Hotlines fail – Pakistan and India prove
Muhammad W. Haider & Tahir M. Azad 8-3-21 Azad: King’s College London Haider: National Defence University Lancaster University [THE ROLE OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE EVOLUTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222] // DHS WAgustin
Pakistan and India have engaged in military and nuclear CBMs on numerous occasions, despite non-cordial relations. The first step in the military CBMs was the establishment of a hotline between the militaries in 1971 following the model of the United States’ and USSR's military communications in the same timeframe (, 87). However, the hotline between the Director Generals of Military Operations of both countries remained symbolic, and no practical advantages were effectively achieved for maintaining peaceful relations. The hotline works well during peacetime while it gets suspended during crises build-ups, rendering it, in essence, useless. The sitting prime ministers of both countries, Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi, signed the next major CBM under the umbrella of the Nuclear Threat Initiatives. This CBM aimed to prevent attacks on each other's nuclear facilities but does not provide any prevention against foreign allies attacking such installations. This measure enabled the exchange of a list of nuclear facilities between both the countries in 1992 (Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan ) which helped to build trust and both the nuclear rivals respected the arrangements during the peace as well as during times of increased crisis. In 1991, Pakistan and India's CBMs progressed further as they signed an agreement for prior notification regarding military exercises and air space violations, especially near the LoC. This set of CBMs opened further channels of communication in the military and diplomatic domains to avoid the repetition of earlier crises but it could not achieve the desired results owing to the non-availability of implementation structures. The next CBM milestone was the 1992 agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons—both countries declared that they do not possess any chemical weapons. However, these CBMs suffered a considerable setback once India declared its chemical weapons arsenal under the Chemical Weapons Convention (). Such incidents created further suspicion between both countries—which were already having problematic relations—and halted the advancement in the process of confidence building. Pakistan considered the incident as a violation of the bilateral agreement which widened the gulf in trust deficit between the two countries. In the wake of this incident, no further progress was achieved until 1999. Later, Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee concluded the Lahore Accord in 1999, which was a milestone agreement for peacebuilding following the nuclear tests in 1998. This agreement incorporated the concept of developing and employing CBMs in both the conventional military and nuclear domains to avoid any untoward nuclear weapons launch situations and to reduce the prospects for future conflicts (). Unfortunately, this set of CBMs was undermined by the Kargil Conflict, which started a few months after the declaration. This time it was the Pakistani side that undermined the peace efforts as political and military leaderships were not on the same page. Here the political leadership tried to put some mechanisms in place for peaceful coexistence, but the military institution spoiled these efforts. This problem necessitates the requirement of structures that can implement and sustain CBMs without significant interference from any state institution, military in particular. From 1999 to 2003, tensions remained high between both the states due to large-scale deployments along the LoC, plus terrorist attacks in Srinagar and on the Indian parliament. The UN General Assembly session of 2003 carved out a route toward a ceasefire and later on to direct negotiations between the political leadership of both countries (, 120–121). A new set of military and nuclear CBMs was then worked upon which included the reduction of troops along the LoC, no further development of military posts, and prior information regarding the testing of ballistic missiles (). The composite dialogue process constituted a major step forward which aimed to resolve the issues between both countries through a strategy that satisfies the demands of both countries (). This dialogue process provided the opportunity to discuss the peace process through a diverse range of domains including the Kashmir issue. However, all these CBMs halted in 2008 () after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai for which India blamed Pakistan. Later, very few efforts were initiated in 2014 and 2015, but those did not work due to pre-existing notions of trust deficit and further accusations of terrorist attacks. The primary issues in the implementation of the military and nuclear CBMs are the non-availability of a framework, transparency issues, and lack of trust. Political aspects will also play a significant role in the success of any military and nuclear CBMs, yet military and security concerns continue to undermine political will between these two states. While Pakistan and India are so-called democratic countries, they do not have liberal democratic structures and the separation of powers remains a contentious issue. Additionally, the policies adopted through CBMs proved to be thoroughly incompatible with follow-up actions because the military and political leadership in both countries remained suspicious of each other. These issues obstructed the implementation of military and nuclear CBMs in both letter and spirit. The recurring crises between Pakistan and India after the Pulwama attacks of 2019 highlight the shortfalls of the concept of nuclear deterrence between both South Asian neighbors. Cyberspace also provides a new domain for waging wars and there are no existing agreements between Pakistan and India in this domain. A cyber-attack may prove disastrous in provoking an unintentional war in the region ().