International law fails – cybersecurity is distinct from conventional warfare
Fischerkeller, 6/20 (Michael P. Fischerkeller, 6-20-2022, "Current International Law Is Not an Adequate Regime for Cyberspace," Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/current-international-law-not-adequate-regime-cyberspace, LASA-CSK)
States increasingly agree that international law, specifically the U.N. Charter and rules of customary international law (CIL) derived from the charter’s principles, applies to cyberspace. Yet both are a poor fit for cyber activities. The charter reflects a bias toward what has been termed the conventional strategic environment, and CIL has evolved in the shadow of both the conventional and nuclear environments. In these environments, states threaten international stability by seeking strategic gains through either coercion or brute force. The cyber strategic environment differs in that threats to stability derive from exploitation—that is, states unilaterally using code to take advantage of others’ cyber vulnerabilities for the purpose of realizing strategic gains. It should be unsurprising, then, that states have struggled to offer comprehensive and in-depth opinio juris on how international law applies to the cyber context. States will struggle to find cyber relevance in international law until new instruments of international law—or adaptations of current law—account for the core features of the cyber strategic environment, the state behaviors they obligate, and how strategic advantage can be achieved lawfully and unlawfully through those behaviors. The rule of nonintervention is a good candidate for adaptation. Strategic Environments Cyber persistence theory, which informs U.S. Cyber Command’s doctrine of persistent engagement, is premised on the argument that cyberspace is not merely a domain but a strategic environment—and, importantly, one distinct from the nuclear and conventional strategic environments. Whereas U.S. warfighting domains—air, land, maritime, space and cyberspace—describe military operational “space,” strategic environments comprise core features that condition states’ security behaviors. Simply stated, the core features of the nuclear environment are segmentation, that is, a feature that manifests as territorial boundaries, and incontestable costs (that is, there is no valid defense against nuclear weapons), which lead to a dominant behavior of coercion in the form of a deterrence strategy (that is, mutually assured destruction). The conventional strategic environment also comprises segmentation but is coupled with contestable costs (conventional capabilities, unlike nuclear weapons, may be defended against). This leads to dominant, episodic behaviors of brute force or coercion, where the latter takes the form of a deterrence strategy threatening to impose costs or a compellence strategy imposing costs through conventional war. Post-World War II international law, specifically the U.N. Charter and subsequent CIL interpretations of the charter, was conditioned by the weight of these core features. With the objective of saving “succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” these rules of state behavior are centered on sovereignty, nonintervention, coercion, threat or use of force, and armed attack. The cyberspace strategic environment is distinct from the nuclear and conventional environments, which poses a challenge to the relevance of these rules. Cyber persistence theory argues that, simply stated, the core features of the cyber strategic environment comprise interconnectedness (not segmentation), a condition of constant contact (not the prospect of episodic action), an abundance of organic vulnerabilities, and macro-resilience (an ability to recover from exploitation of those vulnerabilities). Consequently, states face a security imperative to persist in seizing and maintaining the initiative to set the conditions of security in their favor in and through cyberspace. States can do so through various strategies, policies and activities that reduce the potential for exploitation of their own vulnerabilities and exploit the vulnerabilities of adversaries.