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Failure to establish coherent space policy ends credible deterrence, encourages first strikes, and deliberate risk-taking. Independently, a litany of thumpers outweigh the link.

Tim Swieijs and Frans Osinga 20; Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, PhD in War Studies from King’s College London; Professor of War Studies at Leiden University, PhD from the Clingendael Institute of International Relations; 4/4/20; "VIII. Maintaining NATO’s Technological Edge," Whitehall Papers, Vol. 95, Issue 1, p. 104-118]

Space assets are increasingly central to the functioning of globally networked societies. Satellite launch capabilities are proliferating, while the cost of satellites is decreasing. Fourteen states can now launch their own satellites and more than 80 states possess space-based assets, while numerous commercial providers offer services from space to anyone who can afford them.14 Space-based assets are also increasingly critical enablers of current and future military operations, with most CS4IR functions depending on them. Major military powers without space-based assets are in essence deaf, blind and mute, and indeed paralysed. Intelligence, communication, precision weapons and logistics all depend on properly functioning space systems.

Not surprisingly, space is increasingly regarded as a military domain. Space is now starting to be weaponised, the terms of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty notwithstanding. In March 2019, India became the fourth country to demonstrate a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) capability in a live test, following the US, Russia and China, which first did so in 2007. These tests are emblematic of a more pervasive trend. The US, under President Donald Trump, re-established a Space Command in 2019 as a precursor to an eventual Space Force. In China, the Strategic Support Force, established in 2015, has an important role in further developing the PLA’s space warfare capabilities. Russia, building on the vast infrastructure established during Soviet times, remains an important space power.

In strictly military terms, Europe’s space powers lag behind China, Russia and the US, which are currently recalibrating their military space postures and are actively investing not only in greater numbers of satellites, but also in stronger protection of those systems, better encrypted download and upload datalinks, and further development of ASAT missile systems, satellite jammers and directed energy weapons.15 China has embarked on a manned programme seeking to establish a research station on the Moon in the mid-2020s and to post humans there for extended periods in the 2030s.16 The US also intends to return to the Moon; the first unmanned mission to transport cargo is planned for 2021, to be followed by a manned mission in 2024.17

Meanwhile, billionaires Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos and Richard Branson have each launched their own space corporations, based on grand visions of space exploration, exploitation and colonisation. At the same time, the US government is redrafting its rules and regulations, no longer designating space as a ‘global commons’ but clearly pursuing the objective to ‘unshackle business activity in space’.18 If history is any guide, attempts to establish control over economic resources will likely be accompanied by the deployment of military power to enforce and guarantee that control. Space, in sum, truly constitutes a new frontier for the conduct of terrestrial and, down the line, extra-terrestrial competition and conflict.

Implications for NATO

The literature on revolutions in military affairs (RMAs) suggests that those who manage to harness and exploit new technologies, combine them with novel operational and organisational concepts and evolve a new way of war stand to gain significantly – a sobering insight in this era of strategic competition. This is not lost on, for instance, Putin, who highlighted the impact of AI on the international order when he observed that ‘artificial intelligence is the future,…whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world’.19 Chinese leaders have expressed similar views.20

Whether the technological trends described above signal the advent of another RMA or merely represent incremental change remains subject to debate.21 Regardless, the implications of the technological progress summarised here are already being made manifest and are likely to progressively materialise during the 2020s. The first attacks with swarms of drones have already taken place in Syria, Libya and Saudi Arabia, executed not by a state but by various non-state actors.

NATO members already face an assortment of challenges, including the vicious conflict dynamics in Northern Africa, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, which are not likely to disappear soon. Further, Russia’s nuclear and conventional modernisation, in combination with its antiaccess/ area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, has cast doubt on the credibility of NATO’s conventional and nuclear deterrence posture.22 In this latter context, it has become painfully clear that the armed forces of European NATO members, in particular, have neglected the demands of joint highintensity warfare at their own peril. For NATO, these developments therefore suggest, at a minimum, a strong imperative to not only rebuild its capabilities, but also to keep pace with rapid technological advances.

NATO Initiatives

In recent years, NATO launched a series of initiatives to regain capabilities and expertise, with member states pledging to increase defence spending. Current capability improvement plans focus on enhancing readiness, regaining lost capabilities in artillery, tanks, transport and C2 assets; and introducing fifthgeneration jet fighters in greater numbers than those ordered prior to 2014. Cyber capabilities are also receiving a boost now that cyberspace has been designated a warfighting domain. The Alliance will enhance missile defence in the next decade by fielding state-of-the-art US radar systems in various Eastern European member states. Furthermore, NATO has formulated a roadmap for research on emerging technologies such as AI, quantum computing, autonomy and hypersonic missiles. Various organisations, such as NATO’s Science and Technology Organization (STO) and different centres of excellence, aim to support knowledge diffusion, create awareness and stimulate research and development. The STO conducts research on more than 250 projects across seven domains that canvass a wide spectrum of emerging technologies.23

European NATO member states that are also EU members have similarly agreed on a series of capability improvement initiatives. Following the 2016 EU Global Strategy, the EU launched the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). These initiatives focus on the range of capability targets identified in the 2018 update to the EU Capability Development Plan. The goals are to achieve a measure of strategic autonomy and to create a coherent full-spectrum force package. This force package aims to ensure air and information superiority and access to space-based systems; to support cyber response operations, naval manoeuvrability and air mobility; and finally, and more generically, to develop ‘innovative technologies for enhanced future military capabilities’.24 The US, meanwhile, has announced its determination to leverage the potential of emerging technologies in what has been labelled the ‘Third Offset’. In parallel with this initiative, the US is exploring a new operational concept – ‘Multi-Domain Operations’ – that harnesses and exploits these new capabilities and may play the same role as the AirLand Battle concept of the 1980s.25

Challenges

Despite these efforts, the developments sketched in this chapter present NATO members with an assortment of financial, ethical and military strategic challenges. For NATO’s European member states in particular, the Third Offset poses a considerable financial burden.26 Although European member states currently spend $264 billion collectively on defence, and despite a decade of improvement initiatives, the capability shortfalls that came to light in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999 persist.27 In 2012, one study concluded that without US contributions, Europe would struggle to conduct a so-called ‘Small Joint Operation, Air- Heavy’ – an operation comparable to Operation Allied Force or Unified Protector in Libya (2011).28 In 2020, European armed forces remain critically dependent on the US for C4ISR and suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) capabilities, cruise missiles, ballistic missile defence, stealth aircraft and electronic warfare assets. The same applies to creating and manning effective operational headquarters that rely on state-of-theart C2 technology as well as expertise in operational-level planning and commanding joint operations. Estimates indicate that without the US, the defence of the Baltic states and Poland would require an additional investment by European states of about $288−357 billion.29

Adapting to the new geopolitical environment and implementing capability improvements for their armed forces has proven difficult for Europe’s defence organisations, however, not least because of budgetary realities.30 Defence cooperation initiatives also suffer because European defence industries remain fractured and compartmentalised along national lines, and have a diminishing ability to nationally develop and manufacture complex leading-edge military capabilities. Remedying several of the capability shortfalls – those pertaining to large and complex systems such as tanker aircraft or electronic warfare platforms – also exceeds the requirements of individual countries and calls for collective action. In addition, actually fielding the necessary new capabilities takes at least a decade.31 Finally, while high-end weapon systems and emerging technologies claim much of the Alliance’s attention, funds will also be needed for restoring more mundane capabilities such as ammunition stockpiles and transport capacity, which will enable rapid reinforcement and a sustained military campaign. Given the rather dismal European track record in actually achieving military transformation as envisioned by NATO, investments in Third Offset technologies may never actually materialise and might not produce the necessary improvements even if they did.32

Another challenge lies in the controversial nature of some of these technologies. While the technologies may yield many military benefits, the legality and ethics of, for instance, deploying unmanned and semiautonomous weapon systems are hotly debated throughout society, academia, parliaments and religious circles (including the Vatican). Expert groups discuss the ethical and legal issues associated with military AI, including in the context of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. António Guterres, former UN Secretary-General, captured prevailing concerns when he warned in 2018 that ‘the prospect of machines with the discretion and power to take human life is morally repugnant’.33 Opponents of these weapon systems allege that they will result in the ‘dronification’ of foreign affairs and the dehumanisation of warfare: because the use of drones reduces the need to deploy soldiers, political leaders might be more inclined to resort to force or escalation during a crisis, with war as the result. If both contestants possess such an arsenal, what happens when one of them runs out of these systems?34 As a number of potential adversaries will certainly continue to field unmanned systems and develop military AI applications, NATO member states will need to recalibrate their capability portfolios to include defensive counter-drone capabilities and, given their increased vulnerability to drone attack, will need to reconsider which wars are worth fighting. The advent of military AI also raises military-strategic concerns, including how NATO should respond if Russia and China successfully integrate military AI and get inside Western OODA loops. NATO member states will therefore need to consider which military AI applications they want to develop and under which specific conditions they deem their use ethically acceptable.

A related concern pertains to the deployment of immature AI to the battlefield, which would increase fog and friction and fuel unwanted escalatory spirals. The potential destabilising effects of the combination of new and, in some cases, untested technologies and their impact on the strategic balance of power, escalation dynamics and war presents another challenge. Emerging military space capabilities will pose a serious risk to the dynamics underlying deterrence in a multipolar world which are already under pressure due to a new generation of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), the emergence of hypersonic (> Mach 5) missile gliders and the advent of global conventional prompt strike systems. If military powers can shut down the eyes and ears of adversaries by taking out their satellite systems, these adversaries may be unable to (fully) retaliate. This undermines credible deterrence and creates escalatory tendencies by giving parties an incentive to strike first. Ubiquitous surveillance systems (including spacebased sensors) that are guided by AI and can reveal the location of nuclear missiles (even onboard submarines) increase this risk, as the accurate knowledge these systems provide might prompt pre-emptive strikes or deliberate escalation and risk-taking. Increasingly effective cyber attacks against nuclear C2 systems can likewise undermine deterrence. Hypersonic weapons (with conventional or nuclear pay loads), which can evade current state-of-the-art missile defence systems, may render C2 facilities, aircraft carriers and nuclear missile complexes vulnerable.35 The potential unintended strategic consequences of each of the new technologies, and in particular the unpredictable effects of their deployment in combination, will certainly be topics of considerable political and societal debate within NATO’s European populations that do not necessarily support increases in defence expenditures in general and increased spending on nuclear and unmanned capabilities in particular.

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