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Plan spills over---a shift in cyber policy in space to integration of component assessment, interoperability, official guidance, and a security framework allows NATO to fully leverage space.

Berenike Vollmer 21, President and Co-Founder at The Sciences Po Cybersecurity Association, Non-Resident Visiting Scholar affiliated to NATO CCDCOE Tallinn, Cyber Threat Analyst and ISAO Manager for Cyber Intelligence, February 2021, “NATO'S MISSION-CRITICAL SPACE CAPABILITIES UNDER THREAT: Cybersecurity Gaps in the Military Space Asset Supply Chain”, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349519572_NATO'S_MISSION-CRITICAL_SPACE_CAPABILITIES_UNDER_THREAT_Cybersecurity_Gaps_in_the_Military_Space_Asset_Supply_Chain \\SYang

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AWARENESS Initiate Intersectoral Collaboration: • Aligning differing security and ethical standards between countries; • Organizing at least one annual space asset CSCRM symposium by executives from both sides to exchange on current challenges and estimated organizational impact; • Establishing further PPPs along the SASC, for example with: o CCSDS and ISO; o Space ISAC; o US AIA; o CERTs, CSIRTs and ENISA; and/or o OSA; • Utilizing the upcoming CCDCOE Tallinn Manual 3.0 multi-stakeholder project, as well as the 2020 EU Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade to address gaps. Increase NATO Strategic Level Engagement: • Creating mission-specific guidance, agreements, and security considerations; • Establishing recurrent executive-level SC leadership councils; • Timely increase of resources and staffing. Spur Exchange of Academic Expertise: • Strategically investing in space asset Research and Development (R&D) and the development of viable alternatives, such as through NATO STO’s Information Systems Technology Panel; • Realizing the establishment of a NATO Space Technology Centre under guidance of NCIA; • Considering attack vectors originating from new and upcoming technology, such as AI being increasingly implemented in space assets; • Inviting outside organisations and cybersecurity experts to provide expertise and differing perspectives on the topic, such as through cooperation between NCIA and Europol EPE. Conduct Mission-Specific Cyber SASC Risk Assessments: • Ensuring knowledge on specific procurement and SC environment around each mission, thus sourcing the materials to the level of integrity required; • Moving from detective to preventive third-party cybersecurity management capabilities; • Establishing a formal programme through manifesting policies, governance, procedures, tools, and processes on data sent to and received by any supplier; • Assessing NATO-procured ICT components, such as hardware, software, and services; • Analysing suppliers, suppliers’ sources, and the larger SC ecosystem; • Dedicating specified NATO personnel to effectively assessing and communicating supplier risks to NATO’s executive leadership. Chapter 7: Conclusion 71 Train Cyber SASC Risk Management throughout NATO Exercises: • Including cyber SASC risk management at least in every midsize to large NATO exercise to support a forward-leaning, collective defence approach; • Facilitating space asset CSCRM training for relevant stakeholder organization-wide as well as for key suppliers; • Facilitating individual end user training for each redeployment; • Engaging white hat hackers to penetration test for possible vulnerabilities throughout trainings; • Continuous phishing simulation exercises, mapping upcoming cyber SC threats and priorities, or tabletop exercises to determine key stakeholders and their responsibilities; • Sharing training and test reports to both the military and intelligence community and the commercial sector. REGULATION Streamline Security and Classification Levels: • Implementing formatting standardization for eased data integration and processing, e.g., agreeing on specific SATCOM frequencies, software, timing formatting; • Streamlining classification levels; • Streamlining strict clearances of staff and a good operational understanding of interacting with commercial representatives and users. Enhance Procurement Contract Requirements: • Creating a standardized public-private security framework for NATO-specific SASC cybersecurity: o Streamlining working language, external and internal assessments, incident reporting and communications across all partners and entities, thus creating a single-entry point for suppliers; o Adopting a standards-oriented, streamlined supplier risk approach to CSCRM processes; o Incorporating strengthened insurances, such as for data privacy, into negotiations with suppliers; o Better monitoring progress and operations via customer and supplier assessments to determine CSCRM maturity; o Ensuring that contractors comply with military protection standards. • Including mandatory reports of all space asset cyber breaches, and guidance on prioritization and determination of critical components and responsibilities; • Substituting Security by Obscurity by Security by Design and Default; • Integrating or partially adopting industry standards and procedures into supplier contracts: o NAS9933; o DOD CMMC; o ISO 27001; o NIST SP 800-37; o NIST SP 800-53; o NIST SP 800-171; o NIST 800-172; and o US SPD-5. Chapter 7: Conclusion 72 By completely or partly adopting these policy recommendations, NATO would strive to fully leverage the potential of its 2019 Space Policy and its Declaration of Space as an Operational Domain. Additionally, this would allow NATO to function as a formal and informal MS consultation forum on SASC cybersecurity. This way, it would make full use of its broad collective MS portfolio, best practices and lessons learned, as suggested by NATO SG Stoltenberg. These findings are in line with the assumptions of neoliberal institutionalist theory. As has been shown, NATO and national actors seek to maximize their gain from space assets to maintain relative power and the ability to deter. This behaviour is enforced by commercial competition and innovation. Throughout this thesis, this was proven by findings which align with neoliberal institutionalist theory, thus highlighting that a) Lacking cooperation between NATO as an international organization and its MS, as well as commercial SC partners, hinders to find problem solutions and create internationally binding regulations; b) Commercial competitiveness spurred by the search for economic efficiency, competitive advantage, and cheaper labour trades off security concerns. Following neoliberal institutionalism, and aligned with above presented policy recommendations, NATO’s role should be to guide and advise MS in resolving global political and economic issues, to reduce individual cost and uncertainty. Therefore, NATO should consider a shift from regarding cyber SASC risk management from being ‘nice-to-have’ to being mandated and critical. Doing so will ease safeguarding of delivery and integrity of NATO mission-critical data, better integrate suppliers and manufacturers along the cyber SASC, and increase transparency, responsibility, and liability. Furthermore, this will ease NATO to stay competitive, deterring and up to date with innovative technology, enhancing outcomes of NATO missions and operations to the best possible extent.

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