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Turkey will say yes–they want a better cybersecurity framework to follow from NATO

Kieran Hatton 20, Design Research Intern Duo Security Leveraging User Insight Data to Improve Passwordless Experiences on 36 Million Devices, 4/27/2020, “Turkey’s New Cyber Security Center is Necessary, but is It Enough?”, Medium, https://medium.com/meddah-a-u-s-turkey-storytelling-project/turkeys-new-cyber-security-center-is-necessary-but-is-it-enough-89b7ef8cd347

However, USOM’s defenses are unlikely to dissuade stronger foreign state actors, like those involved in the United Arab Emirates remote hacking of former Turkish deputy prime minister Mehmet Şimşek, from seeking ways to disrupt Turkish cyber protections. States like Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia maintain competitive relations with Turkey. These nations are therefore incentivized to deploy malware to harm critical Turkish infrastructure.

Turkey should implement a cybersecurity framework. Attacks from foreign states as well as non-state actors are often effective given the Turkish government’s lack of familiarity with cybersecurity measures. Turkish government officials have been reported using unencrypted, traditional email or other unsecured accounts to transmit sensitive information. A cybersecurity framework streamlines digital defense measures and greatly reduces the risk of cyber threats by providing a blueprint for systems which meet rigorous cybersecurity standards. These can be in various forms: multinational, like the European Union’s Cybersecurity Certification Framework; organizational, like the International Organization for Standardization’s (ISO) 2700 and National Institute for Standards and Technology’s (NIST) framework; and, even indigenous, like the Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority Cybersecurity Framework.

For more robust systems to bolster USOM without an explicit cybersecurity framework, Turkish cybersecurity experts and government officials may seek help from National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The Turkish government can access incredible resources through two central channels: The Cyber Security Collaboration Hub (CSCH) and the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCE).

Within NATO, the Communications and Information Agency (NCI) oversees the CSCH. The CSCH is newer than the CCDCE. Established in February 2019, the CSCH is an NCI initiative to provide an information center to benefit NATO countries’ CERTs. The CSCH did not require member state buy-in, additional costs, or staff changes. Turkey’s USOM maintains a route of access to this resource as a member nation of NATO. Both the CSCH and USOM are newer additions to NATO’s cybersecurity force and may experience organizational growing pains throughout the next few years.

While accredited through — but not part of — NATO, the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCE) aggregates cyber resources among Sponsoring Nations in NATO. In 2018, 21 members participated as Sponsoring Nations, including Turkey. As such, Turkish experts can access CCDCE archives and collected cybersecurity documentation.

The CCDCE’s Tallinn Manual 2.0, a collection of rigorous research regarding cyber operations and the applicability of international law to the cyber realm, may also inform Turkish military strategy through cyberwarfare.

Cyberwarfare remains a formidable force in the face of dwindling traditional warfighting. Turkish armed forces, observing health precautions following the novel coronavirus, abated their attacks in Iraq and Syria without halting them completely. Unintended consequences of this continued fighting could include increased Syrian refugees flooding into areas under Turkish control, creating a hotbed for the potential spread of COVID-19. Hundreds of infected residing in camps could quickly turn into thousands across northeastern Syria and southwestern Turkey. Cyber offensives present an option to pursue Turkish interests while minimizing casualties on and off the battlefield.

USOM needs to be the first step in a process of erecting cyber defenses across the country. A nascent program is not necessarily ineffective, but the center will have to combat many cyberattacks against Turkey’s still-vulnerable systems. The country must implement a cybersecurity framework, utilize NATO resources, and seek ways to expand USOM’s team and training to other SOCs amid the COVID-19 pandemic to truly provide robust cybersecurity protections against the majority of cyberattacks.

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