Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

NATO will not survive unless European states and Canada pay their fair share – history indicates that they won’t

Richter ‘16 – Associate professor of political science at the University of Windsor, in Windsor, Ontario, Canada (Andrew, Comparative Strategy, 35:4, 298-314, “Sharing the burden? U.S. allies, defense spending, and the future of NATO”, November 2, 2016, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2016.1222843 )//RG

And yet, regardless of the precise amount the United States will spend on defense in 2017 (and the years to follow), it is a certainty that it will remain the world’s largest spender for the foreseeable future, while the goal of more equitable burden sharing in the Western alliance will remain elusive. Sixty-five years of history has revealed that most European countries (and Canada) are simply not prepared to spend what is required to field and maintain highly advanced defense forces, and it does not particularly matter what the United States wants. In effect, European governments have never believed that Washington will diminish its commitment to the Western alliance, no matter how little they contribute nor how shameless they are on free riding on the United States.112 As Ted Galen Carpenter noted in a 2014 article, it appears that the only way to fundamentally change this dynamic is if the United States were to make clear by its actions—not its words—that it will no longer tolerate alliance defense free riding. That would likely mean withdrawing most (if not all) American military personnel from Europe and dramatically reducing air and naval assets on the continent.113 It would also mean ending Washington’s domination of collective defense efforts in NATO. Further, the United States would begin campaigning in favor of the establishment of a pan-European defense force.114 In effect, Washington would have to put allied countries on notice that it is no longer prepared to bear the overwhelming burden of Western defense, and there are limits to its willingness to pay for the defense of others (it might be noted that in March 2016 Republican front-runner Donald Trump made precisely this point.)115 Needless to say, the chances of this happening seem slim; for starters, the United States seems pre- pared, even given recent developments, to continue paying a significant cost both for its own and its allies’ security (in this regard, the administration announced in 2016 that it plans to quadruple U.S. military spending in Europe)116 and the constituency favoring defense spending—and the military more generally—is far larger than in Europe or Canada.117 Yet if the alliance is to survive, significant changes must be made. The key question is whether European states and Canada will make the necessary funding decisions that will permit them to field modern and capable forces in the future. Unfortunately, there are plenty of reasons for skepticism, as defense downsizing in Europe and Canada casts doubt over most allies’ ability and willingness to invest in modern capabilities. Indeed, NATO itself seems to have little influence on member states’ security calculations, and a recent proposal to “name and shame” countries that are not meeting the spending target suggests that the alliance has concluded that public embarrassment holds the best chance of encouraging states to spend more, an unmistakable sign of desperation.118 Indeed, rather than increase their defense programs, most European states and Canada are engaged in, as Hallems and Schreer have recently noted, a strategy of “strategic restraint,” which sees a reduced willingness to pay for the major defense investments necessary to protect against possible threats.119 In the author’s opinion, both Canada and Germany have grown so accustomed to low defense spending that they may be incapable of dramatic change at this point (although at least Berlin seems to have recently recognized the seriousness of the problem). As evidence, one just needs to note the array of dated military platforms that both countries operate, apparently oblivious to the risks such equipment poses both to their own crews and to the civilians in the areas they operate in. Perhaps even more importantly, however, is what the continued operation of such equipment effectively tells the United States—i.e., that both states intend to rely on Washington for their security regardless of whether the United States is pre- pared to accept this burden or not. This would appear to be a fundamental abdication of responsibility by both countries, but in the absence of popular opposition to the policies that result in such military weakness, it seems unlikely that either state will be changing its domestic spending priorities anytime soon. In sum, the growing divide in defense expenditures and capabilities between the United States and most other members of NATO has resulted in the very real possibility that the alliance may not survive. To avoid that outcome, European states and Canada need to accept the fact that a more mature and equitable defense relationship is essential; although in fairness it should be noted that this observation does not apply to the UK, which continues to take its defense seriously (as does France). Any move toward a reasonable program of burden sharing will require a change in mind-set on the part of all NATO members, as dependence on the United States is deeply embedded. The onus, though, must be on European states and Canada to demonstrate that they are serious about accepting a greater degree of responsibility for their defense. If after 67 years of American protection most NATO states are still not willing to pay a reasonable amount for their defense, then the alliance deserves to fail, in which case members will quickly realize the extent of the security bargain that they have enjoyed all these years.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.