Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Security Cooperation fails (not with agenda DA)

Tankel and Rand 15, Rand is the former deputy director of Studies and Leon E. Panetta fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Tankel is an assistant professor at the School of International Service at American University (“Security assistance isn’t the quick fix the US thinks it is,” The Hill, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/250348-security-assistance-isnt-the-quick-fix-the-us-thinks-it-is/amp/)

As we argue in a report recently released by the Center for a New American Security, Security Cooperation and Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment, part of the problem is that BPC has become a catchall for wide array of security assistance and cooperation programs, only some of which actually pertain to enhancing the capabilities and capacity of a partner’s military and civilian institutions. There are myriad challenges to deploying assistance and cooperation effectively. Recent events in Syria only scratch the surface. Security assistance and cooperation has been a critical pillar of U.S. statecraft for decades. The post-9/11 interest in using assistance and cooperation to incentivize and enable local partners contributed to the creation of a slew of new authorities and programs. Yet, despite its strategic centrality and large price tag, our report argues that many security assistance and cooperation programs fail to achieve U.S. objectives because of strategic and structural deficiencies. Strategically, U.S. policymakers are often not clear about the specific outcomes they intend to achieve with security assistance and cooperation. Even when objectives are clear, there may be too many of them for a single program, which results in conflicting objectives. This is especially troublesome when pressing, short-term objectives subvert long-term U.S. goals. Also, there is currently no system in place to adequately assess outcomes. This not only risks wasting taxpayers’ dollars. Failure to assess progress and adjust programs accordingly can actually reduce U.S. influence with recipient states, which may believe they can free-ride or begin to view assistance as an entitlement. The practice of using security assistance to build relationships sometimes contributes to this problem. So does the fact that policymakers too often look to security assistance as a quick fix or way to address demands to “do something.” Yet, security assistance and cooperation remains vitally important and is appealing, especially when options like large-scale U.S. military operations do not make strategic sense. This helps to explain the numerous new authorities that consecutive administrations have requested and Congress has created. The increase in new authorities has contributed to confusion about the purposes of different programs. Moreover, programs are sometimes chosen based on which authorities are available or most flexible rather than on the authority best suited to the task at hand. Finally, most of the new programs are housed at the Pentagon and not the State Department. As a result, programs are deployed to meet Defense requirements as opposed to implemented in a way that furthers broader foreign policy objectives. The bottom line is that more is not necessarily better. That goes for the number of authorities and the level of assistance or cooperation provided to U.S. partners. The spate of new authorities has exacerbated both imbalances between the Pentagon and the State Department and conflicts among the objectives that assistance and cooperation are used to achieve.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.