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Slow, and the US will prevent transfer of all the good stuff

Teichert 22, currently serving as assistant deputy undersecretary of the Air Force for international affairs. His previous positions have included the senior defense official and defense attaché to Iraq, the commander of Edwards Air Force Base, and the commander of Joint Base Andrews (Johm, “THE HARD POWER OF SECURITY COOPERATION,” War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/the-hard-power-of-security-cooperation/)

There is still much work to be done to overcome security cooperation obstacles and properly create a force that is fully ready for strategic competition and ideally postured for integrated deterrence. First, onerous security barriers hinder progress in interoperability and integration, creating operational risk to avoid minor technical risk. When making exportability rulings, decision-makers too heavily and strictly consider security risk or concerns about technological exploitation, preventing the export of U.S. weapons systems without a proper consideration for the operational necessity of offering that capability to allies and partners in order to share burdens and develop interoperability. As a result, in the name of maintaining a unilateral technological advantage, bureaucrats pass on operational risk to combatant commanders and warfighters who expect to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with fully-capable allies and partners. Second, exportability of combat-relevant systems remains an afterthought of the acquisition process. Though American policy directs that new systems be designed for exportability, waivers to this policy are liberally applied and commonplace. Finally, slow security cooperation processes often deliver certain systems late-to-need, in part because of plodding security-focused decision-making mechanisms that are a part of exportability rulings. Delayed delivery schedules create a competitive disadvantage as compared to strategic rivals while frustrating the allies and partners that the United States will rely upon in the next conflict. In the end, some Defense Department and interagency policies and processes continue to zealously guard capabilities while hindering interoperability and harming operational effectiveness. American leaders and security cooperation professionals need to systematically eliminate these remaining obstacles to properly meet integrated deterrence objectives.

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