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Soft law lacks precision causing indeterminate norms and noncompliance

Beard, 07 (Jack M Beard, 1-11-2007, "Soft Law’s Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities," University of Nebraska - Lincoln, https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/spacelaw/87/, LASA-CSK)

One important soft law design choice in constructing many international instruments is the decision to employ vague, imprecise, ambiguous or otherwise indeterminate language. Indeterminate language may be a satisfactory design feature for some areas of international cooperation, but it is a dangerous choice for arms control regimes. The requirements typically associated with arms control regimes are well known, and one is that they “must define cheating quite explicitly.”104 There are fundamental reasons for this requirement. A state contemplating foregoing the development and deployment of new weapon systems in favor of pursuing international cooperation will be reluctant to do so if adversary states are not part of a collaborative regime with a degree of formalization. Such a collaborative regime “must specify what constitutes cooperation and what constitutes cheating, and each actor must be assured of its ability to spot immediately others’ cheating.”105 The dilemma of common interests in this scenario, against the backdrop of perceived security threats, is often modeled in game theory as a prisoners’ dilemma in which each state actor’s dominant strategy is to cheat (even if all actors would actually prefer arms control or disarmament over a spiraling arms race).106 It is in this context that game theorists and other writers argue that the obligations in an arms control regime must be sufficiently precise to ensure that actors can recognize defection.107 Elaborate monitoring, policing and compliance verification structures in such a regime have little value without clear obligations and the ability to recognize cheating. Precision in individual commitments, as well as coherence between those commitments and broader legal principles, framed by “accepted modes of legal discourse and argument,” also assist by discouraging states from engaging in “auto-interpretation” and other opportunistic behavior regarding their obligations.108 The lack of precision in individual commitments, which gives rise to indeterminate normative standards, thus makes it harder for states to know what conformity is expected and also makes it easier for states to justify noncompliance.109 Conversely, the lack of precision may also result in uncertainty and tension as some states attempt to assert highly restrictive interpretations of ambiguous terms. To avoid these problems, especially in the area of arms control, a nation is likely to “seek to describe the performance expected of the other nation as clearly and precisely as possible in the agreement.”110 Thus, in pursuing major arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, the United States “opted for increasingly detailed agreements, on the ground that they reduce interpretative leeway.”

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