke 2018). NATO must clearly communicate their capabilities and the range of potential consequences so adversaries understand the costly nature of attempting to overcome NATO’s defensive capabilities and the high costs by way of punishment should they succeed. Communication strategies should emphasize the resolve of NATO in addressing cyber, space, and EDT threats and, most essentially, the political will to respond to a cyber or space attack. These external communication strategies harden the deterrent by bolstering credibility of a response without tying their hands to a specific response. Moreover, communication through public attribution, as was illustrated in the 2020 Microsoft Exchange Hack (Connolly 2021), demonstrates consensus about the identity of the perpetrator and increases costs for cyber adversaries (Egloff 2020; Egloff and Smeets 2021; Hedgecock 2021). Taken together, intra-Alliance communication improves the resilience of the Alliance and enhances Cooperative Security and Crisis Management. While extra-Alliance communication serves to bolster the Collective Defense.

Cooperation

The cyber and space domains have often been interpreted as public commons. As a result, these commons are difficult to govern and serve as the intersection of public and private actors. NATO must seek to lead cooperation within the Alliance, across partnership states, and with private actors to maintain a scientific edge (Rugolo and Monic 2022). NATO currently supports the Industry Cyber Partnership to improve Allies’ network security and increase resilience. This industry partnership must be replicated in a NATO Industry Emerging Technology Partnership, to facilitate a competitive edge in capabilities that are on the horizon or not fully realized in the operational security environment. The agreement to establish Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) for civil-military cooperation at the 2021 Brussels Summit, is a step in the right direction. Once established, cooperation must also be facilitated across partnership hubs within NATO to prevent stove piping of innovation. Additionally, it is critical that these innovation centers encourage partnerships across the entire spectrum of private industry, from startups and garage innovators to large scale private corporations with extensive scale research and development (Kosal 2022). Finally, intra-Alliance cooperation requires intelligence sharing and capability development among member states to ensure that the Alliance continues to meet the challenges of the strategic environment. One example of intra-Alliance cooperation that compliments NATO’s efforts is the European Union’s initiatives to bolster cybersecurity. The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity’s efforts to improve capacity, cooperation, and a whole-of-society approach to cybersecurity ultimately bolster NATO’s deterrence by denial by hardening the attack surface of Europe.

Recommendations

In keeping with the current NATO essential core tasks- Collective Defense, Crisis Management, Cooperative Security- and the structure of the existing Strategic Concept, we submit several recommendations for consideration in 2022 NATO Strategic Concept: In discussions of the Security Environment within the forthcoming Strategic Concept, NATO must enhance the discussion of cyber, space, and EDT. We recommend that NATO change the language from “cyber attack” to “cyber operation” to capture the wide spectrum of activities that subvert and erode state power including cyber espionage and cyber-enable information operations In discussions of the Collective Defense, we recommend that NATO address how the space domain fits within the context of defense and deterrence, while also acknowledging the critical role that space plays in maintaining communications and interoperability among Allies. NATO must also incorporate public attribution of cyber operations as a political and strategic tool that can bolster the collective defense and cooperative security of member states. We recommend that NATO reach consensus on a threshold that constitutes an “attack against all” in the cyber and space domain. Allies must also decide whether to only communicate the existence of the threshold or to publicly reveal the threshold upon which a member may invoke Article 5.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.