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No cohesion — the alliance is more fractured than it’s ever been.

van Dijk & Sloan ’20 — Ruud van Dijk is the coordi NATOr of the BA and MA programs in the history of international relations at the University of Amsterdam. Stanley R. Sloan is Visiting Scholar in Political Science at Middlebury College, Vermont and a Non-resident Senior Fellow in the Scowcroft Center at the Atlantic Council of the United States. September 28, 2020; "NATO’s inherent dilemma: strategic imperatives vs. value foundations"; Journal of Strategic Studies; Volume 43, Issue 6-7; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

It has been clear since NATO’s founding that what the alliance purports to stand for and what certain member states practice, do not always fully align. It has certainly not been lost on those skeptical of or hostile to the alliance — within or without — that authoritarian regimes have come to power in several member states and that they have begun to erode, if not outright contradict, many of the core principles NATO was designed to defend and promote. At the same time, some of the member states in question remain of crucial importance to the alliance’s security interests. From the beginning in 1949, when treaty values and strategic imperatives have been conflicted, the strategic imperatives have almost always, albeit temporarily on an ‘exceptional’ basis, taken precedence over the values. In the beginning, the dominance of strategic considerations over values was demonstrated when Portugal, under its autocratic regime, was invited to sign the treaty. Its Azores airfields would have been critical to American reinforcement of NATO forces in wartime. However, value-based opposition from European founding members blocked dictator Francisco Franco’s Spain, despite strongly-held views of U.S. Se NATOrs, including leading NATO skeptic Robert Taft, who thought military resources of Spain and Germany would add importantly to NATO’s defenses against the Soviet Union. The point was recorded in Senate Resolution 99 when it passed the Senate in 1951.4 While not new, these tensions today are greater than at few other times in NATO’s history. In our view, they could become an existential threat. This essay focuses particularly on Turkey’s drift away from secular democracy as a contemporary threat. But it is not the only worrying development observed in the politics of NATO states over the past decade. The growth of European radical right populist parties was stimulated in part by the tragic flood of refugees from the south and the fear that not only terrorism, but different racial, linguistic, and ideological challenges would come with the immigrants. Moreover, even the United States and the United Kingdom got caught up in radical right temptations, with Brexit resulting in Britain and Donald Trump’s presidency in the United States. NATO’s military-strategic mission and its role as a stabilising force in international politics ultimately depend on the political cohesion of the alliance and on the credibility of its fundamental principles. An alliance that lacks a common political purpose will also differ on the threats faced by member states, and as a result fail to organise an effective defense. Drifting too far from core principles will render hollow the language in Article 2, where member states pledge to ‘contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded … ’.5 Those of us who believe the alliance can perform a useful role in the world of the twenty-first century and who take the fundamental principles from the preamble and the treaty seriously, need to think hard about the consequences of NATO, through the actions of important member states, not practicing what it preaches.

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