Credibility is irrelevant for global peace.
last line — credibility irrelevant for allied decision-making — if relevant — green
Walt ’22 — Stephen; a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. January 29, 2022; “America Has an Unhealthy Obsession With Credibility”; Foreign Policy; ; //CYang
This rather self-centered view of world affairs conveniently ignores those episodes where it was the United States that acted to disrupt “international peace and stability,” but never mind that for now. If the credibility of U.S. promises is the key to world peace, one wonders why the world didn’t come unglued after the United States lost in Vietnam, after North Korea got away with seizing the USS Pueblo and holding its crew prisoner for almost a year, after the Shah of Iran fell and the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was captured, after the Reagan administration’s hasty withdrawal from Lebanon in 1984, after the Black Hawk Down debacle in Somalia, or after former U.S. President Bill Clinton opted not to intervene in the Rwandan genocide. Maybe U.S. credibility is neither as fragile nor as essential as hard-liners think.
More importantly, this view assumes that security guarantees — in particular, guarantees issued by the United States — are the main ingredient in global peace, leaving little or no role for negotiation, compromise, reassurance, or other diplomatic efforts to give potential rivals less reason to challenge the status quo. It is also worth noting that the positive effects of a successful defense of credibility never seem to last very long: No matter what the United States did the last time it was challenged, it has to respond as soon as a new problem emerges or else its newly won reputation for resolve may shatter like glass.
As you might expect, scholars have explored these issues for years without reaching a clear consensus. Credibility skeptics — such as academics Jonathan Mercer, Ted Hopf, and Daryl Press — argue that concerns about credibility are generally exaggerated, especially when would-be challengers are trying to determine if another state will fight to defend a commitment. They point out that government officials rarely base their estimates of what another state will do on the basis of how that state acted in some unrelated context in the past. Rather, they base them on whether it has interests at stake that are worth defending and the capacity to act effectively. Other scholars have challenged this conclusion, however, arguing that individual leaders acquire reputations for resolve (or weakness) that persist over time and that past behavior can influence how potential challengers gauge a defender’s level of interest in a given commitment. States with good reputations may find it easier to form alliances too. There is also the strong possibility that reputation and credibility are issue-specific: Whether a state lives up to the terms of a trade deal may tell you next to nothing about its reliability as an ally or on an issue like arms control.