Shifting NATO’s space strategy from deterrence by punishment to denial is key to space deterrence.
John J. Klein and Nickolas J. Boensch 20, John @ George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute, Nickolas is @ Bryce Space and Technology, October 2020, “Role of Space in Deterrence,” Handbook of Space Security, p. 111-126/BL
Because states derive strategic advantages from satellites and potential rivals may seek to deny a state this advantage, the concept of “space deterrence” is a relevant concept for space powers. Deterrence by punishment, compellence, deterrence by denial, and dissuasion are important ideas in the formulation of a sound space strategy. Taking the commonly accepted definition mentioned previously, space deterrence refers to persuading a potential enemy that it is in its own interests to avoid certain courses of activity in, through, or from space. Regardless of the chosen terminology or definition, what is ultimately important is that there are actions that can be taken relative to space that affect the decision-making of others.
One of the most essential distinctions in deterrence theory is between deterrence by punishment and by denial (Snyder 1961). Deterrence by punishment concerns the threat of credible and potentially overwhelming force or other retaliatory action against any would-be adversary to discourage potential aggressors from conducting hostile actions. Deterrence by denial refers to the capability to deny the other party any gains from the behavior that is to be deterred (Snyder 1961). This concept refers similarly to deterring an adversary by presenting a credible capability to prevent it from achieving the potential gains adequate to motivate the action (Krepinevich and Martinage 2008).
A related but distinct concept is compellence, which involves convincing an adversary to cease some current undesired action. Compellence is often described as a direct action that persuades an opponent to give up something that is desired (Schelling 1966). While deterrence has a negative object – it discourages unwanted actions – the object of compellence is positive. Effort is expended to force or convince an actor to conform to one’s will.
Both military and nonmilitary means are applicable when seeking to affect the thinking of others to enable deterrence by punishment, deterrence by denial, and compellence. Nonmilitary means equate to the soft power, or the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power (Nye 2005). Nonmilitary means can be used to affect another state leader’s thought processes – whether reinforcing a currently held view that is beneficial to the deterring state or changing the view of another state’s leadership or polities. Consequently, a practical implementation of space deterrence may entail political and diplomatic efforts, such as new international treaties or agreements; multimedia stories presenting news in a favorable perspective; and commerce and trade activities that increase one’s own economic influence or affect negatively a potential adversary or opposing alliance (Klein 2019)
Deterrence by Punishment
A deterrence by punishment approach in space is underpinned in the belief that the threat of credible and potentially overwhelming force or other retaliatory action against any would-be adversary is sufficient to deter most potential aggressors from conducting hostile actions in space. Such a strategy should clearly convey the capability and credibility behind the threat and communicate the specific behavior sought to be discouraged (Morgan 1977). As part of its broader space strategy, the United States seeks to deter attacks against its satellites. The 2017 US National Security Strategy conveys that harmful interference or attacks targeting US satellites will be met with a deliberate response in the “time, place, manner, and domain” of its choosing (The White House 2017). A US joint doctrine describes that, consistent with the right to self-defense, the United States may utilize its space assets to target the space capabilities of an adversary to deter potential threats (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2018). Some security experts view that the punishment portion of the US space deterrence strategy has been pursued and emphasized extensively, perhaps to the detriment of other approaches to secure US interests in space (JohnsonFreese 2017).
Many analysts have identified challenges associated with implementing a deterrence by punishment approach in the space domain. These include establishing appropriate thresholds for retaliation for both non-kinetic and reversible attacks on satellites, differences in severity due to no loss of life when compared to terrestrial action, and having the requisite attribution capabilities and processes. The absence of explicit threshold that a state would retaliate against complicates efforts to deter adversaries. Some policy makers question whether non-kinetic and reversible actions are hostile acts or armed attacks that warrant a military response (Harrison et al. 2017). Reversible and non-kinetic actions on satellites supporting tactical operations may be treated differently from large-scale kinetic attacks on satellites supporting nuclear command or control or early warning missions. However, between these extremes, there is still a highly uncertain boundary that complicates deterrence efforts (MacDonald et al. 2016). Ultimately, what is considered an armed attack or hostile act in space necessitating a retaliatory response will depend on the broader geopolitical context.
Another challenge for a space deterrence strategy is that attacks on satellites typically are unlikely to result in loss of human life. Consequently, hostile actions in space may be considered by some polities to be less escalatory or grave as conflict on Earth. The frequently used adage that captures this thinking is “satellites don’t have mothers.” This view may cause decision-makers to view aggression in space as never rising to levels that would warrant a military response, whether terrestrially or in space. Moreover, because military actions in space are unlikely to produce direct casualties, there may be an appeal to turn to these activities as tensions between competing states escalate (MacDonald et al. 2016). Perceptions that hostilities in space are less severe than terrestrial conflict can be discouraging to those hoping to deter attacks against one’s satellites.
Regardless, the thought that the non-casualty-generating effects of space actions preclude a deterrent threat is unfounded. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter describes the need to refrain from the threat or use of force against a state’s territorial integrity – which may be interpreted as a state’s physical property. Self-defense and retaliatory threats to deter a potential armed attack against a state’s satellites are then appropriate and justified. Upon further examination, one may dispel a historical challenge surrounding space deterrence by punishment: a hostile action against a state’s space systems may still be deterred by threat of retaliation, even if there is no loss of life.
Yet another challenge to effective deterrence in space lies in the difficulty of attributing who or what caused a satellite to cease to function normally. Military actions in space can produce various effects, may be non-kinetic and reversible, and in some cases these effects may be difficult to identify and attribute. An effective deterrent requires timely assessment of the event to orient and respond appropriately. Operating at hundreds to more than 30,000 km above the Earth’s surface makes it difficult to physically inspect and track satellites, thereby making determining and assessing damage an onerous endeavor. The hostile space environment – where satellites face solar activity, scorching and frigid temperatures, radiation, electromagnetic activity, and an increasing amount of debris – further complicates efforts (Wright et al. 2005). Operators must distinguish between intentional interference from adversaries and interference arising from normal operation in a hostile environment.
Some authors argue that the difficulties associated with attribution may be less worrisome than originally thought (Harrison et al. 2009). An attack on a state’s satellites unconnected to a terrestrial strategic event is thought to be highly unlikely. Attacks on satellites will occur following the terrestrial breakdown of general deterrence between states. The source of an attack may be less nebulous than space deterrence literature has declared, particularly if the attacking state launches a coordinated attack on many satellites to try to gain command of space early in the conflict. Drawing from this example, intelligence gleaned prior to the attack may be a more meaningful method of attribution than enabled by postattack space situational awareness (SSA) assessment.
Regardless of this assessment, in the current context of the global proliferation of counterspace capabilities, there will likely be ample room for misperception and miscalculation in a state’s leadership. This necessitates robust SSA capability to address issues of identifying, assessing, and attributing activities that occur in orbit. Greater SSA capabilities allow a state to differentiate between intentional attacks and malfunctions due to the satellite itself or the hostile environment it inhabits, thereby reducing the potential for misinterpretations and miscalculations (Sheldon 2008). Effective SSA capabilities will necessitate knowing what on-orbit systems are present, along with their location, capabilities, historical anomalies, operating patterns, and intended use. Such information will facilitate those preparatory measures needed to pit one’s strengths against a potential adversary’s weakness. Because SSA is a global endeavor, information sharing architectures must be designed to include ethe international community and commercial industry. This means that much of the data and resulting information provided through SSA systems should be releasable and disseminated to many of those participating in the global effort.
Today’s security challenges can complicate the implementation of a deterrence by punishment strategy. While some security analysts assess that thresholds for retaliation, differences in severity for space actions, and ensuring a sufficient attribution capability may be less problematic than many think, it remains to be seen whether this is confirmed in practice.
Deterrence by Denial
Among many security professionals, deterrence by denial is often associated with the concept of dissuasion – activities that seek to influence the decision calculus of potential adversaries to discourage the initiation of military competition. A strategy incorporating dissuasion seeks to convey the futility of conducting a hostile act, affecting the confidence of a potential adversary’s leadership and causing decisionmakers to not pursue a military confrontation in the first place. To be most effective, dissuasion activities occur before a threat manifests itself. Some national security professionals note that dissuasion works outside the potential threat of military action as a kind of “pre-deterrence,” because those states dissuaded will not require to be deterred by punishment (Krepinevich and Martinage 2008). While a deterrent that seeks to punish an adversary is tailored to distinct actions by specific actors at definite times, deterrence by denial commonly lacks this specificity and exists as a general deterrent, one that shapes the security environment through a broad, latent deterrent effect originating from one’s reputation and capabilities (Morgan 1977).
A deterrence by denial strategy for space seeks to frustrate or complicate the adversary’s plans by introducing greater costs and reducing associated benefit. Over the past several years, there has been a greater emphasis on the role of deterrence by denial in the broader US space deterrence strategy. Rather than threatening retaliation against the aggressor’s satellites or terrestrial targets of value, a US space deterrence by denial strategy emphasizes reducing an adversary’s incentive to attack US satellites (Vedda and Hays 2018). A potential adversary may be deterred if it concludes that an attack in space will be ineffectual in achieving the desired effect. Much of deterrence by denial and dissuasion necessitates preparing for potential conflict during peacetime. Because dissuasion involves discouraging the initiation of military competition, for the space domain the requisite peacetime preparedness is included within the contexts of space mission assurance and resilience.
According the US joint literature, mission assurance entails a process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets – including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains – critical to the performance of the Department of Defense mission essential functions in any operating environment or condition (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 2015). Similar to mission assurance but with a different focus, resilience is an architecture’s ability 116 J. J. Klein and N. J. Boensch to support mission success with higher probability; shorter periods of reduced capability; and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats, despite hostile action or adverse conditions (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2018). Resilience may leverage cross domain solutions, along with commercial and international capabilities. By definition, space mission assurance and resilience efforts can prevent a potential adversary from achieving its objectives or realizing any benefit from aggressive action. Space mission assurance and resiliency help convey the futility of conducting a hostile act and, consequently, enhance deterrence by denial and dissuasion efforts.
Space mission assurance efforts consist of defensive operations, which include off-board protection elements; reconstitution, which includes launching replacement satellites or activating new ground stations; and resilience, which includes on-board protection elements (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2018). Resilience in capabilities includes disaggregation, distribution, diversification, deception, protection, and proliferation. Disaggregation is the separation of dissimilar capabilities into separate platforms or payloads. Distribution utilizes a number of nodes, working together, to perform the same mission or functions as a single node. Diversification is contributing to the same mission in multiple ways, using different platforms, different orbits, or systems and capabilities of commercial, civil, or international partners. Deception is hiding one’s strengths and weaknesses from one’s adversaries. Protection is utilizing active and passive measures to ensure space systems provide mission support in any operating environment or condition. Proliferation is deploying larger numbers of the same platform, payloads, or systems of the same type to perform the same mission.
Space mission assurance may be supported by a number of preparations preceding a potential conflict. These preparations may include hardening against cyber threats and signal jamming, incorporating shutters for remote sensing satellites to minimize the effects of dazzling by lasers, or increasing the mobility of satellites through novel propulsion technologies (Kueter and Sheldon 2013). Preparations taken in peacetime may include employment of proliferated constellations of small satellites to complicate an adversary’s space ambitions. Furthermore, the conduct and training of one’s space and terrestrial forces may grant an ample deterrent effect, even if no ancillary preparations have been made. One method of frustrating an adversary’s plans may be to train forces to fight under degraded conditions where military forces lose access to space-enabled capabilities, thereby depriving potential aggressors some of the appeal of attacking satellites (Harrison et al. 2009). Consequently, a potential aggressor may be convinced that the prospects for success are too costly, with little benefit.
Another method of frustrating an adversary’s space control plans is to reduce one’s vulnerability by transitioning traditional space-derived services to terrestrial alternatives, a concept termed space avoidance. Its advocates seek to increase space deterrence by minimizing one’s presence in space, thereby diminishing an adversary’s perceived benefits of attacking one’s satellites (Coletta 2009). For example, some space avoidance advocates suggest this may be achieved by using unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for tactical reconnaissance systems instead of remote sensing satellites. Creating redundancy through terrestrial alternatives is prudent, but one should not be misled when judging whether reliance on space can be abated entirely. UAS are a valuable supplementary resource to space-derived intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); however, most UAS still require space-derived positioning information and communications to operate. Many forms of military power – sea power and airpower, for example – cannot easily reduce reliance on space-derived services. While states should seek to increase terrestrial redundancy to complicate an adversary’s plans, a strategy of space avoidance intending to greatly reduce reliance on space is not feasible in modern warfare.
Alliances, international cooperation, and the global proliferation of space power also play a significant role in deterrence by denial. This international dimension influences deterrence in several ways. First, the proliferation of states operating or deriving benefits from satellites creates stakeholders who would likely prefer that their satellites were not put in jeopardy. States outside of the deterrence relationship may have their satellites affected negatively if deterrence fails and conflict ensues, such as by orbital debris from kinetic attacks or the indiscriminate effects of broad radio-frequency jamming. Second, the deterring state may provide a global or multinational space-derived service, such as the US Global Positioning System satellites, which if attacked could potentially draw countries reliant on this service into the conflict on the side of the non-aggressor (Harrison et al. 2009). In these situations, an aggressor may be hesitant to attack space systems if it will have to potentially contend with an international response (Sheldon 2008). Third, allied or partner states may assist the deterring state when a conflict breaks out. The space systems of friendly countries can complement and supplement the deterrer’s own capabilities, such as through data sharing agreements, interoperability, or even by assisting in the reconstitution of lost space capabilities. Adversary leadership may be deterred from targeting US satellites if they perceive that the United States could leverage the capabilities of its allies to nullify any anticipated benefit (Sheldon 2008).
Some security experts consider the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as being uniquely positioned to bolster deterrence in space through its cooperative alliance. The alliance is increasingly reliant on space for its collective defense and economic prosperity, and an attack on the space assets of any one ally impacts the security of all allies (Schulte 2012). Security experts assert that while NATO is dependent on space-enabled capabilities, its space doctrine and planning have not kept up. Presently, NATO officials are considering how the alliance should address the growing military capabilities of Russia and China, to include issuing NATO’s first strategy for space. The strategy is expected to make space an official domain of operation, giving structure to discourse on military developments in space and NATO’s response. The alliance may also decide that attacks in space would trigger the organization’s Article 5 provisions on collective defense, although internal differences on the subject remain. Analysts have long held that NATO should continue to build the expertise and capacity to conduct operations enabled by space; ensure that doctrine, requirements, and planning account for the operational advantages provided by space; and adapt exercises and training to ensure forces can effectively exploit space-based capabilities (Schulte 2012). It is still uncertain whether NATO’s space strategy will implement these recommendations. A deterrence by denial strategy presents its own challenges. The cost of fielding and launching the most robust, defendable space systems can become a financial burden (Coletta 2009). Hardened, dispersed, disaggregated, or diversified capabilities may cost more to develop, launch, integrate, and operate. Also, resilient architectures may not be able to match the performance of those exquisite space systems. In most cases, smaller, proliferated constellations of satellites will augment, rather than replace these exquisite systems. The space strategist then must consider the benefits of defensive approaches, along with associated time and fiscal procurement costs, when finally deciding upon the best approach. Another challenge of deterrence by denial is that one’s space mission assurance and resilience efforts must be widely publicized to be effective in dissuading others.