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Treaties fail – strong states don’t face penalties, resort to power dynamics instead of legal obligations, and ICJ jurisdiction is almost nonexistent

Simone, 1/7 (Brooke Simone, J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, 1-7-2022, "Strong States’ Noncompliance, Absence, and Self-Interest: How Effective Are Treaties Really? — The Michigan Journal of International Law," Michigan Journal of International Law, http://www.mjilonline.org/strong-states-noncompliance-absence-and-self-interest-how-effective-are-treaties-really/, LASA-CSK)

First, while the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) Article 60 allows for termination or suspension of a treaty in the event of material breach,[3] the likelihood of that termination occurring is minimal, especially for certain types of treaties. For human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, or environmental treaties, termination would undermine the global stability and norms that the parties entered into the treaty to protect.[4] States’ commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a key human rights treaty, has not wavered despite numerous breaches, even as recent as June 2020 after a United Nations’ report outlined the Philippines’ grave human rights violations.[5] Second, strong states are less likely to face retaliation or penalties as a result of treaty violation. For these states, breach does not typically threaten reputational damage severe enough to encourage compliance, nor do they fear reciprocal sanctions, political pressure, or other retorsions and countermeasures as much because of their position as economic and political powerhouses.[6] Strong states often act out of self-preservation and self-aggrandizement, reacting to power dynamics instead of legal obligations or fear of penalty[7]: according to realist Charles Krauthammer, treaties are meaningless “when dealing with countries for which law of any kind is a mere instrument, infinitely adaptable to the requirements of power.”[8] Other enforcement mechanisms, such as internal domestic pressure and shaming by NGOs, are not unique to treaties and are just as influential for breaches of customary international law (CIL) or unilateral statements.[9] Third, the idea that treaty breach can trigger legal actions in court against the violator is actually limited in practice, as there is not always guarantee of jurisdiction. States face binding legal repercussions before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under three situations of contentious jurisdiction, which are often avoided by states.[10] The ICJ has jurisdiction over leading international actors like the U.S., Russia, and China only if they signed a prior treaty agreeing to refer disputes to the court;[11] the U.S. has further limited this legal accountability. It announced in October 2018 that it would withdraw from the Optional Protocol and Dispute Resolution to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which granted ICJ jurisdiction.[12] Ambassador Bolton justified this by referring to President Reagan’s withdrawal from the Optional Compulsory Jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36(2) of the ICJ statute and President Bush’s withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, two additional ways the U.S. has lessened its ability to be held liable.[13] Even when the ICJ or other third-party mechanisms are available options, states can be reluctant to take their disputes there.[14] For these reasons, lack of definite review before a court minimizes the threat of being held accountable for breach, thereby negating much of a treaty’s meaningfulness in promoting credible commitment and compliance. While multilateral treaties strive to create uniform, widespread agreement and enforceability, perhaps it is instead CIL – which emerges over time as binding upon all states without having to opt-in to legal review – that accomplishes that goal, enabling potential accountability for any state’s violation of the law. In addition to the lack of repercussions for treaty noncompliance, a look at the U.S.’s absence and withdrawal from various multilateral agreements suggests that treaties may not be as significant or effective as frequently argued. The U.S. has not signed or ratified several key international treaties;[15] it is not party to the VCLT or the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, but generally accepts their guidelines as binding under CIL.[16] This begs the question: Is codification via treaty necessary for adherence and enforcement, or can CIL be enough? Additionally, the Trump administration has recently withdrawn from numerous treaties.[17] In May 2020, the U.S. announced its intentions to withdraw from the 1992 Open Skies Treaty (OST),[18] which was formed after the Cold War to promote trust between the U.S. and Russia and allows parties to conduct unarmed surveillance flights in each other’s air space.[19] The very premise of this treaty has eroded. The U.S. accused Russia of treaty breach and is now pulling out, despite other countries expressing both continued commitment to the agreement[20] and worry regarding U.S. withdrawal.[21] So another question arises: How effective is a treaty like the OST in its objective to create a binding foundation for trust if irrational leaders can undermine just that, seemingly without concern for the other parties or for global stability? Treaties’ efficacy is also called into question by the U.S.’s wielding of economic power to cripple still-intact treaties. In 2018, the U.S. withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – better known as the Iran nuclear deal – which allowed for the easing of economic sanctions in exchange for Iran restricting its nuclear program.[22] Believers in treaties’ infallible strength would likely have envisioned that the other P5+1 members could continue adhering to the JCPOA’s conditions, at least to a degree. However, the U.S. imposed secondary sanctions on any government that traded with Iran, using its “domination of financial markets” to “bull[y] other countries into capitulating.”[23] Another question yet: Can treaties be touted as binding and successful mechanisms if one powerful, renegade state can threaten the entire agreement through economic force?

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