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Ambiguity fails – escalates probing to find red lines and undermines NATO deterrence

Whitney L. Cissell 20; MA thesis in Security Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, Army Major, Nuclear Nonproliferation Officer, March 2020, "DETERRENCE IN THE DANGER ZONE: HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN DETER RUSSIAN GRAY ZONE CONFLICT", https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/64844

The stability–instability paradox applies to the nuclear and conventional level, and indeed, Russia’s effort to avoid conventional-level warfare with the United States strengthens stability between the states at the conventional level similar to the strategic nuclear level. While U.S.–Russian nuclear stability is based on parity, conventional stability in this relationship is more complex. As shown in Chapter II, Russia has a strong aversion to conflict with the United States and NATO at the conventional level. Russia would be outmatched in military superiority after two to three weeks of conflict and beyond its near abroad and, thus, prefers to operate at the sub-conventional level below the threshold of armed conflict.227 In effect, Russia’s strategy of avoiding any actions that might trigger conventional conflict aims to bolster a sort of “firewall” between conventional warfare and gray zone conflict. NATO, up to now, has effectively obliged this Russian strategy by not brandishing threats of conventional escalation in response to Russian gray zone aggression, let alone undertaking conventional responses. As much as Russia seeks to avoid escalation to conventional warfare it could not win, it is also learning how averse NATO is to threaten such escalation. This aversion is ironic insofar as Cold War–era extended deterrence relied on NATO’s threat of escalatory nuclear responses to conventional attacks.

These respective Russian and NATO postures enhance conventional stability, but at the cost of fueling instability at the gray zone level, reflecting a form of the stability– instability paradox familiar in nuclear strategies. This tailored application of the stability– instability paradox to the specific Russian context yields a tiered relationship of stability between the United States and Russia at each level of warfare, as depicted in Figure 1, and helps explain why the United States and Russia are the most unstable at the subconventional level, on which this research focuses.

Cumulative deterrence may be an option to address the issues created when adapting conventional deterrence to the sub-conventional level including the credibility and communication of the threat. Cumulative deterrence has not been a standard element of U.S. deterrence strategy in the past, and there is limited academic literature and strategic thought about its use in areas outside of cyber and terrorism. However, this new security environment characterized by great power competition at levels below open conflict requires a new way of looking at the deterrence landscape at the sub-conventional level. Subject matter experts for this research confirm that a zero-tolerance deterrence mindset will not work at the sub-conventional level and that the United States might have to choose what portions of the gray zone it wants to deter because it may be difficult to deter everything.229

There is a precedent for applying a cumulative model and mindset of deterrence to limit and shape the sub-conventional level of conflict, and this suggests it may also be applied to the current U.S. need to deter Russia’s gray zone conflict. According to Thomas Rid, cumulative deterrence “consists of a series of acts of force to create—and maintain— general norms of behavior for many political actors over an extended period. Using force, consequently, does not represent a principal failure of deterrence but its maintenance through swift, certain, but measured responses.”230 Cumulative deterrence has been a key part of Israel’s strategy for decades and was developed in the conventional and subconventional level focusing on limiting and shaping ongoing conflicts against both state and non-state actors at the conventional and sub-conventional level.231 In addition, cumulative deterrence has recently been considered for use in deterring terrorism and cyberattacks, as it is designed for long-term sustained conflict, such as competition in the gray zone.232

Doron Almong describes cumulative deterrence as functioning on two levels: the macro, which creates an image of overwhelming military superiority, and the micro, which relies on responses to adversarial actions.233 Almong also explains that cumulative deterrence has three key features.

First, its effectiveness is measured in terms of the number of victories accumulated over the duration of the conflict, which might be envisioned as “assets in a victory bank.” Second, over time, these victories produce increasingly moderate behavior on the part of the adversary and a shift in its strategic, operational, and tactical goals until there is a near-absence of direct conflict. Third, this moderation may eventually result in political negotiations and perhaps even a peace agreement.234 Almong is describing cumulative deterrence as applied to the conventional level of warfare; however, in the context of Russia, the construct can be transposed to the subconventional level. At the sub-conventional level, U.S. responses over time to Russian gray zone aggression could moderate Russian behavior, causing a shift in Russia’s decision calculus and strategic goals, thereby diminishing the conflict.

The advantage of layering a strong conventional deterrence strategy with cumulative deterrence is that it allows the restoration of deterrence over time if conventional threats fail to deter at the sub-conventional level. Over time, cumulative deterrence responses to gray zone actions bolster the credibility of the United States and alter Russia’s decision calculus at the sub-conventional level, therefore strengthening deterrence overall. Successful deterrence at the sub-conventional level requires a reorientation in how the U.S. views deterrence, moving from a zero-tolerance strategy to the long-term attrition of gray zone conflict. This renewed mindset allows for tailored punitive strategies that over time limit the bounds of the gray zone through the reiteration of unacceptable behavior through punishment. Regardless of the level at which a state wishes to conduct warfare, all deterrence strategies rely on three aspects that must work in concert: sufficient capabilities, solid credibility, and strong communication of a threat.235 As Rid explains, confrontations should be “seen as necessary evils that should be kept on as low a level as possible, but that could not be pushed down to zero.”236 This argument assumes escalation control, which is to say that the United States can control escalation at the sub-conventional level on its own terms.

Many authors challenge the notion of escalation control, claiming that it is risky and nearly impossible. Scholars claim that avoiding escalation requires deterring the action and that a policy to deter one action could in fact risk escalation to another. Additionally, scholars claim, “Escalation control or management is an inherently imperfect business. It can be done well or poorly, but it is extremely rare for any set of policies to eliminate the risk of significant escalation altogether.”237 These same scholars agree that the risk of inadvertent escalation can be reduced, but they are concerned that policy makers are incorrectly assuming it can be eliminated altogether.238 The concerns over escalation control are valid; however, it is possible to control escalation and use the threat of escalation to bolster deterrence. Mazarr explains that the gray zone puts the defender in the position to escalate, which is part of the challenge of deterrence.239 Both escalation control and deterrence fundamentally rely on communication and a thorough understanding of the adversary. Proper communication of the capability and the resolve to use the capability to deny or punish an action are just as crucial to escalation control as they are to deterrence. The same scholars who express concerns over escalation control also admit there is a way to control the risk: “Escalation depends heavily on an astute understanding of how the adversary will perceive and interpret events that have not yet occurred—not only in a general sense, but also under the specific and often difficult-to-predict conditions that will shape the opponent’s perceptions and responses when a particular event occurs.”240 The United States can both mitigate escalation and contribute to deterrence by adding an element of ambiguity to its deterrence threats that leave something to chance but also allow a response that limits or controls the escalatory response of the adversary.

When the United States responds with an instrument of state power in any DIME category, such as the expulsion of 60 Russian diplomats in response to the Russian nerve agent attack on a British citizen in 2018, it can strengthen cumulative deterrence credibility. Some of the literature on cumulative deterrence suggests that deterrence works by banking “wins” by responding to events with military power. However, when adapted to the gray zone, it seems critical that all elements of state power must be utilized, not just the military. The military is sometimes—not always—an appropriate response to an action in the gray zone, so threatening military retaliation for every tactic in the gray zone is not credible; however, a state must still have the ability to impose costs on an adversary for an action to make cumulative deterrence successful.

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