Trump’s rhetoric shook the alliance – questions regarding US commitment divide members
Robinson ’6-7 — Eric; M.P.P. in public policy, College of William & Mary; B.A. in economics, government, College of William & Mary, senior research programmer and analyst at RAND Corporation. June 7, 2022; "American politics could derail NATO’s momentum — unless leaders prepare now."; Breaking Defense; https://breakingdefense.com/2022/06/american-politics-could-derail- NATOs-momentum-unless-leaders-prepare-now/; //CYang
With an active Russian invasion on its doorstep and Finland and Sweden asking to join, NATO seems more relevant than at any point since the fall of the Berlin Wall. But, former counterterrorism official Eric Robinson warns the following op-ed, alliance leaders need to keep a wary eye on the looming danger that is American politics. It is a moment of triumph for NATO. The alliance’s main threat, the Russian military, suffered decisive defeats in the battles for Kyiv and Kharkiv in Ukraine. Furthermore, as a direct result of Russia’s invasion, both Sweden and Finland have petitioned NATO for membership. Not since the Berlin Wall fell has a component of the United States’ commitment to Europe’s security been so clearly validated. Regrettably, this remarkable state of affairs in Europe obscures the alliance’s true fragility — a vulnerability so pronounced that NATO’s current confidence could soon become a historic footnote. Internal disputes are not new to NATO, of course. Charles de Gaulle withdrew French military forces from NATO’s high command, Greece and Turkey are effectively rivals, and there is a substantial disparity in defense spending among members. These challenges pale in comparison, however, to NATO’s most critical vulnerability: American politics. In 1947, Sen. Arthur Vandenberg established a baseline for American political alignment when he stated that “politics stops at the water’s edge,” that partisan differences should be minimized in matters of national security. Republicans and Democrats alike would certainly vary in their approaches, but challenging the Soviet Union provided a degree of predictability to American foreign policy. This partisan harmony continued beyond the Cold War, extending into bipartisan support for the Persian Gulf War and the invasion of Iraq. Then came Donald Trump, and an open hostility to America’s longstanding international practices. As a candidate, Trump articulated a deep skepticism of America’s international obligations and his arguments resonated with voters who had soured on the foreign policy establishment. His version of “America First” echoed the original America First Committee of the 1930s and 1940s: disdainful of international commitments, comfortable with authoritarian systems, and accepting moral compromises as a cost of doing business in a rough world. During his time in office, Trump did not shift his views on limiting America’s international obligations, but he never truly acted on his intuition, either. NATO remained shaken yet intact, his administration amended NAFTA with Canada and Mexico, and his team helped establish official relationships between Israel and a series of once-hostile countries. However, since Trump’s exit from office, reporting indicates that he expressed interest or actively explored going further, including wanting to withdraw military forces from Europe and end the US military commitment to the Republic of Korea, two pillars of America’s global security commitment. And notably, Trump’s former national security advisor John Bolton has specifically said he believed Trump would seek to leave NATO. The popularity of “America First” politics returns us to NATO’s critical vulnerability. If he decides to run again, Trump seems almost assured to be the GOP’s nominee for president in 2024. Recent primaries and patterns of behavior among Republicans currently in the House and Senate have shown that Trump’s hold on the GOP may not be ironclad, but he remains the leading party figure. Should Trump return to the White House, he would likely do so with a Republican House and Senate far less likely to push back on his foreign policy than during his first term in office — and as a president who will assuredly be inclined to listen to his close supporters encouraging his basest instincts.