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Misaligned strategies guarantee failure - three reasons

Rauen et al 18 (Brian Rauen, Terri Erisman, and Edward Ballanco are officers in the U.S. Army and graduates of the U.S. Army War College class of 2018. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense.” MORE IS NOT BETTER: FIXING SECURITY COOPERATION”, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/more-is-not-better-fixing-security-cooperation/)LR

First, each host nation has its own unique structure, interests, and strategy to address threats. Each partner military operates within a set of authorities, regulations, and other constraints or limitations that also impact the efficacy of U.S. security cooperation engagements. The relationship with the host nation can be particularly challenging as misalignment of strategies may reflect a classic principle-agent problem, a simple communication problem between well-meaning partners, or a combination of both. Security cooperation has the most potential to be effective when the strategic, operational, and tactical aspects for the United States and its partner align. Second, U.S. national, regional and partner-specific goals may not be coherent or compatible. U.S. national interests are typically broad and may be in competition with one another. For instance, one U.S. interest in a country may be prevention of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens while a potentially competing interest is the adherence to the rule of law, including due process, by the partner nation. Geographic combatant commands (GCC) develop an overarching regional campaign plan and use security cooperation engagements to support that plan, but these efforts may not align with those of the U.S. Ambassador and country team, who also develop a concept for advancing U.S. interests and engagements in their respective countries. The country team is in theory the focal point for integrating all U.S. Government programs and perspectives, including the COCOM strategies and security assistance efforts. Their regular engagement with the host nation contributes to a more detailed and in-depth understanding of the partner, the unique challenges they face, and the viability of U.S. strategies. Yet their country focus does not encourage a holistic view of regional goals to the same degree as the GCC. Assessments and feedback provided by rotational forces, visiting personnel, and analysts in Washington can be incongruent with the perspectives of the country team and lead to disagreements about how to engage effectively. Finally, the goals of U.S. military service-provided units often differ from those of the regional or country-specific teams. Service-provided units are usually not assigned to the GCC. As rotational forces, acting under their respective service component command, they typically execute security cooperation in a decentralized manner. Whereas the services are responsible for manning, training, and equipping their forces to ensure they are ready for deployment, the GCC is focused on its campaigns and strategies. While the two should be mutually supporting, some units deploy with limited knowledge or awareness of long term strategic objectives and therefore focus on their service-directed requirements. In Mali, for example, some units on small-scale deployments viewed their engagements primarily as a unit training opportunity or solely in support of a foreign military sales case, not as part of the plan to facilitate security.

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