Even fear of declining US engagement wrecks cooperation
Kunz 2021
Barbra, senior researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. She specializes in European security and the debates surrounding it, with a special emphasis on France and Germany. “’There is No “Europe’: Disagreements Within NATO Are Not Solely Transatlantic and Pertain to the Fundamentals of European Security”, NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond, (157-176), 2021.dmr
As discussed above, at least part of the suspicions against France’s strategic dialogue with Russia, and more broadly European strategic autonomy, arise from fears that Paris may have ambitions to ‘decouple’ European security from that of the United States. In reality, as noted above, ‘decoupling’ is not on European capitals’ agenda, and thus also not on Paris’. Yet, another aspect over which Europeans disagree is their analyses of long-term prospects for US security guarantees. The debate is consequently about whether Europe needs to start thinking about a ‘Plan B’ or whether Joe Biden’s election as US president means that risks of the United States withdrawing from or reducing its engagement for Europe are off the table. In this context, threat perception again matters tremendously. The greater the fear of Russia, the greater the fear of decoupling. Depending on the kinds of threats European capitals consider most pressing, their focus is either on expeditionary operations (terrorism) or collective territorial defense (Russia). This leads not only to considerable differences in defense planning and posture as discussed above, but also to different degrees of dependence on the United States. Unsurprisingly, therefore, how vociferously European countries place themselves in the Atlanticist camp correlates strongly with the intensity with which they perceive a Russian threat. This is not to say that France, which even in this context represents the other end of the European spectrum, does not need the United States. The two countries in fact cooperate closely at the bilateral level. For Paris, US-French cooperation is most valuable and crucial in the Sahel region in the fight against terrorism, where the United States notably provides crucial reconnaissance and surveillance to France’s counter-terrorism operation Barkhane.36 From a French perspective, this is the most important vector of transatlantic defense cooperation, as again became apparent after the 2020 US elections, when French minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly expressed her hopes of continued US engagement in that region.37 Yet, as seen from Paris, the nation’s survival is hardly dependent on the United States, as opposed to perceptions in Central and Eastern European countries where the US is ultimately considered the guarantor of the nations’ existence. Those states that perceive a threat from Russia are at the same time the most convinced Atlanticists who, in view of their situation, rely on the closest possible cooperation with the United States—and are correspondingly skeptical about stronger cooperation in the EU. On the one hand, they are afraid of prompting less US engagement. On the other hand, they want to avoid having to invest scarce resources in the CSDP, which is by definition not about territorial defense. One key question for the continent’s security is: how likely is continued US engagement? Given that US engagement will still be decided in Washington rather than in Paris, Berlin, or Warsaw, how likely is it that US administrations want to maintain US security guarantees for Europe? And how likely is it—provided they have the political will—that they will be able to do so in light of political and budgetary constraints? On this issue, views and assessments again vary across Europe. Once more, France may be considered the outlier. It is fair to argue that the French analysis on future US engagement is the most pessimistic for European security, based on two observations. First, it is often stressed in France that ‘Trumpism’ is not gone with Donald Trump and that US domestic politics will likely remain volatile.38 Second, as most recently reiterated in its 2021 Strategic Update, France expects the United States to refocus its security policies toward Asia and away from Europe, notably in light of China’s emergence as a strategic rival.39 The French take is thus both relatively traditional—after all, de Gaulle decided to acquire nuclear weapons because he deemed US security guarantees unreliable—and based on systemic factors. In most other countries, transatlantic security relations tend to be viewed in a much more ‘personalized’ manner, i.e., with much greater emphasis on the occupant of the White House without explicitly accounting for systemic factors. From such a vantage point, the years of the Trump administration are considered an anomaly. With Joe Biden’s election, and for instance his speech at the 2021 virtual edition of the Munich Security Conference in which he declared that “America is back,”40 transatlantic security relations are seen as returning to normal. Joe Biden’s accession to the US presidency has therefore already changed one key aspect of Europe’s defense debate: the question of whether or not Europe—and the EU in particular—should aspire for more strategic autonomy. With the Biden administration, the French argument that Europe needs to step up its joint defense efforts to compensate for diminished US engagement clearly seems weakened in the eyes of many.