US says no – it can’t afford to ban Russia from SWIFT – economy shock spills over into the US AND sanctions incite dedollarization
Hirsh Chitkara 22 [Hirsh Chitkara, 2-22-2022, "The US won’t sanction Russia on SWIFT," Protocol, https://www.protocol.com/policy/russia-swift-sanctions-ukraine, smarx, HHW]
“We in Germany are prepared to pay a high price economically — that’s why everything is on the table,” German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said on Friday.
“These are some of the greatest sanctions, if not the strongest that we’ve ever issued,” Vice President Kamala Harris reiterated at the Munich Security Conference over the weekend. “It is directed at institutions — in particular, financial institutions — and individuals, and it will exact absolute harm for the Russian economy.”
Yet for all the aggressive posturing, the U.S. coalition has seemingly backtracked on SWIFT, deciding not to block Russian access to the international payments communication system. Pundits have come to refer to SWIFT sanctions as “the nuclear option.” But some policy experts say this characterization is wildly overstated, arguing instead that SWIFT sanctions wouldn’t be nearly as effective as those directly targeting Russian banks.
So why are sanctions against Russian banks still on the table, while cutting off SWIFT access has been deemed a step too far? There’s a simple answer: Removing Russian access would constitute an economic shock that U.S. politicians and corporations would rather not instigate.
There’s a more complicated and consequential explanation, however, that has to do with anxiety over the U.S. dollar’s status as global reserve currency. SWIFT sanctions, rather than being a “nuclear option” thwarting Russia, could be the first domino in a sequence of events that bolster China- and Russia-backed alternative digital payment systems. Such sanctions might also, in the long run, steer emerging markets toward blockchain-based systems that would reduce global reliance on the U.S.-centric international monetary system. Altogether, SWIFT sanctions could very well incite the dedollarization of the world economy.
Over 11,000 financial institutions spread across more than 200 countries use SWIFT to communicate payments and securities transfers. The system was launched in 1977 by a coalition of banks and headquartered in Belgium, likely in part to convey the “strict neutrality” that SWIFT purports to uphold.
But the vast majority of SWIFT transactions are settled in U.S. dollars, which helps solidify the currency’s status as the global reserve currency. This gives the U.S. tremendous influence over the world economy, allowing the federal government to borrow at discounted rates, rack up national debt that now exceeds $30 trillion and exert influence over foreign nations through punitive monetary policy. Despite the supposed neutrality of SWIFT, the U.S. wielded its influence to boot Iran from the service twice. In both cases, the sanctions had the intended consequence of hamstringing the Iranian economy by limiting international trade.