Effective, integrated allied space operations deter attacks on space capabilities that risk nuclear war
Kestutis Paulauskas 20, Senior Strategy Officer at NATO’s Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, US, 3/13/20, “Space: NATO’s latest frontier,” https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/03/13/space-natos-latest-frontier/index.html
A major surprise attack by an adversary on Allied space capabilities could significantly undermine the credibility of nuclear deterrence (for example, by compromising the Alliance’s ability to detect launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles). It could indeed be a precursor to major global conflict.
How to deter such attacks? Deterrence theory stipulates two ways: deterrence by denial (deny adversary the benefits it is seeking) and deterrence by punishment (ensure that the cost for its action will be prohibitive for the adversary).
The credibility of deterrence – in either of its iterations – rests on a combination of 1) political resolve, 2) capability to inflict pain and 3) clear communication of said resolve and capability. It is admittedly difficult to use space capabilities for messaging – unlike aircraft or ships. Showing off a tiny cube sat soundlessly orbiting in empty space is not a very threatening message. It is also extremely difficult to deny an anti-satellite attack. Moreover, some countries like North Korea and Iran do not have similar space capabilities that could be held at risk, so a deterrence through a threat of symmetric and proportionate punishment (“you take down our satellites, we will take down your satellites”) is not a viable option.
In light of this conundrum, the United States has publicly adopted cross-domain deterrence (in its National Security Strategy), which is based on the idea of punishment: “any harmful interference with or an attack on critical components of our space architecture that directly affects this vital US interest will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing.”
Should deterrence fail, the best defence against an anti-satellite weapons threat would be to go after – through cyber or kinetic means – the enemy’s launch capabilities and ground control stations.
Kinetic action produces debris, the ultimate deterrence to actual war in space. Chinese and Russian investment in space capabilities should make them also increasingly dependent on space. Because of space debris, space can be considered a realm of ‘MAD’ – mutually assured destruction. A war in space is effectively unwinnable. Unless an irrational actor with anti-space capabilities would feel very disadvantaged and desperate, and would consider making space inoperable a victory.
In light of the Alliance’s space-related vulnerability, an ever bigger focus needs to be placed on resilience and survivability of space capabilities. This can be achieved by placing more satellites in orbit, developing more multi-purpose satellites, involving more Allies and doing so in cooperation with commercial actors. Maintaining a robust infrastructure to service or quickly replace disabled satellites will be critical. These are all ingredients of an effectively deterrence by denial: no matter how many Allied satellites an adversary would be able to target and take out of action, it would not affect the Alliance’s ability to rely on space support to its operations.